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SUMMARY
This is the first of four volumes which report the results of a
simulator experiment in which crew performance in a traditional
airline cockpit (McDonnell-Douglas DC-9-30) was compared to that
in an MD-88, a highly automated ("glass cockpit") derivative of
the DC-9 family. In thls experiment volunteer alrllne crews who
were qualified in one of the two aircraft flew a predete.rmined
scenario designed in the same manner as line-oriented fllght
training (LOFT) scenarios employed for training purposes by the
airline.
The purpose of this study was to examine _ointly cockpit
automatlon and social processes. Automatlon was varied by the
choice of two radically different versions of the DC-9 series
aircraft, the traditional DC-9-30, and the glass cockpit
derivative, the MD-88.
The goals of the study were achieved primarily by comparing
various performance measures of the crews in dealing with the
situations introduced by the LOFT, and particularly by examining
the effect of the automation (two models of the same aircraft) on
crew performance, coordination, and communication. The simulator
runs were videotaped and examined in detail. In addition, two
experts, the LOFT instructor, and a line qualified pilot-observer
rated crew _erformance, and the crew rated their own performance
and perceptlon of workload. Errors in procedures were also
recorded, analyzed, and classified as to severity. Attitude
questionnaires were administered to all members of the volunteer
group, those who flew the LOFT as well as those who did not.
Results show that the performance differences between the crews
of the two aircraft were generally small, but where there were
differences, they favored the DC-9. There were no criteria on
which the MD-88 crews performed better than the DC-9 crews.
Furthermore, DC-9 crews rated their own workload as lower than
did the MD-88 pilots. It should be noted that while both groups
were about equal in total flying experience, the DC-9 pilots were
more experienced in type, and it is difficult to separate out the
effects of this factor. There were no significant differences
between the two aircraft types with respect to the severity of
errors committed during the LOFT flight. The attitude
questionnaires provided some interesting insights, but failedto
distinguish between DC-9 and MD-88 pilots.
Further results from this experiment will be reported in
subsequent volumes. A summary of the contents of Volumes II, III
and IV can be found in Appendix 5.
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I • INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND: AUTOMATION, CRM, LOFT, and AQP
This airplane requires constant awareness as to who is doing
what and this is easily broken down. The 757 requires as
much, if not more, crew coordination than other aircraft.
Human nature being what it is, it is very easy for a pilot
(Capt, or F/O) towant to do all the tasks associated with
flylng the aircraft (programming the FMC, selecting
autopilot functions, setting MCP altitude window) by
himself, and not bother the other guy, or get it done faster
than him, or do it just because "I'm the captain and I want
to do it all." The pilot not flying (PNF) rapidly becomes a
non-revenue passenger and either sits back and tunes out, or
the situation becomes a little tense. It's imperative that
this not happen, by stressing coordination durlng uraining.
--- B-757 pilot interviewees (from Wiener, 1989)
Human participation in system operation has always been a mixed
blessing: on the one hand, many systems would never have achieved
operational status without the flexibility and resourcefulness of
human operators (e.g. manned space flight). On the other hand,
errors and inappropriate actions on the part of human operators
have caused untold numbers of incidents and many accidents. Some
of these, such as the collision of two B-747s at Tenerife; the
capsize accident of the ferry Herald of Free Enterprise at
Zeebruge, Belgium; the nuclear accidents a--t--Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl; and the chemical disaster at Bhopal, must be
considered catastrophic. In each there were documented failures
of information flow from machine to human, human to machine, and
most important for this study, human to human.
There are also several parallels between manned space flight and
aviation, and one of them is the relative importance of
technology and human factors. In the early.dais of both fields,
technology was the primary limitation to mlsslon success, and
human factors considerations were minimizedbecause the crew
members exhibited "the right stuff". The right stuff means that
by superior skill, and _erhaps daring, test pilots were able uo
overcome various adversltles. Romantic as it may be, the right
stuff is not an approach to air safety that we would recommend.
The role of human factors was realized in World War II, starting
with the recognition of the importance of the human's physical
interaction wlth the system (e.g., viewing instruments, hearing
alarms, etc.). However, technological and other changes in the
late 1970s highlighted other aspects of human factors which were
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not being addressed by the traditional approaches• Two of these,
the impact of cockpit automation, and crew coordination and
communlcation, are the subject of this study.
From the days of World War II, the human factors considerations
for such systems involved the human's.physical interaction with
the system: viewing instruments, hearlng alarms, reading
instructions, reaching controls, shape codlng to avoid mistaken
actions, etc. Technological and other changes in the late 1970s
highlighted other aspects of human factors which were not being
addressed by the traditlonal approaches. Research directed toward
airline operations in three important areas was initiated at the
NASA Ames Aerospace Human Factors Research Division• The
relationship between these areas is depicted in Figure I-I below•
1. Automation. Wiener and Curry (1980); Boehm-Davis, Curry,
Wiener, and Harrison (1983); Curry (1985); Wiener (1985,
1988, 1989) and others brought awareness of the drawbacks as
well as the benefits of flight-deck automation•
2. Social Processes. Ruffell Smith (1979); Cooper, White, and
Lauber (1979); Foushee and Manos (1981); Foushee (1984); and
Kanki and Foushee (1989) are only a few of the works
describing the importance of social processes (leadership,
communication, crew interaction) in the aviation domain•
• Fati__e. Graeber's research (1988) investigated the effect
fatlgue, shift work, and related factors on subjective
responses and human/system performance.
AUTOMATION CREW COORDINATION
FATIGUE
Figure I-l• Graphic representation of three primary areas of
research into air carrier human factors. The shaded area
represents the study by Foushee, Lauber, Baetge, and Acomb
(1986); the hash-marked area represents the present study•
For the last decade the research programs have concentrated on
studying one of the main variables at a time. The early phases
of these programs were characterized by problem definition, and
all three programs found it difficult to define their problem
even when considering only one factor at a time. By the second
half of the decade of the 1980s the research had matured to the
point where combinations of the main variables could be studied,
and their interactions determined
To date the work of Foushee, Lauber, Baetge, and Acomb (1986) has
been the only investigation to examine two of the factors
simultaneously, cockpit resource management (CRM) and fatigue,
depicted as the shaded area In Figure I-l. The surprising ....
results of this experiment emphasize the importance of crew
coordination rather than fatigue. Th.e present study e.xplores the
two-way intersection between automatlon and crew coorulna_lon.
There has not been, to our knowledge, any investigations of the
intersection of fatigue and automation, although l_ Is generally
presumed that automation reduces fatigue.
Automation
In 1979, as a result of several committee hearings into air
safety which identified automation as a salient, though little
understood area, Congress mandated that NASA study the human
factors issues of cockpit automation. Renwick Curry and Earl
Wiener began their studies at Ames, first attempting to determine
the nature of the problem, and later to_roduce guidelines for
the safe desi_gn, and operation of auuomaKlc equipment. An early
publ_cation (Wlener and Curry, 1980) provided an overview of the
human factors problems, and some rudimentary guidelines. The
following year they began a series of field studies, working with
airlines and crews, examining actual line operations (curry,
1985; Wiener, 1985, 1989).
These field studies have indicated that the basic assumptions
behind automation are subject to question. Very briefly, it
would appear that:
i. Workload is chanqed,.not reduced by the new
equipment, and may slm_ly be relocated in time,
sometimes to the beneflt of safety, sometimes not.
2. Human errors are not eliminated, but their nature may
be changed. In many cases, the errors may be more
critical: that is, automation may eliminate small
errors and create the opportunity for large ones.
3. There are wide differences of opinion about the
usefulness and benefits versus risks of automation in
the minds of line pilots, and therefore wide
differences in patterns of utilization.
It also became clear in NASA's field studies that the type of
equipment on board exerted an influence on crew coordination,
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communication, and resource management. However clear, this
statement is based only upon observations by Curry and Wiener,
not on any empirical investigation. The need to examine nnis
observation empirically led to the present study.
Cockpit Resource Manaqement (CRM)
In the 1970s, following a series of disastrous accidents in which
the failure appeared to be not with individual performance of the
crew members, but with their performance as a team, the worldwide
aviation community began to recognize that a crew must be viewed
more than a group of highly skllled individuals, but as a close-
knit two- or three-person team.
A recent example can be seen in the report of a B-737 which ran
off the end of the runway at Charlotte (National Transportation
Safet_ Board (NTSB), 1987). Such a phenomenon, the lack of crew
coordlnation during an in-flight emergency, had previously been
illustrated in the simulator experiments b_ Ruffell Smith (1979).
In this experiment, airline crews, faced wlth a simulated in-
flight abnormal condition, often did not take advantage of the
resources, human or inanimate, available to them, and as in the
accidents mentioned, failed to work together as a team. Often
the captains did not function in proper leadership roles, and the
junior officers did not perform as effectlve suEoralnaues. Over
the last decade NTSB re_orts have frequently cited poor crew
coordination and communlcation as contributing factors in
aircraft accidents, and they have repeatedly urged the FAA to
require CRM training for pilots (Kayten, In press).
Ruffell Smith's findings led to a new thrust in the study of
flight-deck human factors known as cockpit resource management
(CRM), pioneered by NASA scientists and university grantees
(Foushee and Manos, 1981; Foushee, 1984; Helmreich, Foushee,
Benson, and Russini, 1986). For an overview of CRM research, see
Foushee and Helmreich (1988).
At the same time several airlines and consultants began
developing CRM training programs for crew members, wlth the
intention of schooling them In the art of effective management,
communication, and crew coordination on the flight deck, and
emphasizing te__am performance rather than individual prowess.
Today CRM tralnlng is recognized and encouraged by the FAA, but
is still not an FAR requirement. FAA Advisory Circular 121-51
defines the need for CRM training and provides a theoretical
framework for its development, but stops short of telling the
airlines either that they must provide this training, or how to
do it if.they chose to. The circular wisely notes that the
concept is still in the developmental stage, and more can be
gained by allowing the carriers to develop new concepts, than by
forcing them to follow a government-specifiedprogram.
Most FAR Part 121 airlines in the U.S. now Offer some form of CRM
training, ranging from two or three day courses of intensive
training to an hour or two during recurrent training. Part 135
5
airlines are also now beginning to develop programs. Numerous
commercial vendors have entered the market with CRM curricula and
materials, and several contract flight training centers now offer
CRM programs to their customers.
Advanced Qualification Program (AQP)
While air carriers for the foreseeable future will not be
required to offer CRM training, the emergence of the concept of
Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) will provide a strong
financial and perhaps quality incentive to do so. Under Special
FAR (SFAR)58, which governs AQP requirements, airlines may elect
to present AQP proposals on a fleet-by-fleet basis to the FAA for
approval, or to continue with traditional training as governed by
FAR 121 Appendix E, F and H. The principal difference between
traditional and AQP flight trainin_ lies in the fact that under
AQP, the carrier may train their pilots to a criterion of
proficiency, rather than "filling in the squares" with fixed
hours of practice or numbers of maneuvers. It is the obligation
of the carrier, however, to demonstrate that the criteria have
been met, and this includes CRM proficiency.
Should an airline elect to train under AQP, a strong CRM training
_rogram and self-evaluation will be req_}ired. AQP offers the
incentive of more flexible ground SChOOl anu simulator training,
and more effective utilization of training resources, ho_efully
resulting in a higher quality product at lower cost. Thls alone
will probably accelerate the pace.of development of _ training
and evaluation in the U.S., and slnce much or nne rest or _ne
aviation world usuall[ follows the lead of U.S. in the training
technology, other nations as well.
Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT)
Concurrent with the development of CRMwas the emergence of a
simulator training concept known as Line Oriented Flight Training
(LOFT). (The more general term, Line Operational Simulation
[LOS], is now being used by the FAA. LOFT is considered a sub-
category of LOS). The FAA's view of LOFT is covered in Advisory
Circular 120-35B. A review of LOFT can be found in Orlady and
Foushee, 1987. Wiener (in press) discusses the design of LOFTs
for high technology aircraft.
In traditional flight training conducted in simulators, emphasis
was placed on individual skilled performance, primarily in
handling abnormal situations: e._. the ability to perform
difficult maneuvers and to cope wlth emergencies. While handling
the emergencies clearly required team effort of the crew members,
little emphasis was placed on team functioning, leadership, or
role definition: they were viewed merely as necessary e!ements
in successfully completing required procedures.
The CRM movement was largely responsible for the development of
the LOFT concept. Training specialists came to recognize the
need to emphasize teamwork and leadership concepts by giving the
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crews the opportunity to fly an entire leg which would simulate
as closely as possible the typical airllne mission. Crews would
be evaluated and debriefed not only on maneuver completion, but
also on their ability to work together as a team. Debriefing
with the aid of video tapes recorded during the flight were most
revealing to the crews. Thus CRM and LOFT were complementary
movements in air safety, CRM emphasizing the re.am performance
concept, LOFT offering the opportunity to practlce It.
B. THE RATIONALE FOR THIS STUDY
What the authors asserted in planning th.is research.is that the
modern, high technology ("glass") cockplts may requlre.some
special considerations. The assertion is that the equlpment may
drive a social atmosphere that is dist!nc _ from the tradltlonal -
cock_its, and hence the interaction of automatlon an_ c_ must De
consldered. If this could be demonstrated to.be true, at least a
portion of a CRM trainlng program might be tallored to a generlc
advanced technology cockpit. It should be noted that already
several airlines have added, or are in the process of preparing,
CRM instruction with respect to the high technology aircraft,
either in formal CRM training or in recurrent training.
There is now good reason to believe that automation and social
processes in the cockpit influence each other, in both airline.
and space flight operations. The field stuules my curry _ ;
and Wiener (1985, 1989) on the Impact of automation have revealed
the importance of crew coordination in avoiding many of the . _
"traps" posed by the new equipment. We have no_ea as well nna_ t
traditional role assignments, SUCh as pilot-rlylng vs. pa±u_-nu -
flying, even though spelled out by the airlines' operations
manuals, often break down, particularly under high workload
(Orlady, 1982; Wiener, 1989).
Numerous B-757 pilots commented during interviews and in
questionnaires in Wiener's 1989 study that there is a lack of
obedience to the standardized procedures of "who does what", a
problem usually not present in well-standardized traditional
cockpits. This may not necessaril[ be bad: it could be an
adaptation to the demands of the hlgh technology cockpit, not
anticipated by those who write regulations, procedures, and
checklists, and provide flight training. But for the present, we
must accept the doctrine that adherence to procedures, includ-ing
a strict definition of "who does what", is a maslc rounuatlon or
cockpit safety (Degani and Wiener, 1990).
For example, the field stud_ of B-757 crews at two ma_or_airlines
(Wiener, 1989) tentatively indicates that automatlon in tnese
highly advanced aircraft may impact on crew coordination,
supervision, and CRM in the following ways:
i. Supervision by the captain of the first officer may be more
difficult: at the very least, it may be considerably
different from that found in traditional two-pilot cockpits.
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For example, although standard operating procedure calls for
the captain to revlew information loaded into the control-
display unit (CDU) before it is actually executed, this step
is often ignored in high workload situations. This can
produce two undesired effects: a) insufficient redundant
checking of information to eliminate errors; and b)
insufficient situational awareness on the part of the
captain, possibly resultlng in the captain being "surprised"
(a word often used pilot volunteers in this study) by
maneuvers of the aircraft•
There may be a de facto transfer of authority from the
captain to the ir_rs-_ficer due t 9 the fact. that many of
the first officers are more proriclen_ unan une cap_alns on
the CDUs by which the pilots enter information into the
flight management computers. As some interviewees have
opined, "He who controls the CDU Controls the airplane."
This is not to imply an intentlonal usurpation of authority,
but more likely an unintended by-product of the automated
systems. This is also in part due to an equipment-induced
impairment of the captain's ability to supervlse the flight•
There is often a breakdown in the traditional "who does
what" (standard operating procedures) in the "_lass cockpit"
aircraft, which is computer-induced. Pilots will often do
tasks assigned to the other pilot, usually with his/her.
consent and awareness, for a variety or reasons• wni±e _n_s
may at times be effective cockpit resource management in the
short run, in the long run it can be injurious to
standardization, which is the foundation of safe piloting•
C. OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY
The purpose of this study was to examine jointly cockpit
automation and social processes. Automation was varied by.the
choice of two radically different versions of the DC-9 serles
aircraft, the traditional DC-9-30, and the glass cockpit
derivative, the MD-88. The research design was not intended to
be a competition; it was not a question of which aircraft crews
did "better", but to enable an exaunination of the stren gt.hs and
weakness of the two cockpit technologies in flying identical LOFT
profiles. We felt that such a study is particularly important at
this time for several reasons. .-
I. This work may contribute to the technology base for not only
transport aircraft, but also long duration space station
operation. Many of those experienced in space flight feel
that attention to automation and social processes are the
two most critical requirements for a successful mission.
2. This work may contribute to safer operation of present
aircraft and to design of future aircraft where multi-member
crews use advanced cockpit technology, and may provide data
and examples upon which CRM programs can be tailored to
8
modern aircraft.
•
The advent of AQP, with its heavy emphasis on CRM training
and evaluation, creates a need for a sound foundation for
Droaram design. Since each aircraft type
CRM and LOFT be presented with its own individual proposed(fleet) must
training package, it would seem highly advisable to
determine some of the differences between crew performance
in traditional and high technology cockpits.
Details of the research methodology can be found in the next
chapter, and as well in subsequent volumes in this series (see
Appendix 5).
D. ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
This report is organized in chapters designated by Roman
numerals. Chapters I, II, and III deal with the background,
purpose, and methodology of the study. The results are reported
in Chapters IV and V.
Figures and tables are designated by chapter number (Roman) and
serial order in the chapter (Arabic). Thus Figure III-2 would be
the second figure in Chapter III. The 28 histograms reporting
the data from the Likert attitude scale items carry their own
serial number and thus do not have a figure designation as
described above.
References to other publications cited in thisreport are found
in Chapter VII. We have made no attempt to offer a comprehensive
review of the automation or CRM literature. A recent revlew of
human factors in automation can be found in Wiener (1988), and of
CRM/Crew coordination can be found in Foushee and Helmreich
(1988). For a review of communication in aviation, the reader is
directed to Kanki and Foushee (1989), and Kanki, Greaud, and
Irwin (1989).
Further results of this experiment will be reported in subsequent
volumes, listed below. A brief summary of the contents of
Volumes II, III, and IV can be found in Appendix 5.
EXPECTED
VOLUME PUB. DATE TOPICS
II Early 1992
III Early 1992
IV Mid 1992
Further analysis of errors;
analysis of procedures
Analysis of communications
Summary of first three volumes
9
E. SUMMARY
This chapter outlines the need for a study of the influence of
cockpit automation on crew communication and coordination, and
the @oals of thls study. The motivation for the study was that
automation had observed, but had notprevlous field studies of
experimentall[ validated, the fact that communication patterns in
the modern, hlgh-technology aircraft appeared to be different
than in the traditional cockpits.
Another factor motivating this study was the fact.that research
on the individual toplcs of automation and communlca_lon nau
matured to the point that they might be studied in combination.
Rapid changes are taking place In training technologies and
regulations that might make it advisable to recognize.the.need
for certain differences in training pilots rot communaca_lon ana
coordination in the modern versus tradftional cockpits.
°
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VOLUNTEER PILOT GROUP
A. OVERVIEW
This study was based on data received from pilot volunteers at a
cooperating U.S. airllne. The three sources of information were:
1. Biographical and fl[ing experience data from the one-page
sign-up sheet by whlch the pilots volunteered. Atonal or
84 pilots was recruited by this method. A copy or unls form
can be found in Appendix 3. Two joined the study later.
2. Questionnaires were mailed to 86 volunteers in January 1990.
73 questionnaires were returned. The questionnaire
contained both biographical and flying experlence
information, a 28-1tem attitude scale, and other questions
pertinent to the study. Eight open-ended questions were
also included. A copy of the questionnaire can be found in
Appendix 2.
3. A simulator experiment was conducted during the summer of
1989 in which 24 crews (12 DC-9 and 12 MD-88) flew a
specially designed LOFT mission. Two of the MD-88 runs were
discarded from the data due to instructor error. The LOFT
runs produced a variety of data, including flight evaluation
forms filled out by a special observer, and by the simulator
instructor, self-reports from the _ilots themselves_ and a
variety of measures derived from vlueo capes _aKenuurlng
the flights and analyzed at NASA's Ames Research Center.
These dataare discussed fully in Chapter III and IV. The
rating scales can be found in Appendix 1.
B. RECRUITMENT OF THE VOLUNTEERS
Recruitment Procedures
In preliminary meetings with airline management and the Safety
Committee of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) a recruitment
procedure to obtain DC-9 and MD-88 volunteer pilots was
determined. As a matter of convenience, only pilots from one
base would be used, and the experiment would be open only to line
pilots in those two aircraft. A brochure of the question and
answer format described the purpose and methods of the study to
the _ilots. The final page was the sign-up sheet mentioned
prevlously (Appendix 3). If a _ilot wished to volunteer, he
merely filled out the form, asslgned himself an identification
(ID) code, and mailed the form to the University of Miami.
The list was provided to the airline's simulator dispatch
section, who scheduled the 48 pilots who actually flew the
experimental simulator session. Of the 48 pilots, two were
recruited by the scheduler on his own initiative from sources
other than the original 84 volunteers. These two pilots were
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later sent a copy of the sign-up package, and they returned the
sign-up sheet and from that point on were indistinguishable from
the other volunteers. A copy of the questionnaire (Appendix 2)
was sent to each volunteer.
Schedule compatibility of each pilot was the controlling factor
in crew selection from the volunteer group, as all sessions were
on the volunteer's own time.
The figure below shows the distribution of the 73 pilots_who
returned the questionnaire, by aircraft typeanaseau:_ _'nl_
distribution did not dlffer in any way from _ne uzstrlmu_lo of
volunteers. Several pilots sent back blank questionnaires with
orthe explanation that they were no longer on the DC-9 .MD-88,
even though the cover letter that accompanled the questlonnaire
requested that all volunteers, regardless of their present
aircraft seat, fill it out.
Seat and aircraft type°
MD-88 CAP'[
Figure II-1. Distribution by aircraft seat and ty_e of
the 73 volunteers who returned completed questionnalres.
The questionnaires were sent out during January 1990, following
the completion of the simulator experiment (August 1989).
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Confidentiality
Volunteers were assured of confidentiality by a system of self-
assigned ID codes. The original sign-up sheet contained the
volunteer's name, home address, and telephone number for
administrative purposes, as well as his self-assigned ID code.
No other document contained any identifying information, only the
ID code. The code was entered into a computer database along
with the other information on the sign-up sheet, but has since
been removed, so that no pilot can ever be identified from his ID
code. The simulator flights were identified serially from 1 to
24, and a separate computer file linked the run to the two
pilots' IDs so that a match could be made between LOFT data and
questionnaire data. This file has also been erased.
The LOFT flights were videotaped by two cameras simultaneously.
One camera, already installed in each simulator by the host
airline for thelr LOFT debrieflng pur_?ses_ recorded_a panoramic
view of the cockpit from aft of the pllo_s seats. A secona
camera supplied by NASA recorded a p?rtion of the instrument _--o
panel. Audio was recorded from lapel micropnones worn my _ne uw
pilots, and a third microphone suspended from the ceiling of the
simulator near the instructor's panel.
Standard practice by the host airline was to use their tape fO_ya
debriefing session between the LOFT instructor and the crew.
agreement with ALPA, the tape is erased at the end of the
session. ALPA granted the project team special permission to
keep the recorded video tapes, based on the assurance that they
would be promptly sent from the training center to Ames, and that
no persons other than project staff would be allowed to see the
tapes. Several pilots requested copies of the tapes of their own
fllghts; these requests were denied.
Representativeness of th___eeSample
Experimenters can never be sure of the degree to which a group of
volunteers faithfully represents the population from which they
were drawn. Are people who volunteer for a project, who are
willing to give their time for no direct gain, attitudinally
different from those who do not respond? We are not prepared to
answer this question, for by its very nature, we have no
information about the non-responding group. Nor do we have data
about why the volunteers were willing to do so.
It has been suggested that man_ of our MD-88 pilots may be from
the low end of the seniority dlstribution within their group.
During a brief period in 1989 new aircraft deliveries had slowed,
and a number of newly trained MD-88 pilots were placed on
reserve, and flew very little. Some persons in the training
center suggested that a number of our volunteers came from that
group, and were at least partially motivated by the desire to
practice their skills by flying the "NASA LOFT."
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The same question of representativeness may be asked about those
who returned their questlonnalre versus those who did not...This
is commonly known in samplzng theory as "non-response bias
However, since our response rate was so high (73 out of 86), it
is unlikely that any such bias affects our results.
In summary, we believe that it is safe to assume that the
volunteer gr)up was fairly representative ?f_the DC-?. and MD_8___
pilots exist Lng in 1989, thoug_ lu ma_ well 9e _rue _na_ ±_se ny
volunteer group, they possessed some inurlnslc mo_iva_zon una_ we
would not be able to define.
C. FLYING EXPERIENCE OF THE CREWS
Flvinq Tim___eean__ddExperience in Type
Pilots were asked on their sign-up sheet to state the total
number of flight hours they had accumulated at the host airline
(including second officer time), and the number of months they
had been in type, DC-9/MD-88. The results are displayed below in
Figures II-2 and II-3. The difference between the samples with
respect to total flying hours was not statistically significant.
Totol flight hours
a't time of sign up
ml
¢1000 1000 3000 500<3 7000 gO00 11000 >13000
-29_ +4eg9 -4999 -691HI - ! 09t;9 - ! 2991
HOURS
LEGEND
MO-80
_--I OC-g
Figure II-2. Total flight hours
of volunteers at time of sign-up (n = 83).
From 1989 to the end of 1990, the MD-88 fleet had nearly doubled,
and increased by one-third in 1991. At the time of this writing
(fall 1991) there are 85 MD-88s in the fleet. In contrast, the
DC-9s are scheduled to be retired in 1993. Some have already
been retired.
14
4e"
40.
36,
25
O.
16
IO
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Figure II-3. Number of months in t_pe for
DC-9 and MD-88 pilots at time of slgn-up.
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Figure II-4. Number of hours in type for
DC-9 and MD-88 pilots at time of sign-up.
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These facts, coupled with the fact that for various reasons many
pilots tended to stay on the DC-9 a long time, produced in the
volunteer group large differences in experience. As Table II-i
shows, the MD-88 and DC-9 samples had essentially equal flying
experience, but Figures II-3 and II-4 and Table II-i indicate
that they had less experience in the aircraft. There is a simple
explanation for the months-in-type data: it was almost impossible
for MD-88 pilots to have much experience in type due to the
newness of the plane. The greatest number of months reported by
an MD-88 pilot was 24. For DC-9 pilots, it was 156 months.
Some DC-9 and MD-88 first officers obtained those positions
relatively rapidly, not serving the customary years as se?ond
officers in B-727 and heavier aircraft. At the Kime or une
experiment the airline was enjoying an expanding demand for its
services, and was receiving new aircraft (MD-88, B-757,and 767s).
The pilot work force was expanding rapidly. Also, for a variety
of reasons, including seniority, bases, quality of trips and the
like, many engineers were remaining in their seats, allowing
rapid movement of new pilots into first officer seats.
TABLE II-l. Statistics on total flying hours.
MEAN FLYING EXPERIENCE
OF VOLUNTEERS BY TYPE
TOTAL TIME
('HOURS)
MONTHS
IN TYPE
HOURS
IN TYPE
OC-9
5569
30.4
1697
MD-88
6482
9.5
437
Signif.
Level
ns
.002
.0002
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Miqration Patterns
In order to appreciate the complexities of human factors in
airline o_erations, and to understand the differences between the
two experlmental groups, it is necessary to explore further the
movement of pilots from seat to seat. On the questionnaire
pilots were asked to place a check mark in a matrix of aircraft
type-by-seat indicating each of the seats they had prevlously
held at the host airline. Those data are dis_la_ed in Tables II-
2 through II-5. Likewise they were asked to indlcate the seat
held immediately before the present seat. Those data are
displayed in four tables, II-6 through II-9.
The migration patterns displayed here are fairly typical, with a
few noteworthy exceptions. Both the DC-9 and MD-88 captains
showed the classic patterns, with most having served in the
engineer's seat of the three-pilot jets listed, and a variety of
first officer's seats in 727 and larger aircraft, before making
captain in a lower seniorit_ plane. Of the 39 captains in the
study, fifteen listed experlence in the 757/767 alrcraft prior to
going to the DC-9 or MD-88; eight of the 24 DC-9 captains and
seven of the MD-88 captains.
Among the MD-88 captains, there were nine other captain's seats
listed, most notably five in the DC-9. Why would captains leave
seats in 727s, 737s and DC-9s for an essentially equal seniority
and salary aircraft? The answer probably is that they saw their
future in glass cockpit aircraft, with the next stop being the
757/767, and wished to start their exposure to the new technology
as young captains, rather than waiting in an old technology
cockpit for their chance to bid the 757/767. In contrast none of
the DC-9 captains had previously held a captain's seat.
The first officers likewise showed typical patterns, with most
having served as engineers on 727s. Similar patterns can be seen
in 757 pilots from two other companies (Wiener, 1989). It is
interesting that five of the 16 MD-88 first officers had
previously held that seat in a DC-9. Their motivation to move to
the same seat in the MD-88 was probably similar to that of the
captains mentioned above. Transferring to the right seat of the
MD-88 was essentially a lateral move, but it allowed early entry
into glass cockpit technology. Their next step could be either
the right seat of the 767, or to remain on the MD-88, awaiting
captaincy, and thereafter captaincy of the 767. Both of these
would be easy transitions for a first officer well versed in MD-
88 technology.
The migration patterns seen in the DC-9 and MD-88 pilots at the
host airline were generally typlcal of the inuus_ry for l?w
seniority captains and first officers, with the added feature
that the MD-88 was seen by many to be a "prep school" for a
position on the 767. Likewise, the right seat of the 767 was
viewed by many DC-9 and MD-88 first officers as a logical and
advantageous position to be held prior to transition to captain
on the MD-88.
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TABLE II-2 and II-3.
and first officers.
Seats previously held by DC-9 captains
SEATS PREVIOUSLY HELD:
DC-9 CAPTAINS (n=24)
F/O
21DC-9
MD-88 0 0 xxx
B-737 0 2 xxx
B-757/767 0 8 xxx
B-727 0 17 19
DC-8 0 10 6
L-1011 0 15 14
8/0
xxx
SEATS PREVIOUSLY HELD:
DC-9 FIRST OFFICERS (n=18)
Capt.
0
F/O SlO
OC-9 xxx
MD-88 0 0 xxx
B-737 0 0 xxx
B-757/767 0 0 xxx
B-727 0 0 16
DC-8 0 1 5
L-1011 0 0 1
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TABLE II-4 and II-5.
and first officers.
Seats previously held by MD-88 captains
SEATS
MD-88
PREVIOUSLY HELD:
CAPTAINS (n= 15)
DC-9
CalSt.
5
F/O
12
MD-88 --- 0
B-737 2 1 xxx
B-757/767 0 7 xxx
SlO
xxx
xxx
B-727 2 12 10
DC-8 0 8 9
L-1011 0 7 8
SEATS PREVIOUSLY HELD:
MD-88 FIRST OFFICERS (n=16)
DC-9
MD-88
B-737
B-757/767 0
B-727 0
0
F/O S/O
5 xxx
-_ XXX
1 xxx
1 xxx
0 15
0 1
0 1
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TABLE II-6 and II-7. Last seat held prior to present DC-9 seat.
LAST SEAT PRIOR TO PRESENT:
DC-9 CAPTAINS ('n=24)
F/O
0
8/0
Dc-g xxx
MD-88 0 ,0 xxx
8-737 0 0 xxx
B-757/767 0 xxx
B-727 0 1
DC-8 0 3 0
L-1011 0150
LAST SEAT PRIOR TO PRESENT:
DC-9 FIRST OFFICERS ('n= 18)
F/O
--mm
S/O
XXXDC-9
M0-88 0 0 xxx
B-737 0 0 xxx
B-757/767 0 0 xxx
B-727 0 1 12
DC-8 0 0 4
L=1011 0 0
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TABLE II-8 and II-9. Last seat held prior to present MD-88 seat.
LAST SEAT
MD-88
PRIOR TO PRESENT:
CAPTAINS ('n= 15)
F/O
1
S/O
XXXDc-g
M0-88 --- O" xxx
B-737 1 0 xxx
B-757/767 0 5 xXX
B-727 3 _ 0 0
DC-8 0 0 0
L-1011 40 0
LAST SEAT PRIOR TO PRESENT:
MD-88 FIRST OFFICERS ('n=16)
DC-9
MD-88 0
B-737 0
B-757/767 0
B-727 1
DO-8 0
L-1011 0
F/O SIO
4 xxx
-'- XXX
1 xxx
0 xxx
0 8
0 1
1 .0
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Miqration From the DC-9 and MD-88
During the roughly 14 months between the sign-up of the volunteer
pilots and the returnof the questionnaire, a sizable numb_er of
the pilots left the DC-9 and MD-88 for other alrcraz_. Ten or
the 73 pilots who returned their questionn.air?s indicated such a
move, with only one representing a promouion co captaincy. The
old and new seats held by these i0 pilots at the tlme of the
second questionnaire is summarized zn Table II-10.
TABLE II-10. New seats occupied by pilots who left the DC-9
or MD-88 in the first 14 months of the study.
NEW SEATS OF
HAVE LEFT THE
THOSE WHO
DC-9/MD-88
OLD 8EAT
DC-9 Capt.
DC-9 F/O
MD-88 Capt.
MD-88 F/O
NEW SEATS
727 Capt.
727 F/O
767 F/O (2)
MD-88 Capt.
727 Capt.
DC-9 Capt.
767 Capt.
L-1011 F/O
767 F/O
L-1011 F/O
o
There is no clearly discernible pattern in these movements. Five
of the moves were to _lass cockpit aircraft (four 767, one MD-
88). Furthermore it is difficult to understand some of the moves
without knowing the motivation for the bid. In some cases the
motivation may not have been an advance in equipment
sophistication or salary, but bases or base security. Examples
would be the DC-9 captain or first officer moving to the same
seat on the 727. Although the 727 is a heavier aircraft, the pay
differential is slight. The MD-88 captains who move to the 727
and DC-9 captain seats is somewhat in contradiction to what we
have described as an upward progression through advanced
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technology aircraft. In future questionnaires, we must ask the
volunteers who have moved to state their reasons for the new bid.
D. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Volunteers were asked for information regarding advanced
aircraft, and their ownership of home computers. The exact
wording of the questions can be found in Appendix 2.
The table below speaks for itself. We were interested simply in
knowing what each pilot thought was the most advanced aircraft he
had flown. Note that the questionnaire made no effort to define
"advanced", leaving this to the pilot.
TABLE II-ll. Responses to query about the most advanced aircraft
(in pilot's opinion) he had flown.
WHAT IS THE MOST ADVANCED
AIRCRAFT THAT YOU HAVE FLOWN?
ARGRAFT
DC-9
M0,-88 Rt.OT8
M0-88 21
B-757/767 9
B-727
I
0G-g PILOTS
II
2
1
10
1
DC-8 1
L-1011 1 12
A-310 1
Mil. Transa. 2
12Mil. Fighter
Pilots were also asked to name the aircraft in their company's
fleet that would be their first choice to fl[ if the quality of
trips and salary were the same. Not surprislngly, the majority
of pilots from both fleets chose the 767. What is interesting is
the number of DC-9 pilots (20 per cent) who chose the DC-9.
Another 20 per cent elected the 727 and L-1011. We cannot
explain this result. It was clear throughout the study that the
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DC-9 pilots shared a great sense of loyalty to their aircraft.
But it is somewhat surprising that about 40 per cent chose
aircraft with outdated technology in response to this question.
We can only speculate that among DC-9 pilots there is a group who
are devoted to traditional technology coc_)its, and wish to fly
them as long as they can. Perhaps responalng DC-9 or B-727 was a
wav of exhibitina thelr disdain for the new technologies.
S0*
_D
_z
_SOo
Z
_3
10,
What would be your first choice of
plane to fly in Delta'$ present fleet?
OC-9 B-737 9-787
CHOICE
B-727 L-1011
LEGEND
DC-9
Figure II-5. First choice of aircraft in company's fleet.
Finally, the questionnaire asked the pilots about ownership of
home computers. The data are displa[ed in Tables II-12 and II-
13. These questions were designed slmply to gather normative
data about computer ownership, as this is often stated as one of
the reasons that first officers seem to have an easier time in
glass cockpit ground school than the captains. Prior to this
study we could find no data on computer ownership by pilots. The
assumption has been that more first officers own home computers.
This was not borne out in this survey. Half of the first
officers, about three-quarters of the captains reported owning
home computers. For this sample, the differences between
captains and first officers were not statistically significant.
There also was no significant difference in computer ownership
between DC-9 and MD-88 crews.
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TABLE II-12. Number of captains and first officers reporting
ownership of home computers.
DO YOU OWN A
HOME. COMPUTER?
YES
' 28
Total
NO
CAPTAINS 11
F/Os 17 17 34
45 28 73
TOTAL
39
TABLE II-13. Type of computer owned by crew members.
TYPE OF
TYPE
None
IBM ¢ompat
Maolntosh
Apple II
HOME COMPUTER
CAPTAINS
11
11
4
F/OI
16
9
i,
TOTAL
27
2O
7
11
3Other 3
> 1 computer 1 2 2
Type missing 2 2
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What we failed to ask, however, may have been more important:
who uses the home computer? Aside from the obvious economlc.
advantage of the captains, it is c0nceivable that m?re cap_alns
own computers since DC-9/MD-88 captalns are aDou_ _ne age uo_nave
children in junior hlgh ana nigh SChOOl, ana_we canno_p_u_T_
that the pilot is the user of the home computer. _e _na_ as l_
may, we have failed to show any true differences between captains
and first officers_ let alone link this to success in MD-88
ground school. For now other explanations will have to be
offered for the generally accepted fact that first officers tend
to find ground schools in glass cockpit aircraft less forbidding
than do captains.
/
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III. STUDY METHODOLOGY
A. OVERVIEW
As explained in Chapter I, the fundamental purpo?e of this study
was to determine the influence or cockpit automation on _ne
performance.of fllght crews. The LOFT was designed t 9 exercise
_h. _a-abillties of the crews in a variety or areas, Incluu÷ng
_'[,h_=_u_aance and naviaation, systems management, monitorlng,
and crew coordination. The prlmary independent varaable in the
study was automation, varied by selecting two aircraft of the
same family, the DC-9-30 representing a_low leyel of auto:_tlon,
and its derivative, the MD-88, representing a nlgn _eve±
automation. The LOFT was written in such a way that it did not
favor either aircraft, but should be equally difficult for both.
The data reported here and in future volumes flowed from tw?
sources: 1) the LOFT experiment, and 2) a questionnalre tna_
volunteer pilots filled out regarding their attitude toward
automation, and other aspects of their flying job. The LOFT
flights generated a large amount of data, only a small portion of
which is reported in this volume. The remainder will be reported
in Volumes II and III (see Appendix 5). All of the questionnaire
data are reported in Chapter V of this volume.
B. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN OF LOFT FLIGHTS
In addition to the automation level, a second independent
variable which we had hoped to investigate was who was the pilot
flying (PF) and pilot not flying (PNF) on each flight. The
assignment as to which pilot would be the PF was determined
before the crew arrived, and the experimenter asked the crew
members in each case if they would agree to the assignment, which
they always did. Thus the design consisted of two orthogonal
independent variables, each at two levels, as depicted as a two-
by-two matrix in Figure III-l.
Cap -
F_st Of-fice_
DC-9 MD-88
6 5
6 5
Figure III-i.
Basic experimental design.
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It was our intention to fly six crews in each cell for a total of
24 crews, and this was done, but data from two MD-88 crews had to
be eliminated from the analysis due to departures from the script
by LOFT instructors which invalidated the flight, yielding the
unbalanced design depicted in Figure III-l. Though 24 crews
completed their LOFT flights, two MD-88 crews (#16 and #20) were
discarded from the analysis. In one case, the instructor
inserted the wrong malfunction, then corrected it.after the crew
had detected the fallure. In the other case, _ne ins_ruc_or
forced the crew to attempt to land at their original destination
after the crew decided an approach would not be prudent. This
leaves the design depicted in Figure III-l. In order to control
for unequal sample slzes caused by deleting these two crews, the
regression approach to calculating sums of squares was utilized
in all analyses of variance.
Thus all LOFT data reported here are based on the 22 crews
depicted in Figure III-l. Details of the LOFT scenario are given
below and depicted in Figure III-2.
The choice of the PF/PNF did not turn out to be an effective
variable. There was a point on the LOFT, as the crew began its
descent to a Category II approach to Columbia, at which the
captain had to take over as PF. For economic reasons, due to the
high cost of maintaining training for Category II PF duties,
first officers were not allowed to serve as PF on these
approaches. Following the missed approach, some captains gave
the PF assignment back to the first officer, others did not.
C. LOFT SCENARIO
The LOFT scenario design was a joint effort between the study
team and the company's DC-9 and MD-88 simulator instructors. It
was designed to include periods of high workload, generated by
system failures, deteriorating weather at the destination, and
complex ATC clearances. The flight was based on a regularly
scheduled flight for DC-9s and MD-88s from Atlanta (ATL) to
Columbia, SC (CAE). Due to low ceilings, a Category II approach
was required at Columbia, and this.was acceptable for both DC-9
and MD-88 aircraft at this company
Figure III-2 displays the scenario for the study. The numbers in
the figure correspond to the points that follow. (i) The scenario
flown began at the gate in Atlanta. Weather was fog_y at both
Atlanta and Columbia. As the crew preflighted the a_rcraft, they
had difficulty starting the auxiliary power unit (APU) which
supplies electrical power on the ground or in tne a_r if needed.
The APU would start only after obtaining assistance from a
mechanic. (2) Everything then went normall[ until the crew began
their approach to Columbia. (3) At this polnt, one of the two
constant speed drives (CSD), which transfers power from an engine
to an electrical generator, began to overheat, but the
temperature leveled off In a cautionary (yellow) range, short of
the emergency (red) range. This required that the crew monitor
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AUTOMATION SIMULATION SCENARIO
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the temperature after completing the associated checklist, rather
than disconnect the CSD and its generator, and continue the
approach to Columbia. (4)
The weather was poor at the airport, and the crew ultimately,,h:d
to abandon the approach at a low altitude. Because ano_ner n
radio" aircraft had missed the approach immediately ahead of
them, and could not be contacted by ATC, the crew had. tod_ _ an
unpublished missed approach course to an unpumllsneuno± _ g Lo
pattern. During the mlssed approach, the CSD temperature began u
climb to the red range, and if the crew dld not.detect this
before reaching the holding pattern, the CSD fa_leu, snu_ing
down one of the generators. The missed approach threw the crew
into a very heavy.workload environment. They had to enter and
maintain the holdlng pattern, secure the failed CSD and
generator, talk to the company dispatcher and weather, and choose
an alternate airport (5,6). Additionally, the APU, which would
not start initially at the gate requiring a ma!ntenan? _ call,
would not start at this point either, leavlng them wl_n only one
operating generator.
The crews eventually established themselves in the required..
holding pattern at CAE VOR, and contacted the company dispa_cner.
The dispatcher attempted to persuade the captain to return to
Atlanta, a reasonable demand since Atlanta could provide adequate
passenger convenience and aircraft maintenance for the airline.
However due to the deteriorating weather at Atlanta, most crews
elected to go to Charlotte (CLT), which had clear weather (being
north of the advancing cold front), and was one of the alternates
on the flight plan.
This often was a period of intensive communication between the
crew members, and with the Atlanta dispatcher. Various captains
called dispatch and requested the weather at numerous.neari_
airports. Only one captain had brierea his rlrs_ orrlcer
advance of the approach at Columbia that if the[ had a mlssed
approach they would file to Charlotte, thus maklng the decision
in advance. Those captains who attempted to return to Atlanta
were "forced out" by warnings from ATC of the deteriorating
weather, and likewise for all other airports forward of the cold
front. Although CLT was the obvious alternate, and was on the
flight plan as such, it sometimes took some inveigling on the
part of the LOFT instructor, acting as ATC or Meteorology, to
head the crew there.
D. DATA ACQUISITION
Instrumentation
All of the company's training simulators are equipped with a low
light level video camera, as well as microphones that are worn by
the crew during LOFT exercises. This camera is mounted from the
ceiling of the simulator, behind the pilots at about the position
of the LOFT instructor. It shows a panoramic view of the cockpit
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area, and the backs of the pilots' heads. The recorder is
located outside of the simulator in an equipment bay.
In addition, a NASA video camera was installed in the same
location, recording the central instruments on the captain's
panel. A microphone suspended from the ceiling near th_h e
instructor's station recorded his commentary as well. LOFT
instructor played the role of Maintenance, ATC, Dispatch,
Meteorology, or anyone the pilots would contact by radio. He
also played the role of the maintenance crewman who was sent to
start the APU on the ground in Atlanta. All of this was recorded
on a channel on the NASA video tape. The confidential handling
of the tapes was discussed in the previous chapter.
The tapes were viewed by qualified analysts at NASA Ames. They
constructed a variety of logs of the actions of the crew, the
errors made by the crew, and the verba_ behavior. For purposes
of this volume of the report, the creation of the error database
from the tapes will be covered in the next chapter. More
detailed information on the extraction of data from the tapes
will be found in Volumes II and III.
Observers
Two observers in the simulator rated the performance of the crews
following the flight. One was the company LOFT instructor, who
filled out the usual CRM Evaluation Sheet (see Appendix i). The
LOFT instructor also conducted a post-flight debriefing of the
crew, according to the normal procedure for a company LOFT. The
company's video tape was used, and self-critique by the crew,
rather than that of the instructor, was encouraged.
The other was the "NASA observer", a highly qualified company
captain on medical leave, who was retained for this purpose. He
had served as a line pilot and instructor on the DC-9, a line
captain on the B-767, and at our request attended ground school
on the MD-88. During the flight he took notes and filled out the
Detailed Rating Form. Following the flight he filled out the
Overall Rating Form, which can be seen in Appendix i, and wrote a
free text summary of the flight, detailing the strong and weak
points of each crew's performance. These were used for the
determination of the "most serious error" which will be discussed
in the next chapter.
At least one member of the NASA study team was present for each
run. He greeted the pilots when they reported, attempted to set
them at ease and emphasized that they should regard this as a
normal company LOFT, and reiterated the confidentiality
agreement. No volunteers expressed any concern about
confidentiality. During each flight the study team member
monitored the recorders, and observed the flight via the two
video terminals outside the simulator cab. He also attended the
post-flight debriefing, but did not provide an[ ratings or data.
Following the debriefln_, the experimenter agaln thanked the
pilots and answered thelr questions, without revealing the full
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purpose of the experiment, and asked them not to discuss the LOFT
scenario with other pilots. We found no reason to believe that
any crews arrived with prior information about the LOFT.
Ratinq Forms
Four rating forms were used in each flight. These can be found
in Appendix I. The data derived from these forms will be
discussed in the next chapter.
.
.
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Each pilot independently filled out the Participant Survey,
which was essentially a self-report on the workload and
demands of the LOFT. This form is derived from the NASA
Task Load Index (TLX) developed by Sandra Hart of NASA Ames
(Hart and Staveland, 1988).
Overall Rating Form (one page) and a Detailed Rating Form
(two pages).were filled out by the NASA observer. The
Overall Ratlng form stressed crew communications, decision-
making, management and coordination. These were essentially
global scales of crew behavior, not related to particular
duties or phases of flight. This form was derived from
earlier work by Helmreich and Wilhelm (1987).
The Detailed Rating Form covered each step of the flight and
each duty of the crew and each phase of flight, from
_restart to approach and landing. This form was first used
in a simulator study by Foushee, Lauber, Baetge, and Acomb
(1986).
Finally, the company LOFT_instructor made his evaluation on
a 17-item five-point scale, ranging from "Poor" to
"Excellent", Wlth "Normal" in the mlddle. This form was an
adaptation by the company of the Line/LOFT form developed by
Helmreich and Wilhelm at the University of Texas, and used
by numerous airlines world-wide.
Questionnaire
An extensive questionnaire was mailed to the volunteers in
January 1990, several months after the completion of the LOFT
experiment. The questionnaire, which is duplicated in Appendix
2, contained certain biographical questions on flying experience
with respect to total hours and hours in type, types of
approaches flown in their current type, a 28-item Like rt. attitu}e
scale with probes regarding flying, safety, and automa_lon, elgn_
open-ended questions, and several miscellaneous questions.
Results of the questionnaires are given in Chapter V, and
elsewhere in this volume in graphic form.
33
IV. RESULTS OF SIMULATION EXPERIMENT
A. OVERVIEW
In this chapter we shall discuss the results of the simulator
experiment, in which various measures of performance were
recorded or derived. These included self-assessed measures of
workload by the pilots; observer and instructor ratings of crew
performance on the LOFT; and analyses of.two independent sets of
ratangs by expert observers of the severlty of crew errors during
the LOFT. Additional analyses of crew errors will be found In
Volume II.
B. ASSESSMENT FORMS
Measures of subjective workload and performance effectiveness
were assessed on several forms that had been used before in NASA
simulation experiments. Each of the forms used in this study is
reproduced in Appendix i. We will discuss them in the order that
they appear in the appendix.
Pilot Self-Assessment of Workload
Each pilot assessed his own workload subjectively at the end of
e flight using the ,,Participant Survey", an unweighted versionthe NASA Task Load Index (Hart and Stavelanu, 1988). This
rating form consists of six workload-related dimensions: mental
demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort,
and frustration. Pilots reported their responses along.a.seven-
_oint Likert scale ("Low" to "High") with high numbers inalca_Ing
greater amounts of the dimension in question, e.g., a rating of
"7" on, for example, Item No. 2, would represent a maximal self-
rating of mental demand, etc.
Hart and Staveland (1988) advocate the completion of a scale-
weighting procedure wherein respondents evaluate the importance
of each dimension to their perception of workload in the
performance setting. However, in another full-mission simulation
study, Chidester, Kanki, Foushee, Dickinson, and Bowles (1990)
reported that a simple summed composite of the six items
correlated .92 with the weighted scale scores. As a result, the
procedure typically used to weight individual items of the TLX
was eliminated and only the summed rating will be reported. In
summary, each pilot circled a numeral from 1 to 7 representing
his self-assessed value for each of the six dimensions (mental
demand, etc.). These were summed to produce a mean for each
dimension.
NASA Observer's Assessments of Performance
The NASA observer was present in the simulator cab with every
crew, and evaluated crew performance following completion of each
flight segment using: I. the "Overall Rating Form", and 2)
individual performance during specific phases of the segment,
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using the "Detailed Rating Form."
Overall ratinq form (crew performance)
This form was adapted directly from Helmreich and Wilhelm's
(1987) Line/LOFT Checklist, which was, in turn, derived from
previous NASA simulation studies. The observer was instructed to
complete the form evaluating the crew asa.unit,.n?t_a_stwo _
indlvidual pilots. Ratings were made on flve-poln_ LIKeE_ sca±es
and were intended to assess the expert observer's overall
impression of performance on each dimension. Sixteen of the 21
items on this form were analyzed. The selection of these items
was consistent with the Chidester, et al. (1990) study, in which
a factor analysis suggested these 16 items represented a common
dimension. The remalning five items were excluded from the
analysis. The numbers of the deleted items are circled in
Appendix i.
These ratings were summed and averaged to form a crew-level
composite for the flight. This means that for each crew a single
number was derived that represented the NASA observer'_opinion
of the quality of the crew's performance. The new scale had a
range from 1 to 5.
The internal consistency of this scale as assessed by the
coefficient alpha was .96. This indicated a high degree of
internal consistency within the scale. Items composing this scale
can be found in Table IV-I and the form i_selr in Appenalx ±.
The scale will be referred to as "observer ratings of crew
performance."
Detailed ratinq form (individual _ performance)
This form was adapted from Foushee, Lauber, Baetge, and Acomb
(1986). Within each section of the form (preflight, taxi/take-
off, climb, cruise, etc.) the observer rated the performance of
both individual crew members. Ratings were on a 5-point Likert
scale.
LOFT Instructor's Assessment of Performance
At the end of the LOFT session, the compan_ simulator instructor
filled out the "CRM Evaluation Sheet." Thls was the only
assessment made by the LOFT instructor.
From the 15 items contained in this scale, 12 items were selected
(see Appendix i); they are displayed in Table IV-5. These 12
items were selected from the 15 based upon a simple correlational
analysis which revealed 12 of the items to be highly correlated.
The remaining three items were dropped from analysis. Three
measures were calculated based on the 12 items, and these will
require some explanation.
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Summary of Ratinq Forms
The four rating forms that were employed during and after the
LOFT flights are summarized below. Only the Detailed Rating Form
was filled out during flight; the rest were completed during the
flight.
Form
Participant Survey
Overall Rating Form
Detailed Rating Form
CRM Evaluation Sheet
Filled out by
Each pilot
NASA observer
NASA observer
LOFT instructor
C. SELF-ASSESSMENT OF SUBJECTIVE WORKLOAD
Method
Following the flight, all crew members completed the Participant
Survey (Appendix 1) derived from the NASA Task Load Index (TLX)
(Hart and Staveland, 1988).
Self-assessment scores were analyzed by castin_ the data into a
2-by-2 (aircraft type-by-seat) analysis of varlance (ANOVA).
This allowed statistical assessment of the influence of cockpit
technology (DC-9 vs. MD-88), duty assignment (captain vs. first
officer), and the interactions (non-additive combined effects) of
these two variables. The role of PF versus PNF was not examined.
Results
The total composite score, a global measure of workload described
in the previous section, the contrast between the two aircraft
was significant at the .051 level (F (1,20) = 4.30). The other
main effect (seat) and the two-way interaction were non-
significant. To examine further the main effect of aircraft type
(automation), the results from the captains and the first
officers were analyzed separately by t-tests for two independent
groups (DC-9 vs. MD-88). The results for the captains were non-
signlficant, however for the first officers the difference
between the mean composite workload ratings for the two aircraft
were statistically significant, indicating that MD-88 first
officers attributed a higher workload to their cockpit duties
than those assigned to the DC-9s.
The mean workload score for MD-88 F/Os was 30.50, for DC-9 F/Os
was 26.67. The mean composite scores for the four combinatlons
of aircraft and duty posltion ("seat") are displayed below.
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Figure IV-I. Mean composite self-assessed workload
scores alrcraft type and Seat.
Each of the six individual items that made up the composite score
of the self-assessment form was also subjected to ANOVAs of the
same design (type-by-seat). Of the six, two resulted in
significant results in the contrast of aircraft type: Physical
Demand (Item No. 3) and Frustration Level (Item No. 7). In both
cases, the means were higher for MD-88 crews than for DC-9 crews,
meaning that MD-88 pilots perceived their jobs as being more
physically demanding, and more frustrating. The means for the
four groups on these sub-scales are displayed in Figure IV-2.
In none of the six ANOVAs was the seat assignment, or the
interaction of seat and aircraft type statistically significant.
However, additional t-tests were run separately on the captains
and first officers, testin_ MD-88 crews' rating against DC-9
crews. These showed that In the two significant scales, for the
first officers, Physical Demand was viewed as significantly
higher for MD-88 crews compared to DC-9 crews, but for captains
there was no significant dlfference. The Frustration Level
ratings were significantly higher for both crew members In the
MD-88 compared to the DC-9 (see Figure IV-2). The differences
between the mean ratings were similar: t =..2.11 for captains,
and t = 2.19 for F/Os.
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Figure IV-2. Mean scores on the Physical Demands and
Frustration sub-scales by aircraft type and seat.
D. NASA OBSERVER'S RATINGS
Overall Ratinq Form (Crew Performance)
Method
The NASA observer completed an overall rating form after the
flight (see Appendix I). This form was developed from the
University of Texas Line/LOFT form in use at many airlines.
Results
The mean composite rating for the two types of aircraft was
computed. For the 12 DC-9 crews the mean was 3.43, and for the
10 MD-88 crews it was 2.91 (hi_her ratings represented more
satisfactor_ performance). Thls differencewas analyzed b_ the
t-test for independent groups, and was found to be statistlcally
significant (t = -2.40, p < .05). Thus in the eyes of the NASA
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observer, on a global measure of crew performance, DC-9 crews
performed their duties on the LOFT more proficiently than the MD-
88 crews, though the absolute difference was small (17 per cent).
TABLE IV-I. Sixteen items on Overall Rating Form administered
by NASA observer. Note that these 16 items are taken from an
original list of 21 items.
CREW COMMUNICATIONS AND DECISION MAKING
le
Communications were thorough, addressing coordination,
planning,and problems anticipated.
2. Open communications were established among crew members.
3. Timing of communications was proper.
5. Active participation in decision making process was
encouraged and practiced.
6. Alternatives were weighed before decisions were make final.
INTERPERSONAL (MANAGEMENT) STYLES AND ACTIONS
8. Crew members showed concern with accomplishment of all
tasks at hand.
9. Crew members showed concern for the quality of interpersonal
relationships in the cockpit.
WORKLOAD AND PLANNING
ii. Work overloads were reported and work prioritized or
redistributed.
12. Crew members planned ahead for high workload situations.
13. Appropriate resources were used in planning.
CREW ATMOSPHERE AND COORDINATION
14. Overall vigilance
15. Interpersonal climate
16. Preparation and planning
17. Distractions avoided or prioritized
18. Workload distributed and communicated
21. OveraLl crew effectiveness
/,
39
Detailed Rating Form (Individual Pilot Performance)
Method
During the flight the NASA observer completed a second rating
form that evaluated performance during each phase of flight (see
Appendix i), the Detailed Rating Form. This form was adapted from
Foushee, Lauber, Baetge, and Acomb (1986). Within each section of
the form (preflight, taxi/takeoff, climb., cruise, etc.), the
observer rated the performance of each Individual crew member.
Ratings were completed using a five-point Likert scale and were
summed and averaged toform a composite for each crew member
during each phase of flight. Items forming this scale can be
found on the Detailed Rating Form in.Appendix I, and will be
referred to as "observer ratings of Indlvidual phase
performance."
Results
The two-page Detailed Rating Form can be found in Appendix i.
During the flight the NASA observer completed this form,
evaluating performance during each phase of flight. These were
summed across phases, separately for two conditions, Normal and
Abnormal. The first Normal phase began initiation of the LOFT on
the ground at Atlanta and continued until the generator CSD hign
temperature warning light illuminated on the initial approach to
Columbia, marking the beginning of the Abnormal phase. The
Abnormal phase ended when the crew began its approach to
Charlotte, marking the beginning of a second Normal phase.
The data were again aggregated across crew members, since we had
abandoned the original plan of analyzing PF/PNF differences for
the reasons stated in Chapter III. Also we learned that it was
impractical to distinguish between captain and first officer
proficiency, as their performance as a two-pilot crew was so
highly interdependent. The ratings by the NASA observer are
summarized in Table IV-3. The overall means, summed over the
four phases of flight, are displayed in Table IV-2.
TABLE IV-2. Mean proficiency ratings by NASA
observer by phases of flight.
Abnormal Normal • N
MD-88 2.90 2.96
DC-9 3.23 3.10
I0
12
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The only statistically significant difference found in these
analyses was in the overall performance measure. Here th? .
performance of the DC-9 crews was again signiflcantly me_er tnan
the MD-88 crews (F(I,20) = 4.75, p < .05). However the
differences were slight, the ratings of the DC-9 crews being only
about seven per cent higher th.an the MD-88 crews. These =inalngs
were consistent with the prevlous data showing small, though
statistically significant, differences favoring DC-9 crews.
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TABLE IV-3. Mean proficiency ratings by NASA observer by phase
of flight. Larger numbers represent more proficient performance.
Mean S.D_____.
MD-88
CC N 3.02 .15
CC A 3.07 .46
SIT N 2.97 .16
SIT A 2.95 .47
PRO N 2.91 .14
PRO A 2.75 .33
OVRN 2.96 .I0
OVRA 2.90 .22
DC-9
CC N 3.22 .59
CC A 3.36 .63
SIT N 3.13 .16
SIT A 3.19 °60
PRO N 3.09 .24
PRO A 3.04 .48
OVR N 3.10 .20
OVR A 3.24 .47
CODES
N = Normal phases; A = Abnormal phase
CC = Crew coordination/communication
SIT = Planning and situational awareness
PRO = Procedures/checklists/callouts
OVR = Overall performance and execution
Sample size is i0 for MD-88 crews, and 12 for DC-9 crews except
in the CC-N where some data from one MD-88 crew was lost.
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E. LOFT INSTRUCTORS ' RATINGS
Method
One additional performance rating was completed by the simulator
instructor. This utilized the LINE/LOFT checklist (referred_to as
a "CRM Evaluation Sheet" at the host airllne, see A_p?nulx ij.
This f?rm is currently being employed through the alrlan?_s
particlpation in the NASA/University of Texas c_ evaluation.
There are some ambiguities in these data that can be attributed
to the fact that we had a constantly changing instructor force,
particularly in the MD-88. Ideally, for experimental purposes,
we would have preferred to have had one instructor-evaluator for
the entire experiment; the next best thing would be one DC-9 and
one MD-88 instructor conduct all of the LOFTs. Neither of these
was attainable for practical reasons.
On the DC-9 side, two instructors ran all of the LOFTS; however
on the MD-88 side, there were many instructors, and some observed
only one or two crews. As a result, comparisons across observers
were difficult. Each rating may contain uncontrolled random
variation which cannot be expected to sum to zero.
We made two attempts to "equilibrate" the instructors
statistically. From the company's training records, we obtained
each observer's average and standard deviation for crews observed
in the CRM evaluation database. Based on those figures, we
sought to standardize the present crew ratings.
The following statistical adjustments could be made:
I. We could analyze the uncorrected average of the 12 items.
i_ We could compute a "deviation score", the scale value minusaverage rating each observer had given all company crews.ne
observed and rated prior to the experlment. Thls wou±a In
effect "calibrate" the ratings each instructor gave our crews by
"unbiasing", adjusting for hls tendency to give high or low
ratings in the past. This would yield for each measure a simple
score adjusted for the instructor's bias.
3. We could create a "standard score" by taking the adjusted
simple score (No. 2 above) and dividing by the standard deviation
of all ratings the observer has given for company crews (a
standardized score). This would adjust not only for each
instructor's bias, but for his variability as well.
The simple score is just another overall rating. Deviation and
standardized scores compare each observed crew to all others an
instructor has observed and give us an idea whether he felt that
each observed crew was better, the same, or poorer than the crews
previously observed in LOFT. Thus the adjusted scores computed
from the CRM Evaluation Sheets from our experiment would be
directly comparable to regular company line crews who had been
rated on the same form.
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Results
The three indices of instructor ratings were highly correlated:
the correlation coefficients are displayed in Table IV-4.
Also, the correlation between the instructor's rating (CRM
Evaluation Sheet) and the expert observer's rating (Overall
Rating Form) can be assessed. High correlations between the
instructor and the observer would be the closest we can get to
inter-rater reliability. Instructor simple scores correlated .80
with the expert observer's ratings, whale deviation scores
correlated .43 and standardized .49. The simple score correlation
is impressive, and suggests substantial agreement between the two
evaluators of each crew.
Each of the indices was submitted to analysis of variance. No
contrasts were statistically significant. In brief, we could
find no differences between the crews of DC-9s and MD-88s with
respect to the LOFT instructors' ratings. The simple score came
closest to discriminating the MD-88 and DC-9 (F (1,18)=2.12,
p=.167). The means are displayed in Table IV-6 below. None of
the differences was significant.
TABLE IV-4. Intercorrelations between simple scores
and two adjusted scores on CRM form.
Simple
Deviation
Simple Deviation Standard
.65 .71
°95
We should note two things concerning these data. First, simple
scores approximate what was seen by the expert observer, but the
effect (if any) was too small to be detected by our design.
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TABLE IV-5. Twelve items (out of original 17) rated
on LOFT form by the simulator instructor.
Briefing thorough, established open communications, addresses
coordination, planning, team creation, and anticipates problems
Communications timely, relevant, complete, and verified
Inquiry/questioning practiced
Assertion/advocacy practiced
Decisions communicated
Crew self-critique of decisions and actions
Concern for accomplishment of tasks at hand
Interpersonal relationships/group climate
Preparation and planning for in-flight activities
Distractions avoided or prioritized
Workload distributed and communicated
Overall crew effectiveness
Table IV-6. Means for original and adjusted
LOFT instructors' ratings.
MD-88 DC-9
Simple 3.163 3.47
Deviation -.08 -.13
Standard -.Ii -.42
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Second, on the average, crews in this study were rated as
performing less well than those, crews that the.instructor had
seen in other company LOFT's. Tnls secona rlnalng is not easy to
interpret. It could mean simply that our scenario was more
difficult than those typically used in the company's LOFT
sessions, which was probably the case. Comments made by both the
instructors and the volunteer pilots indicated that this LOFT
scenario was considered quite difficult compared to other LOFTs
which the company employed.
In summary, even with the statistical adjustments we made in
order to attempt to compensate for the fact that we had a number
of instructors rating the LOFT performance on the CRM form, we
did not find differences in these ratings attributable to cockpit
technology (DC-9 vs. MD-88). More will be said of this in
Volumes II and III of this report, which will analyze the
communication between crew members in the two aircraft.
F. ANALYSIS OF CREW ERRORS
In this section we present data from two analyses of crew errors:
1) ratings based on direct observation of the crews during the
LOFTs by the NASA observer; and 2) analyses of the video tapes of
each LOFT performed at NASA Ames by two qualified pilots who were
trained to rate the error data.
NASA Observer's Ratings - Mos____tSerious Error of Eac___hhFlight
Method
During the actual LOFTs the NASA observer kept a log of errors
that he had observed during the flight. He did not rate or
classify these errors at the time. When all of the flights were
completed, we asked the NASA observer to determine for each
flight the most serious error committed. When he had done this
for the 22 successful flights, we asked him to then rank order
the 22 "most serious errors" from the least serious (rank 1) to
the most (rank 22). Thus he produced a rank-ordered list of the
most serious errors from merged data of the two aircraft. We
then analyzed these data using rank statistics for two
independent groups (White rank sum test).
Results
Our directional experimental hypothesis.was that the MD-88 crews
would commit errors which were more serlous than those produced
by the DC-9 crews. This was based on the observation by Wiener
and Curry (1980) and Wiener (1988) that one of the effects of
cockpit automation appeared to be that crews committed fewer but
more serious errors. If this were the case, then the larger
ranks would tend to be assigned to the i0 MD-88 flights and
smaller ranks would go to the 12 DC-9 flights. The mean rank of
the errors of the 12 DC-9 and i0 MD-88 "most serious errors per
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flight" should be different, namely that the mean of MD-88 ranks
should be larger, if the hypothesis were correct.
In fact this was not the case. The ranks of the most serious
errors were almost perfectly intermixed, yielding a Z of 0.20.
Thus our hypothesis was not supported: the crews of--the two
aircraft types produced most serious errors of equal magnitude.
Video TaDeAnalysis of Errors - Cateqories of Seriousness
of the Error
Method
Videotapes recorded during the experimental LOFT sessions were
sent to NASA-Ames Research Center for analysis. At Ames, error
analyses were undertaken employing a complete review of the
videotape records. Using these records, two highly qualified
observers reviewed each flight for operational errors. Both
observers were recently retired pilots. One retired from an
airline with substantial experience line flying and instructing
in the B-767. The other retired from the military and had served
as an observer in _revious NASA investigations: Both observers
studied the host alrlines's DC-9 and MD-88 tralnlng anu rllgnu
operations manuals prior to initiating error identification.
The observers worked together to review videotapes of each
performance. When an error was recognized by one or bot _
observers, the ta_e was stopped and the segment contalnlng an
alleged error revlewed. After this process, both omservers had to
agree that an error had occurred and had to agree on a
description of the error or it was not counted in the analysis.
This was a conservative error tabulation process that ensured
that every error data point was reviewed at least twice. Since
some performance errors were more operationally significant than
others, errors were categorized according to level of severity.
This process was accomplished by both of the observers involved
in the videotape error analysis
Error classifications
A three-level classification, based on previous work by Foushee
et al. (1986) was utilized. The three levels of error severity
and their operational importance is listed in below.
Type 1 - minor, with a low probability of serious flight
safety consequences.
Type 2 - moderately severe, with a stronger potential for
flight safety consequences.
Type 3 - major, operationally significant errors having a
potentially negative impact upon flight safety.
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Examples of .T_pe 1 errors included: unnecessary interruption of a
normal checkllst, incorrect clearance readbacks that were quick±y
corrected, and missing an item required during the takeoff
briefing.
Examples of Type 2 errors included: failure to complete a normal
checklist not accompanied by significant missed items, and
fallure to check in wlth the tower in a tlmely manner as
instructed by approach control.
Examples of Type 3 errors included: troubleshooting a significant
system failure (CSD) without using th.e written procedure_ turning
the wrong direction (reciprocal headlng) on exiting holdlng, anu
either disconnecting the CSD before it was required or failing to
monitor CSD temperature allowing overheating to shear its shaft.
Results
A total of 273 errors were identified by the video observers
across the 22 crews. A consensus was reached by the two observers
on the severity classification of each error. They replayed the
tapes until they could agree on the severity. If they could not
agree, the less severe rating was adopted. A tally of these
errors by phase of flight (normal vs. abnormal) summed across the
two aircraft t_rpes is displayed in Table IV-7. The same data by
phase and by alrcraft type are shown graphically in Figure IV-3.
The means, broken down by aircraft type, are displayed in Table
IV=9. It is clear from the data displayed in Table IV-7 that the
most severe errors (Type 3) prevall in the abnormal phases of the
LOFT flight.
TABLE IV-7. Error frequencies by normal and abnormal phases
of flight, summed across two aircraft types.
Normal Abnormal Total
Type 1 16 13 29
Type 2 51 95 146
Type 3 ii 87 98
Total 78 195 273
Error frequencies were correlated with evaluations of performance
by the ex'_ez°c observer and by "simulator instructors, as
summarized in Table IV-8. Those which were significant were
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negative, indicating that instructor ratings showed an inverse
relationship to errors, as one would expect. An absolute value of
r greater than .243 indicates significance at the .05 level (two-
Tailed).
TABLE IV-8. Correlations between errors and observers' ratings.
Error type Total 1 2 3
NASA observer
LOFT instructor
-.45 .18 -.29 -.62
-.46 .04 -.38 -.46
With the exception of minor (Type 1) errors, high error
frequencies were associated with poor performance ratings.
However, when submitted to anal[ses of variance, total error
frequencies did not reveal signlficant effects for aircraft type.
The data in the table reveal only minor differences between
aircraft type in severity of errors. Based on an ANOVA, there
were no differences between the DC-9 and MD-88 with respect to
severity of errors in any category. This is consistent with the
data produced from the examlnation of "most serious errors" by
the NASA observer. Though none of these comparisons was
significant, they do tend to show MD-88 crews making more errors
than DC-9 crews overall. A case can be made that in the glass
cockpit MD-88 there is simply more to do, and more errors can be
made (e.g. attempting to reprogram the FMS while on the glide
slope at low altitude). Volume II will discuss the nature of the
errors in the two cockpits. Our sample size is not sufficient to
detect effects of this magnitude. We can only conclude that we
have failed to produce evldence to support the hypothesis that
more severe errors are made in highly automated cockpits.
Errors b___phases of flight
As a follow-up to these overall analyses, error frequencies were
broken down by phase of flight, to determine whether significant
differences between aircraft might occur during some periods.
Each tape was coded to identify elght phases: pre-takeoff, climb,
cruise, descent, CSD overheat and procedure Completion, approach
to CAE (including missed approach and holding), diversion, and
approach to CLT. As might be expected, errors were very closely
associated with the abnormal phases of flight.
Of the 273 total errors identified, only 78 (29%) occurred during
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normal flight (though these periods averaged approximately 50% of
the total LOFT time) as previously defined as the_period from0 _L
initial cockpit activities in Atlanta up co _ne CSD ral±ure llgn_
appearance at cruise between Atlanta and Columbias and the period
during the approach and landing at Charlotte. The means of the
errors by error type (severity), phase of flight, and aircraft
type are shown in Table IV-9, and Figure IV-3.
TABLE IV-9. Mean frequency of errors by error type (severity),
flight phase (normal vs. abnormal, and aircraft type_;
ERROR TYPE
1 2 3
DC-9
Normal 0.92 1.83 0.33
Abnormal 0.67 4.50 4.33
MD-88
Normal 0.56 3.22 0.78
Abnormal 0.56 4.56 8°89
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Figure IV-3. Operational errors by aircraft type, phase
of flight, Normal (N) vs. Abnormal (A), and severity.
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In order to ascertain what portion of the flights was spent in
the normal and abnormal phases (as defined above), the time was
computed from the video tapes for each flight, and the means were
determined. These means are shown in Table IV-10. An analysis
of variance.was performed ?n these data with. aircraft t y_e and
phase as maln effects. Nelther was s_a_is_ically slgnlrlcan_.
The mean t_me in the normal versus abnormal phases of flight were
virtually identical. Although the mean time in both phases was
slightly higher for MD-88 crews, this difference was not
slgnificant. The interaction term was also non-significant.
Since the times spent in the normal versus abnormal phases were
so nearly equal, the frequencies of errors can be viewed as error
rates. One may convert these to mean errors per minute b_
dividing by the appropriate mean time (approxlmately 40 minutes).
TABLE IV-10. Mean time in normal versus abnormal phases
of flight by aircraft type (in minutes).
PHASE OF FLIGHT
Normal Abnormal
DC-9 39.8 39.9
MD-88 43.7 42.0
Overall 41.5 40.9
Follow-up analyses were overall something of a disappointment. We
had hoped that they would clarify the performance.ratings by
isolating where errors were more likely to occur In each alr-
craft. It appears either that these differences are very slight,
or that the effects are so small that our design cannot detect
them. In-depth analyses of the error data will be presented in
Volume II of this report.
The question remains whether the error data supports confidence
in the observer ratings and self-reports of crew w?rkload. Err?r
frequencies.reported here are highly correlatea wi= 9 inaepenaenu
ratings, which would tend to bolster observer validlty,.but they
do not appear to provide independent evidence of o_eratlonally
significant problems in the MD-88. This wlll be dlscusseu
further in Chapter VI.
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G. SUMMARYOF LOFT DATA
The preponderance of data presented in this chapter points toward
a conslstent, but slight, superlorlty of the DC-9 performance
over the MD-88. In the areas of self-report of workload, the MD-
88 crews saw their workload as higher than did the DC-9 pilots,
but again the differences were small. The ratings by the NASA
observer and the LOFT instructor tend to favor the performance of
the DC-9 crews, but again the differences were very slight.
ii!
Considering the fact that the experience level in type was much _
higher in the DC-9 than the MD-88 crews (see Chapter II), the
on which thepicture is even less clear. There were no measures
MD-88 crews were seen to perform in a manner superior to the DC-9
pilots, but the time-in-type factor cannot be ignored, i_ne way
to look at the data is to say that the automatlon maue
possible for the MD-88 crews to compensate for their lack of
experlence in type.
As a way of estimating the importance of time in type, taking the
DC-9 and MD-88s separately, we correlated the months-in-type with
a variety of performance measures: overall performance rating,
Type i, 2, and 3 errors, captains' and first officers' assessment
of total workload, and captains' and first officers' assessment
of frustration and physical demand. No significant correlations
were found. Thus we cannot say that, at least within fleets, the
experience level in type affects any of our performance measures,
and by inference, the differences between DC-9 and MD-88 tlme-ln-
type figures may not be important.
Another interpretation would ask why it is that the crews of a
technologically superior aircraft could not do better, compared
to those flying a 1965-era cockpit technology? Still another
interpretation would be to say that crew experience we saw in
this experiment was not an artificial experimental factor, but a
representation of the "real world" of line flying; that for at
least a few years to come, at most airlines world-wide will
continue to consist of a large group of pilots highly experienced
in type in technologically unsophisticated aircraft, and a
somewhat smaller group of less experienced (in type) pilots in
advanced cockpits. Thus our samples represent the present-da[
"real world" of airlines with technologically mixed fleets, wlth
the highest experience being by far in the less advanced
cockpits.
The results of this LOFT experiment provide both good and bad
news to those who design, build, regulate, and operate modern
aircraft, and reflect the typical dilemma faced by those who must
provide training. On the positive side, despite pilot reports
and concerns raised in a variety of previous research studies,
the performance of crews in the automated aircraft was as a
practical matter no worse than those in the corresponding
traditional aircraft. On the negative side, despite the design
goal of workload reduction on the automated aircraft, crews in
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the MD-88 performed no better, and reported perceptions of higher
workload than DC-9 pilots flying the same LOFT.
As a general conclusion, it appears that the automated
environment is neither better nor worse than the electro-
mechanical: it is simply different. These differences will be
emphasized in the volumes that follow.
Pilots, through their training and efforts are adapting, as
pilots always have. But in the current era or enllgn_enean.uman
factors awareness, the designs should be more "user rrienuly" co
the pilots and not require so much adaptation. The human pilot
can only adapt so much - and then an incident occurs and it is
attributed to "pilot error".
The question for the research and development community remains:
how do we provide the best pilot-aircraft interface? The
question for the operational community remains, given the current
aircraft designs, how do we provide the best training,
procedures, and support necessarily to operate a new generation
of equipment?
"J"
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V. QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
A. OVERVIEW
Questionnaires were designed to elicit pilot opinions, experience
level, and specific information and viewpoints. It was somewhat
difficult to design a questionnaire that would be equally
responsive t? the needs and opinions of DC-9 and MD-88 crews.
Most MD.-88 pllots had flown traditional cockpit aircraft; but
only elght of the 42 DC-9 pilots (all captains) had experience in
advanced airliners (B-T67/757). In this study we do not take i_!!_!
into account military or corporate aircraft the volunteers may<
have previously flown.
The questionnaires were mailed to the volunteers in January 1990.
The LOFT flights had been completed at the end of August 1989. _ ....
Most of the questionnaires were returned by the end of the March;
a few straggled in during April and May. They weredesigned with
the goal that they could be filled out in one hour• Some
respondents attached lengthy answers to some questions, often
written on typewriters or word processors, indicating rather
strong feelings about the topic. _ ....
Questionnaire components
The questionnaire contained the following parts:
I.
•
•
•
Biographical information on flyin_ experience at the host
airline, total flying time, time in type, etc. These
results are summarized in Chapter II.
A 28-item Likert attitude scale, adapted from the one
previously used by the author in his field studies on the
MD-80 (Wiener, 1985) and the B-757 (Wiener, 1989)• Some
probes were identical to those in the previous studies,
others were tailored to this study• An attempt was made to
design probes that were e_ally sensible for the DC-9 and
the MD-88 crews, however it Is clear that many of the DC-9
pilots had no experience with advanced technology aircraft,
so their answers would be based on their general knowledge
of automation, what they had seen and heard•
Information was sought on the number of various types of-
instrument approaches (e.g. VOR, ILS, LOC) that had been
made_ in the last year by the crews. Questions about
Category III approaches and autolands are not appropriate
forthe DC-9; otherwise these questions applied equally to
both types of aircraft.
Eight open-ended questions allowed the respondents to
express in their own words attitudes regarding various
aspects of their flying experience. Open-ended questions
gave the volunteers the opportunity to spell out in detail
their opinions or experience in response to a variety of
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issues (see Appendix 2 for a list). The final question was
the most general. Volunteers were asked to relate anything
about the human factors of their flying jobs that they
wished to discuss.
B. ATTITUDE SCALES
Likert Scale Construction
A Likert scale is a standard tool in attitude assessmen t-_ It is
a form of "intensity scale_" whereby not only the direction but
intensity of the response is measured. An item consists of a
"probe", whlch is a positive or negative statement to which the
respondent is asked his degree of agreement/disagreement. The
response scale contains an odd number of possible responses,
t_plcally five or seven levels from stTong agreement to strong
dlsagreement, with a neutral value in the center. The center
response is somewhat ambiguous: it can mean "no opinion",
"undecided", or a truly neutral or centrist positlon on the
probe. In this study, five response levels were employed:
"strongly agree", "agree", "neither agree nor disagree",
"disagree", and "strongly disagree". The response form is shown
in Appendix 2. Note that in the histograms that follow, we have
labeled the center response as "neutral" for brevity. This word
did not appear in the questionnaire.
Handlinq of Numeric Data
The probes are referred to as Item 1 through Item 28, and data
are displayed as histograms. The 28 histograms which follow
simply report the percentage of responses to each probe at the
five levels, by type of aircraft the respondent was currently
assigned to.
Numerical data from the questionnaires were entered into a
computer-based file, and statistical analyses were performed.
For each of the 28 attitude items (PI to P28), two-way factorial
2-by-2 analyses of variance were performed. The two dimensions
were automation level (DC-9 versus MD-88) and seat (captain
versus first officer).
In none of the 28 Likert probes was there a significant
difference between the responses of the DC-9 and the MD-88
pilots. Thus it appeared that one's current aircraft type, which
we take as a surrogate for level of automation, did not affect
one's attitude in a variety of questions on automation and other
aspects of line flying, equipment, and safety.
In only one of the contrasts of captain versus first officer was
there a significant difference. This was in Item No. 27,
"Automation capability enhances safety", th e results of which are
displayed in Figure V-l. It appears from the figure that the
captains agreed with the probe more than the first officers.
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One of the two-way interactions (automation-by-seat) was
statistically significant. This was Item No. 7, "I use the
automation mainly because _y company wants me to." These data
are displayed in Figure V-2 The significant result indicates
that the effect of automation and of aircraft seat did not
combine linearly to produce the results. This interaction is
difficult to interpret. The main source of the interaction seems
to be in the "neutral" and "disagree" responses. Looking at
these responses in the graph, one can see a disordinal
interactlon between aircraft and seat. More MD-88 captains than
first officers are neutral, and the opposite for DC-9 crews.
When one examines the "disagree" response, the opposite is true,
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Figure V-1. A significant difference between captains and F/Os.
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Figure V-2. A significant interaction
between seats and aircraft type.
Interpretation of Attitude Scales
The reader is cautioned that the information in the attitude
scales, as in the open-ended questions, is subjective opinion of
the volunteer pilots. It is valuable information, both for
researchers and persons in the aviation industry, attitude
_uestionnaire data should be taken seriously. But likewise, it
is important that any particular result not be over-interpreted
by the reader, and that be clear that such data are not from
essentially experimentally controlled conditions. -_
The following seven pages contain in histogram form
of the 28 Likert scale attltude questions.
the results
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C. FREQUENCY OF USE - INSTRUMENT APPROACHES
Volunteers were asked to indicate in blanks on the questionnaire
forms the number of times in the last year (1989) that they had
used various instrument approach modes: autolands (MD-88 only),
Category III ILS (MD-88 only), Category II ILS, VOR, LOC and ADF.
The data are displayed in graphic form on the pages that follow.
No attempt was made to perform statistical analyses on the data,
or to contrast DC-9 with MD-88 usage. These figures represent
documentary data, for the purpose of reportin@ an estimate of_the
level of usage of various modes in the traditlonal and automa_ea
aircraft in daily line flying.
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NUMBER OF" AUTOLANOS
Figure V-3. Number of autolands in the last year, MD-88 only.
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Figure V-4. Number of Cateqor7 III ILS aDDroaches, MD-88 only.
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Figure V-8. Number of ADF approaches by aircraft type.
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D. OPEN-ENDED COMMENTARIES
Data Handlinq of Open-Ended Questions
Replies to the open-ended questions were individually read,
analyzed, and classified by the author. Much of the analysis of
these free text responses.was subjective. Direct quotations were
chosen to represent a varlety of vlewpoints. There was no
attempt to make the number of quotations on any viewpoint
represent the proportion in the database. They were selected for
inclusion on the basis of representing a variety of opinions.
The quotations are as close to verbatim as possible. The author
_erformed "light editing" to make the quotations more clear,
Improve punctuation where needed, and put them into complete
sentences. Where words are Underlined for emphasis, these were
the choices of the respondent, not the author. In a few places
editorial insertions were made for clarity, and these are
delimited by the symbols < >. On several questions, results
were tabulated and presented prior to the body of direct
quotations. The two-digit number at the end of each quotation is
for cross-referencing.
Quest. Topic Paqe No__=.
1 Errors pilots have made or seen 70
2 Crew coordination 81
3 Trainin_ 87
4 ATC envlronment 92
5 Workload 98
6 Likes and dislikes of cockpit features 103
7 Differences between MD-88 and DC-9 [i] 108
8 Anything on human factors 115
We ask the reader to keep in mind that in interpreting the open-
ended replies, most of the MD-88 pilots were new to the aircraft.
This may explain some of the negativity, as it takes lon_er to be
"comfortable" (word the pilots typically use) in these alrcraft
than in traditional aircraft (Wiener, 1985).
[1] Only answered by _ilots who had flown both a traditional
and a glass cockplt aircraft (MD-88 or 767/757)
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1. Describe in detail an error which you made, or observed, in
the DC-9/MD-88 that could have led to an incident or violation.
How could it have been avoided? (equipment design? training?
crew coordination?). Please describe specifically what occurred?
Responses to this question are listed below. To the greatest
extent possible, they are verbatim from the volunteers' own
words. In some cases minor editing was required.
Due to the prevalence of reports of altitude deviations ("busts")
and other problems related to altitude acquisition and
maintenance, the reports are divided into those that involve
altitude, and all others.
The two-digit number at the end of each re_ort is a questionnaire
serial number, included for cross-referenclng. In those cases
where the respondent indicated that he was no longer occupying
the seat which he held at the time of his volunteering for the
study, the new seat is included in brackets.
The problem of "killin_ the capture" on the MD-88, which appears
both in response to thls questlon and to ?_ners, was rlrs_
encountered by the first author in a prevlous field study,
dealing with crew transition to the MD-80 (Wiener, 1985). The
problem arises from the FMC logic when .the _ilots_ intentionally
or otherwise, change parameters while _e alrcrar_ is in the
altitude capture mode, but has not completed the capture
maneuver. A change in parameters, notably vertical speed or .
airspeed, may result in the aircraft departing from capture moue,
and thereby failing to level off at the target altitude.
MD-88 Reports - Altitude Deviations
Climbing out of BHM we were cleared to FL 270. Before reaching
altitude, we were cleared pilot's discretion down to FL 240. We
rearmed the flight guidance system to FL 240, thinking that the
airplane had already captured the FL 270 altitude. Actually we
had disarmed the alt hold mode and the aircraft continued to
climb to 28,500 before ATC and we caught the error
simultaneously. We should have actually watched the aircraft
level off and not assumed anything. Automation tends to leadto
complacency which takes improved crew diligence and coordination
to overcome. 09
Possible altitude deviation and accident. Climbing out set
altitude window and observed it arm. Only due to other traffic
were cleared only to FL XXX. We got busy with routing changes,
and looked up and saw that we were going through our assigned
altitude. I then noticed that the altitude window had changed to
a new altitude which was not selected. Most people use the
altitude window as the place where you ("symbolically") annotate
your altitude. As a result of this incident and a few others, I
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now write down on a piece of paper the altitude assigned. So in
this case, instead of decreaslng workload, the result was the
opposite. Another example -- all the automatic warning systems
that are supposed to be there to catch the errors by the pilots
such as take-off warning horn. I do not trust themto do their
job, i.e. back me, the human, who is liable to make errors, ii
(L-1011 F/O)
The MD-88 has a unique altitude bust feature built into it, with
the autopilot en_aged, autothrottles engaged, and VNAV engaged.
When the pitch wlndow of the FMA is showing VNAV/LVL and you push
the SPD/SEL button, the pitch window goes to VERT/SPD, not
ALT/HLD and generally a i00 fpm climb or descent will develop.
Most of us are aware of the problem and don't do that anymore,
but design could prevent that. 12
Captain moved the IAS wheel while A/C was capturing altitude. It
canceled the altitude hold and went 200 feet low before I called
out altitude. 13
Level at FL 350, clearance to descend to FL 240 at 250 kts. IAS
250 was selected to descend instead of VNAV. Aircraft pitched up
to get 250 kts. We busted through 35,400 before disconnecting
the autopilot and then descended properly. Why not go into alt.
hold or no climb until speed is dlaled in and selected? The
descent on the MD-88 still gets many new pilots in trouble,
particularly those coming off the 767. 20
I failed to make a crossing restriction because I expected the
aircraft (MD-88) to perform the descent. I had not programmed
correctly and did not closely monitor because an F/A <flight
attendant> offered us a meal. (There would be no opportunity to
eat at the airport). .Double problem: i) scheduling (no
provision for eating), 2) inappropriate monitoring of automated
flight. 21
F/O climbing to i0,000 assigned altitude, VNAV and autothrottle
on, autopilot off. He leveled at i0 without trimming nose down
and immediately engaged the autopilot. As the A/P trim tried to
trim nose down, the altitude increased a couple of feet, enough
for the VNAV to sense above i0,000. This caused the autothrottle
to advance to climb power, completely overpowering the ability of
the slow autopilot trim to keep the nose down and hold altitude.
The A/C pitched nose up and began a rapid climb. I caught it at
10,200 with the VSI indicated 1200 + fpm. Avoid by trimming
before engaging the autopilot. 22
Captain's leg. Holding instructions given by ATC and captain
decided to copy holding instructions as well as F/O. Aircraft
was in a descent and when holding altitude given, nobody dialed
it in and altitude bust occurred. Some has to "mind the store".
If captain had been doing so or if he was hand flying the
airplane, he would not have had the freedom to wrlte instead of
flying. 35
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We were climbing out to cruise altitude and were given an
intermediate altitude level off. We dla_eu in the new altitude.
The plane was climbing rapidl_, so the captain started to
decrease the rate on the vertlcal window. Thzs disarmed the
altitude capture. I noticed it 200 feet below level off
altitude, and the autopilot had to be disconnected so we didn't
fly through the assigned altitude. <See also report No. 13
above, next report (62), and comment at the beginning of this
section>. 58 (767 F/O)
Several altitude excursions due to manipulating vertical speed
wheel on FGS panel after the altitude capture, which kicks A/P
out of capture mode. 62
I feel that the biggest problem.in the MD-88 is altitude
excursions. I had three excurslons and one fail-to-capture.
Leveled off at 13,000 accelerating, F/O getting out an approach
plate, and I was looking at radio panel when altitude alert went
off. We were climbing through 13,300 when I disconnected and
recovered. Second was in traffic pattern at BWI, downwind to
base turn at 2000, and third was entering downwind le_ at ATL.
All three incidents traced to inadequate autopilot trlm rate.
85 (727 captain)
MD-88 Reports - Other
Arriving into ATL, a line of severe CB's were depicted on the ND
as just west of the runways. A/C were landing to the east. I
stated to the captain about I0 minutes from landing that I
thought we should hold in the clear to the west of ATL until the
CBs moved across the field to the east. I was concerned about
landing with a tailwind if not windshear. With the CBs east of
the field, they would not be a factor in approach or landing.
The weather depiction on the ND was invaluable In forming my
opinion. The captain, however, pressed on with the approach, and
just prior to entering the weather the wind were reported as 280
degrees at 13 kts. (exceeding our tailwind limit). We executed a
missed approach into a CB and tried to coordinate a turn back to
the west in moderate turbulence. 5-10 minutes later the storms
moved off the field and a very easy visual approach was made.
More training in windshear avoidance involving geographical
relationships of A/C, airport, and CB would help. The MD-88
ND/weat.her feature is excellent in displaying realtime weather
scenarlos, i0
On ILS final encountered severe turb and rain, executed a missed
approach. Map failed due to no VOR update. We were told to hold
at intersection, but couldn't find it due to map failure. (Note:
intersection we were to hold at was off of an inoperative VOR).
Then autopilot began having trouble holding altitude (we are now
unsure of where we are and had to hand fly or monitor A/P very
closely. Now both of us are trying to findwhere to hold,
monitor the A/P, and talk to company and passengers. (A real
mess). Solution: one fly and one do the rest - and have maps
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ou___t;communicate; inertials would help (no map loss). 14
Set up at night to do an ADF approach. The FMS was not set up
for that approach, so I tried to build it myself. The FMS called
for a descent before the ADF for final approach. Goin_ to MDA
early could have been disastrous. We need IRUs <inerulal
reference units> and complete lists of available approaches to
each airfield in FMS. 15 <Note: starting in the fall of 1991,
all of the company's MD-88/90 series aircraft will be delivered
IRU equipped.>
Landing at DCA, River Approach, F/O flying. As he called for
before-landlng C/L, I lowered gear, flaps, read C/L, then when I
was able to look outside again he had flown past R/W l_Je
could not get back to the runway, so we lanueu.on z± _
tower's OK). I would avoid this happening agaln by: ij_a_goou
briefing; 2) I do not take my eyes off of runway auring C/L.(Or
an_ other time). Of course a three-man crew_w?uld hay? avolued
thls problem, but as I indicated earlier <at_l_uue scale>, I am
neutral on that subject. 18
We were cleared to hold at an intersection and the FMS depicted
holding was similar, but not same as depicted_on the h?id .
depicted on the STAR. I let the FMS (LNAV) s_art the.nolglng '
pattern before I caught the difference. Lucklly the inlnlal turn
was in the same directlon. I should have been more careful - une
copilot too. I was flying but he was engrossed in the FMS hold
as he had never used LNAV for a hold. Never trust automation
without checking it out first. 19
We were approaching Austin from the east no.rth, east in absolutely
clear and visibility unlimited weather at night, we were neaulng
straight for the SPICE outer marker and were anticipating a
visual approach to 13R. Both the F/O's and my radios were tuned
to the 13R ILS frequency and our courses were set properly. Both
of our nay displays were in the map mode. In other words we were
doing everything right - ILS armed to capture. The controller
cleared us for the visual approach and asked us to keep the speed
up and keep it in tight as much as possible for spacing on other
landing traffic approaching from the northwest. I complied with
his request and turned base leg inside of SPICE OM. I started my
turn to final, looked out of my window during the turn and runway
lights and VASI-L and rolled out on that runway. The tower
controller advised us that it appeared to him that we had rolled
out aligned with R/W 17. .A quick glance at the instruments and I
knew he was correct, and Immediately rolled to the right and back
to the left and was in the slot for 13R and landed without
incident. The controller hadjust saved me. Both runways have
VASI-L but there are no approach lights to 17, something we both
should have picked up immediately, but didn't. Als?, ther? are
usually some bright lights just south of and 1-2 mlles west of
the extended centerline of R/W 13R which illuminate a number of
ball fields and some tennis courts. I usually look for them to
assist me in finding the approach end of runway 13R. I don't
recall seeing them that particular evening. I normally change my
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nav display to full compass rose when intercepting the localizer
whether o_erating IFR or VFR. I did not get around to doing that
thls evenlng - probably because I was usin_ the map to turn
inside of SPICE. This could have been avolded had I refused to
cooperate wi.th the controller's request and flown an approach
rlgn_ over _ne SPICE OM. I don't allow controllers to talk me
int?.dolng anything I am not comfortable wlth and really had no
parulcular concerns with this request. I later called for our
next ATC clearance and asked that controller to pass along to the
tower controller my gratitude for his actions. The F/O seemed a
little surprised that I would do such a thing as admit to my
error overt he radio. I would like to think that either the F/O
or I would have discovered the error before landing on the wrong
runway, but since the controller was the first to catch it,
thankfully we'll never know. 44
I programmed FMS with one piece of information (a holding
pattern) but did not execute it since it was for my own
information only. Captain at a later point programmed something
on his FMS. The Execute button illuminated on both FMSs due to
my arming the system, and he hit the button. It inserted my
holding pattern into the flight path even though we were not
cleared and aircraft started a turn. Easy catch, but other goof-
ups wouldn't be as easy. Better CRM <cockpit resource
management> would have cured this one. 55
Tuned wrong loc frequency for 8L in ATL. Did not identify the
LOC due to conditions - VFR daytime. Armed ILS and assumed
autoflight would capture local_zer. I realized something wrong
when A/C depiction on nav display showed us going through the
localizer. This could have been avoided by: 1) have PNF verify
the loc frequency; 2) identify the nav aid regardless of the
weather; 3) ensure at least one pilot is in arc mode; 4) not
relying on the autopilot to the place where you become
complacent. 56
On approach to BHMR/W with
F - 5 both radios tuned to the ILS, the/u was navigating in the map mode. We were cleared for the VFR
approach and the F/O continued for the runway displayed on the
ND, which could have put us 1/2 mile south of the actual R/W 5.
When NAY 1 and 2 are tuned to the ILS, the FMS no longer
accurately updates its position and goes to dead reckoning when
ILS's are selected, and the switch <ND display mode> should be in
arc or compass rose, not map! This is one of several such
incidents. The AHARS Should be replaced with IRUs as in the
756/767. 59 (L-10111F/O)
Slowing from 340 kts. at ii,000, then being cleared down to 8000.
F/O began descent using IAS mode, selecting IAS 250. He did not
notice that the trim rate was too slow to bring the A/C speed
back to 250 below I0,000 until we could select alt hold and
extend speed brakes to comply with speed restriction. I was
distracted by complying with route changes issued along with
altitude change - d_rect intercept input to FMS, and frequency
change at the same time. Training to complete airspeed change
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prior to selecting lower altitude might have helped. 60
The captain loaded the flight plan into the.FMS..for a flight from
HOU to CVG. The fix just prlor to IIU (L?ulsvl±leJ was MYS
(Mystic), but the captain saw the unfamillar MYS on the flight
plan and entered the familiar MSY _ns--_-into the
computer. I caught _--6e---_a--_pointed it out to the captain.
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DC-9 Reports - Altitude Deviations
A very eager F/O took the initiative to set in assigned altitudes
and even thought he was PF, and as PNF our proceaures ca±_ zor me
to acknowledge on radio, then set the alt alert er. After several
instances of this F/O quickly setting it nlmselr, we were set p
for me to assume he would set it the next time. He was busy and
did not and we busted an altitude. These new F/Os should be told
in training that their performance is not predicated on eagerly
doing "extra" tasks. 7
The most common error is the failure to level off and maintain
proper altitude. Too many times during the last I000 feet of
climb or descent distractlons such as "heads down" in the charts,
frequency changes, etc. cause altitude deviations. There always
seems to be a frequencychange or runway assignment given about
level off time. 8
Altitude bust. Heard the AAD in my subconscious, however went
I000 feet below my assigned altitude. Copilot could have caught
it. It should have a voice <alert> that says "Altitude,
Altitude". 36
While cruising at 31,000 the autopilot was inadvertently turned
off or kicked off by itself and the A/C began a slow descent. We
noticed it at about 250 feet below our asslgned altitude. 48
After takeoff the F/O hand flew the aircraft to i0,000 feet,
leveled off and engaged the autopilot. There was turbulence, and
scattered buildups in the area. We also received a frequency
change while attempting to avoid the weather. I observed the
airplane to be descending toward 9,500 feetand pointed this out.
This is not an uncommon error. It could be prevented by an
"altitude capture" mode. On the DC-9, when the A/P is engaged,
the vertical speed existing at time of engagement is maintained.
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Altitude excursion seems to be the problemon the DC-9. Fairly
frequently the PNF prevents an altitude excursion and twice I had
been involved in missing an altitude, once in climb and once in
descent. The scenario seems to occur when the PF and PNF are
distracted by separate events/problems and both lose altitude
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awareness. The autopilot is engaged and seems inadequate to
capture the pilots' attention. IThe i000 foot prior <to assigned
altitude> call helps, but is not always maue. Perhaps the PF
should fly the A/C after the first AAD alert until level off; no
looking at charts, talkinq on separate frequency from PNF,
talklng to flight attendants on the interphone, adjusting radar
-- some of the common distractions. 82
Altitude bust descending on initial phase of descent during
approach briefing. It was caught after we were 300 feet low.
Better crew coordination and "flying the plane" would have
helped. I suppose auto altitude capture would have caught it,
but this is no substitute for staying heads up.
DC-____99Reports " Other
During one of my first months on the line I aborted a takeoff
just prior to V-I. The reason I aborted was because of an
autothrust disengage light illuminating. This is a system rarely
used on a DC-9 and turned out to be a nuisance light. Looking
back it was an unnecessary abort, however at the time I was
concentrating on the takeoff and waitin_ to hear the first
officer call "V-I". The light in question is red and to me, red
is bad. I gained view o_ the red light from my peripheral visionand executed an abort, feel this is poor design. It may be
necessar_ for the light to be red and the system is rendered
inoperatlve on the ground by the ground shlft_ however _nenose
strut begins to decompress near V-i and the alrcrar_ goes co une
flight mode t_.us enabling the s_stem on the _round. Granted t_is
was probably lust a fluke, but it caused a hlgh speed abort.
F/O didn't communicate during arrival STAR. He twice dialed in
the wrong course or got distracted with speed control and didn't
update or fly published course. Since I'm a fairly new captain
(eight months), I've watched things very closely to make sure
items are corrected before they cause a problem, and have had
good luck so far. 3
Victor airway on arrival had large left turn to station (about
120 degrees). Clearance to cross intersection at I0,000, F/O
read intersection at 67 DME when it was really 37. We had
confirmed outbound course, and intersection at I0,000, but not
the distance. If I had not questioned the descent point we would
have busted the altitude at the intersection. A glass cockpit
would have avoided this: distance to waypoint readout, visual
display of waypoint, green arc <projection of point at which
target altitude would be obtained>, and FMS display readout. 5
This occurs almost every flight into DFW or ATL when it is the
F/O's leg. I try to get a gate and Approachor Tower will call
and I'll miss their call. The company wants us to call about i0
minutes out in DFW and closer at ATL. I know how to avoid this:
by calling for a gate when we are on the ground. I used to do
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this, but I was told, "Earlier." DFWwill usually say "call when
on the ground." This <early call> was one of the things the
company said it would not require when we first started flying
the DC-9. 6
Captazn's leg on an early departure after a very short layover.
No other traffic into ATL and 3 previous controllers tola us to
keep speed up. Neither of us noticed that we were indicating 340
knots at 8000 feet, until Approach called us ana asKeu our speeu.
I was new to the F/O seat, and failed to notice that the captain
didn't slow at i0,000. I was studying the approach. 24 [767
F/O]
<Note: the following incident included on the questionnaire
took place on an Air Force DC-9 (C-9), which is outside of
the scope of this study. It is included in this report
simply because it is an interesting, very critical
incldent.>
While in the Air Force, on the eighth leg of an eight-leg day I
had a new copilot in the right seat. He was tired and
overloaded, so he was sitting back sprawled out with his left
hand resting on the flap/slat handle (fairly common position).
We finished the checklist and took off on the roll. As I called
for gear up, his left hand stayed on the flap/slat handle and he
brought them up. Fortunately the DC-9's flaps and slats move
slowly, and I reached over and extended them. The DC-9 family
has a problem in its design.when the copil?t is.seated
comfortably usually rests hls nana on une lever In my opinion
the design lets people get comfortable in a position that when
they are tired they move the lever that is most convenient.
Since then, when I am tired, I remind myself of what can happen.
28
We were on a standard arrival to IAH and were supposed to
intercept a radial inbound to a VOR from an intersection. I, the
F/O, set the inbound radial in my course select window and
simultaneously told the captain what the inbound course was. He
was still tracking the outbound radial from the last VOR. He
acknowledged me, but did not set the new radial in his window. I
failed to notice after about two minutes that we had passed the
intersection and the captain was still tracking the outbound
radial. I told him that we needed to turn.back to intercept,
just as ATC called us and asked if we had Intercepted the inbQund
course yet. If the captain had put the new course in his window,
or monitored my PDI, he would have noticed that we had passed the
intersection. If I had watched him closer, we would not have
flown past it so far. 29
Waiting to cross an active runway, Tower told us, "proceed
straight ahead across runway at B, aircraft taking the active
will hold for you, expedite across, contract Ground <121> .7 when
clear." The captain pushed up the power, and I looked in my Jeps
to see the Ground frequency. Well, Taxiway B split and we were
expediting straight. The captain kept looking left at the
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aircraft holding for T/O, all lights on, and my initial call to
stop was not heeded, and I ended up skidding us to a halt before
we taxled onto the grass. We ended up less th.an five feet (more
like three feet) from the grass. A happy endlng, barely. How to
avoid: I) always look where you,re _olng; 2) cr?w coordination
- listen to your crew; 3) communlcatlon - better uermlno±ogy
from the tower (no "straight across"). 32
I was recently cleared HMV, FLM2 arrival to CVG. In error, I
flew HMV direct FLM, CVG. L_stening closer would have prevented
this: However, if the DC-9 had a "glass cockpit", the proper
routlng would probablyhave been entered into the FMC, whlch
would have prevented this kind of error. 39
Last leg of a long day - dark, tired, failed to notice on flight
plan that we were tankering fuel to Daytona Beach.. I knew that L
Daytona Beach was (at that tlme) a ?utback_runway, Du_ _lan _ put
two and two together until I was nalz way _nere..I _?oKeu au ,
flight plan a saw a "do not tanker" message. I flnal±_ rea±izeu
that I had missed some information. I checked with fllght
control and found they had erred by dispatching aircraft with
extra fuel. Checked as to runway length vs. our weight (we were
close to max landing weight). Flight control provided numbers as
the book in our cockpit was so conservative that I would have
been too heavy to land with zero fuel on board! Once we began
thinking like pilots and not like bean counters I realized that
we would have no trouble landing a DC-9 on the runway available.
However, to cover ourselves we got all the exact figures and
landed. Landlng was uneventful, except I made the landing
although it was F/O's leg. He was glad I did. This made me
realize I could have pushed his limits if I had told him go ahead
and land. So it worked out, but I check the figures now every
time, tired or not. 40
In the DC-9, the crew inadvertently tuned the Falmouth VOR
(117.0) instead of CVG VOR (117.3) and began tracking inbound.
It occurred during a time of heavy workload during descent. A
glass cockpit display and FMS would probably have prevented this
event. A third cockpit member to handle ATIS, gate asslgnmen_,
cabin PA s and checklist reading, might have also prevented this
occurrence. 41
This error occurred at Hopkins International Airport in
Cleveland. We were parked at Gate B-17 and pushed back at a yery
slow traffic period. We were the only aircraft moving on the
field. The active runways for takeoff were 23 R/L. After we
pushed back the captain started the first engine and left the
second one for me to start while he taxied. The time it took to
get to the runway was minimal. I coordinated ground clearance
and takeoff clearance on the radio. I also accomplished the
"after engine start", "taxi", "delayed enginestart", and "before
takeoff" checklists. It was my leg to fly. By the time I
finished all of this and got my head out of the cockpit the
captain stood up the throttles and gave me the aircraft for
takeoff roll. As soon as I started to advance throttles
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Cleveland Tower told us to abort takeoff because we were on
runway.28 (of which 6000 feet remained). The Tower seemed ready
for thls mistake - I presume iu naa nappenea before. If you look
at the runway layoff there's concrete everywhere. 46
Dialed in wrong course for LOC/ILS approach and unable to get
flight director and autopilot to fly the same approach. F/O and
myself visually cross-checked each other to make sure we had the
same course set in. 49
i) Using autopilot turn knob to correct to a new radial, thought
knob was in detent, but we were actually in a shallow turn. 2)
Holding at marker awaiting ILS approach, strong winds, no DME,
cleared for app and let down from 3000 to 1800. Asked to make
360 degree turn for spacing, then cleared for approach. A lot
closer to marker than we thought, resulting in large angle of
intercept inside marker. Times like that would be nice to have
DME or FMS. 52
Failed to set brakes on engine start. A/C rolled toward
terminal. Would be avoided by stricter adherence to checklists
and crew coordination. 61
Copilot landed in ATL with 5-kt. tailwind and rain. Landed in
landing zone on a speed runway, 8L. I told him, "you reverse and
I'll brake (light rain)." Went to make high speed turn off and
the aircraft started sliding sideways. I got in straight and
stopped it on the high speed. Later I thought I should have gone
to the end of the runway. Talked to a 767 captain that landed
behind us and they actually had a 15-kt. tailwind at 20 feet. He
called the Tower and told them to turn the airport around before
someone got hurt. When I went back out the airport was turned
around. 63
On a back course ILS into Columbus, Georgia, at night, IFR,
weather at minimums. As a new F/O I forgot to put the proper
course in the PDI prior to the approach. It was still set on the
previous direct heading to the Columbus VOR. I was paired with a
captain in his first month. When BL mode on the flight director
was selected, steering was given to the course in my PDI Instead
of the correct back course. The captain was flying and followed
the flight director. There wasn't any ADF available to back up
the approach, so he descended on a course 50 degrees off of the
proper one, centering the flight director steerlng. It was some
time later that the discrepancy was noted. Had there been
terrain or traffic and the error not detected, an accident or
incident could have resulted. This could be avoided by approach
checklist emphasizing placing the proper course in the PDI. 69
Misread the outbound heading on a jet airway where two jet routes
converged over a fix. The wrong heading was taken. 72
Autopilot engaged, instructions to slow below clean speed. When
we lowered slats autopilot did not retrim rapidly enough and A/C
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lost i00 feet with continued descent. Deactivated autopilot and
recovered manually. 86
We were filed over two VORs and then out a specific radial from
the second VOR. The two VORs are less than 30 miles apart, anon
differ by only 1 digit <.2 mhz.> (116.7 vs. 116.5). The cap_a
was flying and had switched my nav radio to a separate VOR at the
destination fleld for another reference. We started out the
radial from the first rather than the second VOR as filed.
Pertinent factors included a short (pushed) flight, the close
proximity of the two VORs, and the similarity In frequencies. I
the
would recommend that if a crew member is going to change
other crew member's nav radio, that he should tell him. I would
also recommend that VOR stations so close should differ in
frequency by more than one digit. If this is not possible, then
I would recommend that the first digit <I mhz.> be varied, e.g.
115.7 vs. 116.7, instead of 116.5 vs. I16.7. <No serial number =
this report submitted after database was completed>
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What can you say about crew coordination on the DC-9/MD-88?
What areas of crew coordination/communication need
improvement?
MD-88 Crews
With the many options available as to how you want to use the
different gadgets_ it's important to tell th.e or_ler guy wna_
method you are uslng and what you are plannlng _o uo. F/O 9
I like the policy of "my leg I'll do the FMS, your leg. yo_do the
FMS." With the autopilot off, then the PNF programs _ne _/_.
However, this pollcy is only moderately followed. If.I am flying
and the captain programs the FMS, I .am not always posltlTewha_
mode of operation exists (i.e. crosslng speeus ana resurlculon ,
etc.). If the captain updates something for me, I appreciate it
if he verbally tells me what he did, at the least. F/O i0
MD-88 crew coordination - the _ilots are usually too busy if
anything comes up from the cabln during climb and descent. Any
call in a terminal area can be a real distraction or possible
problem. We also have a hard time building crew rapport due to
switching flight attendants so much. We need to improve
communication between cabin and cockpit crew. Adding much more
information to the re qu.ired.briefing is not the answer• Already
the captains are spending tlme <wlth flight attendants> that
should be used to help in the preparation of the cockpit, to the
point where the F/O has to do everything if you are to leave on
time. You need to keep the entire crew together and have a
briefing when you check in for the rotation. Another factor is
that some captains who come off three-man crews don't realize
that you have to operate as e_uals when it comes to workload•
During emergencies crew coordination is imperative. You are
constantly on the edge of the abyss of task saturation in a busy
terminal area. In most cases the F/O cannot go back to check on
the problem, and must take the word of a person who may not have
the training to give a good assessment of the nature of the
problem. It's very easy to have both <pilots> working on the
problem and not have one guy maintaining aircraft control• F/O
II
I think it's improving, but there is significant room for more
improvement• Sometimes I (as F/O) feel a real need to drag game
plans (for abnormals) out of the captain. He should be telling,
not me asking• Also many captains have their own set of
procedures which tend to impede communication until you have
customized yourself to him. Sometimes communication can be
impeded b_ concern for FAA and compan_ procedures. More concern
for coverlng your rear than the big plcture. F/O 14
Coordination is good, CRM training is making it better. What is
• good for the goose is good for the gander. Captains are not God.
If an F/O must do certain duties a particular way, then all crew
members should do it the same way. I see too many captains who
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believe "do as I say and not as I do." They will enhance
communication, respect, and a better cockpit working environment
if they adhere to procedures. F/O 15
I think the captain sets the pace. I try to maintain an
environment that is open and free to communicate. Judging
(albeit subjectively) from the results of recent trips, it
appears than open communications pay off in smooth and hassle-
free trips. F/O 17
Coordination is good. But there is too much talking (climb
power, VNAV, fla_s up, slats up, bank angle 25, etc.). Reduce
some of the requlrements that must be said out loud. Capt. 20
Crew coordination is this aircraft depends on each crew member
advising the other continuously of what they're doing. It is so
easy to say "just do it" yourself because the other person is
busy on the radlo, etc. I don't always verbalize all my actions.
As captain, I find that I can't watch all that the F/O does
because of my own workload. Capt. 21
I've seen too many occurrences of both sets of eyes glued on the
FMS computer, when one set should have been monitoring the flight
and airspace. F/O 42
Crew coordination on the 2-man crew is excellent -- far better
than the 3-man crew. There is less coordlnatlng to do. As tar
as the rest of the crew.- flight attendants - are concerneu,
elimination of this ridlculous ,,sterile.cockpit" rule would be a
big step forward. We often hear the flight attendants talking to
each other over the interphone system about some pr?blemth?_
have and they are trying to decide whether or no_ Tuley snou±
call us to advise for fear that we will get angry with them for
violating the sterile cockpit. Capt. 44
Coordination is normally good, however, when one pilot is
occupied with one duty (e.g. making a PA to passengers, obtaining
ATIS on arrival, talking to company ramp to find out gate) the
other pilot is unmonitored. Thus if he initiates an action or
copies a clearance incorrectly the "out of the loop" pilot will
never catch it. All the automation in the world won't catch
that. Main area of crew coordination that needs improvement is
one pilot verbalizing his future intentions or plans to the other
so any errors in the plan can be caught quickly. F/O 55
Overall I feel that coordination is good on the MD-88. I feel
that coordination is a lot better when both pilots have been on
the 88 for a while and fully understand the full capabilities and
limitations of the FMS/autopilot. F/O 56
Greater standardization is needed. The complexity of the
autoflight system means an endless variety.of techniques are
used. Pilot disagreement on methods used Is a constant problem.
CRM doesn't really address the problems we have. Capt. 57
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You need to assign jobs so both don't get tangled up trying to do
different things on the FMC. F/O 58
Having flown both the DC-9 and the MD-88, I realize a great deal
more communications is necessary on the MD-88. More attention
has to be paid to the details of operating this aircraft. There
are too many ways this aircraft can turn around and bite you.
Never alienate your help: he may not be there when you need him.
On the DC-9 you could be a one-man show if it were necessary.
Capt. 59
I think crew coordination in the MD-88 is good. Following
company procedures, common sense, and common courtesy, when
combined allow for good coordination in the cockpit. Bringing
coordination with the flight attendants in better focus b_ better
briefing and better understanding of what servlces are melng L _^
offered on a particular flight could s_and improvement, capt. _u
Too much talking is required when hand flying, since all
manipulation of the nay and FGS panel is supposed to be done by
PNF. F/O 62
Briefings are important, particularly in bad weather. You need
to communicate what automation you intend to use, and when you go
to manual control. Further, when ATC changes a route or
instruction, the PF should command how to reset the computer, or
if to use it at all. Capt. 77
DC-9 Crews
_/Os need to talk more about what they are going to do next, i.e.
...at 14 DME I am descending to i0,000 feet and turning right to
296 degrees outbound." They are slow and tend not to communicate
their intentions as much as I would like. Capt. 3
On the whole crew coordination is excellent. If there should be
any areas of improvement, it would be the standardization of
procedures and Information in line flying; and more emphasis on
the F/Os input being desirable7 e-yen required as part of the
communication loop. Capt. 4
There has been great improvement on the DC-9 in the past lear in
crew coordination. The CRM program has put in place the Idea of
the open cockpit. Capt. 5
Crew coordination is OK, but not great, but OK. I don't like
having the PNF moving the gear and flaps for me. Some times he
doesn't hear me or sometimes I want them now and not later. If I
say what I'm going to do and then do it, itseems OK to me. To
retract the gear for the F/O, I have to reach all the way across
the throttle quadrant and block <the view of> the instruments as
a critical time. Capt. 6
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The DC-9 is very straightforward with little/no automation, S?ies
crew coordination goes to basics...more a matter or persona±it
than equipment-related tasks. These new/inexperienced F/Os
should have it stressed to them that extra eagerness is not
necessary to prove their worth (see _ <See comment No. 7,
Question I>. The importance of PF/PNF duty assignments is no
less in this cockpit than In the 757. More is not better for an
eager F/O. Capt. 7
Generally DC-9 crew coordination/interaction is excellent.
Although I was a skeptic at first, the use of earpieces/headsets
has greatly improved crew-crew and crew-ground communications,
but reducing the "was that for us?" by about 90%. Capt. 8
Crew coordination on the DC-9 is generall_ pretty good because
the cockpit is small and it's easy to monitor each other.
Company procedures are adequate. Each captain needs to
specifically brief each F/O he flies with on his individual
techniques. F/O 29
Generally speaking crew coordination is satisfactory. This is
one area that could be improved. The PNF should not change the
nay radio frequencies without notifying the PF. The PF, whether
he is captain or F/O, should be in charge of the nay radios. F/O
30
MD-88 crew coordination is more critical due to the higher
workload than on the DC-9. Trying to hand fly an MD-88 while
telling the other crew members how to program the DFGC/FMS is
particularly labor intensive and ?learly alverusDoru% ?rew___
members' attention away from maintaining a saze lOOKOUt. _/u 33
[F/O MD-SS]
I think it is basically good. Improvement could be made though,
by each crew member flying verbally informing the PNF of his
actions. This should be done on a continuing basis. I am
referring to such things as heading being turned for navigation,
altitudes being vacated, crossing restrictions which are being
flown. This is not something that should be put on a required
checklist, but rather an attitude and standard operating
philosophy. Capt. 39
I have not had a single incident or problem on the DC-9 (since I
began flying captain). DC-9 operation lends itself to _ood crew
coordination. If I have a guy who might be new, or a little
weak, I slow things down and help him keep up with the aircraft.
F/Os all try hard to please the captain. Actually they.tend to
be too hard on themselves, i.e. get down on themselves if landing
isn't perfect in every detail. The biggest problem in crew work
is with flight attendants. We sometimes change girls five times
a day. This makes it tough to even know who is back there and if
they know what to do in case of emergency. I feel same crew of
F/As should fly the whole rotation (as American does). This way
you can get around personalities and not be put off by a possible
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bad first impression. Note: 99% of F/As are outstanding. They
do a very hard job extremely well. Capt. 40
Our present approach to CRM seems to be leading to more
confrontatlon In the cockpit, between me and the copilots. I
constructive criticism in the cockpit,welcome suggestions and . .
but I see more of a challenge to my authorlty. At t_mes the
cooperation and assistance of my copilots seems.to be less than
prior to the days of CRM. The.captain's authorlty as flnal
declsion maker must not be dlmlnished. Especially in une case or
new h_re F/OsI have seen an increase in insubordlnation. Again,
I welcome an open flow of cock_it constructive criticism in both
directions. But what I am seelng is more of a "this is the way
we used to do it in the Air Force" mentality and less of a
willingness to conform to the company's way of doing things.
Crew members are encouraged in CRM to draw upon their previous
experiences. However, this must be ke_t in proper perspective.
The captaln still must have the authorlty to "set the tone" in
th.e cockpit, and expect the F/O.to car r_ out his assigned duties
wlthout having to glve a long dlssertatlon ]ustlfylng each .
decision. Perhaps _art of the _roblem is that our c?mpany is.
hiring some older pllots with hlgher experience levels resululng
in a captain/copilot team with both pilots closer to the same age
and experlence level. A more likely explanation, however, is
starting to hire more assertive types. The "B scale" issue no
doubt adds to friction in the cockpit. Capt. 41
Overall coordination is excellent. The DC-9 is so sim_le and its
systems are so well organized. Each crew memb.er functlonswell
wlth the company's current guidelines. Occaslonally i work wl_n
captains who do not comply with certain operational procedures,
but these have been few. Usually these same captains are the
ones who don't communicate as well as they should. But I adjust.
F/O 46
Crew coordination is generally very good on the DC-9, especially
with the new captains. When procedures are accomplished in the
"flow" or order like we were trained to do them, crew
coordination is good. Some of the older captains that have been
on the DC-9 for years and still somewhat set in their "old ways",
which can cause a breakdown in crew coordination and
communication. F/O 48
Things are improving after exposure to CRM. We need to pay m@re
attention to details of what person (PF or PNF talking on the
radio) is doing. In good weather we tend to get lax and drift
off into other thoughts rather than the apparent uneventful job
at hand. Capt. 49
Crew coordination is good on the DC-9. You have to work together
on a two-man crew, especially in bad weather or an abnormal
situation. Sometimes there is much too much chatter when you
taxi, especially at the big airports. Many times copilots try to
read the checkl_st when I am busy figuring ou_ where we are
going. I just tell them to hold on a second. Training pounds
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into them the checklist and the dual response. That is great in
the simulator, but in the real world you have to teach the
copilot how you want to do it. Capt. 63
Our recent changes have been an improvement. The sterile cockpit
concept has some merit, but it is a classic case of "them that no
playa the game maka the rules". The.captain is responsible for
safely completing the flight anu havlng a relaxed cockpit
environment has been one of the reasons our company has had the
best safety record of all airlines in the past 35 years. Capt.
67
I don't have any concerns in this area. I think the operation is
smooth and safe. Dual head com radios would help. Also the
ability to receive messages (ATIS, and eventually ATC
instructions) via datalink would allow both pilots to monitor ATC
at all times. Capt. 74
Crew coordination overall is very good and improving,
particularly with the cabin crew. The biggest difflculty is
communicating with the F/As. Some captains will not let me talk
95% ofto the F/A when I ask to in a low workload time frame. _
the trips, by the end of the first day, • Know wna_ a cap_aln
expects and feel we work together well. By the end of the first
trlp I feel like there is a very good foundation for working
together. It's the few guys who i) insist on doing just about
everything their own way; 2) feel threatened by any suggestion,
question or initiative, that cause the problems. The impact
seems to be that I, personally and together as a crew, see
performance drop dramatically. It frustrates me that in those
situations I try harder to be even better and usually perform
worse. I feel sure it is because the captain and I are not
supporting each other. CRM sounds great during training, but
it's not reachlng these guys and I have yeu _? rln9 anyone wno.
has been able to effectively deal wlth these inulvluua±s. Tnelr
personalities which make them difficult to get along with also
makes them CRM-illiterate. F/O 82
In general coordination is very good. The only time I experience
much of a problem is when the captain "mumbles", or repeatedly
does not speak loudly enough to be heard and/or understood (due
to cockpit noise, radios, headsets, etc.) Eventually you get
tired to asking him to repeat himself and just assume what you
thought he said. F/O 90
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•What did you think of your training for the DC-9/MD-88?
What topics should receive more/less emphasis? Any comments
on training aids and devices that were used, or needed?
MD-88 Crews
TABLE V-I. Listed below are replies made by two or more
respondents (MD-88).
Need live instructors
Systems training too shallow
Long Beach training inadequate, used
MD-82 materials with MD-88 differences
Need more hands-on training devices
Should have more FMS in ground school
Course is too intense, concentrated
CPT was excellent device
Training devices were out of date
Need ground school instructors with
line experience
6
3
5
4
8
4
2
3
There was a lack of personal instruction. The whole ground
training program was done by video tape and because the plane is
so new there were many questions and no experienced instructors
with answers. The video tapes were good, but I believe an
instructor should teach systems and be able to lead in-depth
discussions on each system and their quirks. There is always the
way a system is designed to work on paper and then how it
actually works in real life. 9
I was trained in Long Beach <Douglas>. Systems needed more depth
and the program should hav e been MD-88, not MD-82 with .....
differences training. Systems on 727 S/O were _augn_ in auequa_e
depth and this is how we should be taught. Interactive computers
are very good. We should head in that direction. But do not
eliminate the teacher/student classes where questions can be
asked. I0
I thought MD-88 training was great. The only room for
improvement would be to have a flight training instructor or a
better trained ground training instructor to run the
FMS/autoflight and system CPTs. The ground training instructors
just can't answer line-related questions. 12
There should be more emphasis on systems and how they work• Much
more emphasis on the thlngs that can bite you: not capturing
altitude; how you can <inadvertently> negate captures; map
failures; going into D/R and drifting; when to turn it
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<automation> off because your are overloaded. 14
Training in both aircraft was very good. In the full-time F/D
fly without the F/Daircraft, I feel that it is important to _ ..
(autopilot on or off_ so that the pilot can become aware or une
pltch.attitudes required for various reglmes of flight. This
pertalns to the first few days in the simulator before too many
abnormals are introduced. 16 [Capt. DC-9]
I feel that the training was excellent on all aspects of the
plane except the FMS. I was expected to learn the FMS on the
line and in fact that's where I learned the system. This
definitely needs more emphasis. _t FMS trainer was not available
when I went through training and is needed. 19
Good training, but we need more emphasis on MCP, and less on ram
air etc. Best training I have received at our airline. 20
Not enough time. Full day in class plus necessary study time for
very long days. After a week at this pace, I found myself
saturated and my learning curve for new material_eaked.
really felt pressured because it was also my initial cap_aln
upgrade. 21
Training was excellent except for one thing. DC-9 to MD-88
conversions were given only four legs as an IOE. This is
inadequate since the 88 presents a radically different approach
toward flying. 35
I was pleased with the concept of the MD-88 ground school - slide
tape presentation. I do think, however, that in the future the
person who narrates the tape should be a pilot. I found myself
becoming aggravated at the reader of the text for several reasons
that had an overall negative effect on my learning. It was
obvious that he did not have a flying background because he
either mispronounced words or put accent on wrong syllablel For
example, engine pressure ratio - we call it "E-per", ne rererreu
found them totn _t as "E.P.R." As far as the training aids, I
...... ' ' ' ' te
be the best yet. As for the simulator, I thlnk it° Is an absolu
waste of tlme to sit in a simulator and before each periou glve
the instructor a flight attendant briefing. I feel the same way
about a departure brlefing. Fine, if you have.an unusual
departure, but otherwise we all know who is going to do what,
when, and how. Let's fly the simulator. We can talk during
briefing and debriefing. Like a fellow pilot said, "We are
sitting in Atlanta in the middle of the summer with OAT of 95
degrees. If the F/O is so stupid that I have to tell him we'll
not have to use engine anti-ice today, he doesn't belong in that
cockpit. 44
Training was basically good. I had real problems with the
autoflight system. It didn't make sense to me. I kept thinking
of the 757/767 system. A pitch wheel for vertical speed only.
After training I went back to the DC-9 for two months. On my
first MD-88 approach, into DCA, my F/O asked me if I was a little
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high. Then Approach Control came in with, "Do you think you can
make it?" We made a 360 degree turn. I was at least I0 miles
behind the aircraft, trying to use the autoflight system. Too
much time between training and flying the aircraft. 59 [L-I011
F/o]
There are some areas of the FMS that after a__ear are still
poorly .understood ?r uncomfort.able to use. ulscusslon wlnn other
MD-88 p11ots reveals same feellngs. HLD and DES pages seem to be
particularly troublesome. 71
It was good overall, but to much drills on V-I cuts, missed
approach, etc. This is necessary to.meet the FAA criteria.which
are totally unrealistic. We are loslng sight of the mlg plc_ure.
If I lose an engine, I want speed and altitude and to get back
down, but I am not going to fly +/- 5 kts. and +/- 50 feet as in
simulator drills. More time should bespend on real world
problems rather than imaginary so-called critical situations.
Have we ever lost an airplane due to losing an engine at V-l? I
doubt it. 77 [Capt. 767]
DC-9 Crews
TABLE V-2.
respondents (DC-9) .
Listed below are replies made by two or more
Need better CPT
More systems training
Better incorporation of CRM into training
More training on Jeps
Simulators and CPTs not reliable,
out of date
Too much emphasis on non-precision approaches
Need instruction on ops specs, FARs, AIM
3
2
2
2
4
2
2
o
I feel that the DC-9 school is a good school and always has been.
One area that could be addressed more is performance. I can't
comment on the training aids as they have been completely redone
since my training. I have heard favorable comments about the new
ones. 2 .....
The DC-9 trainin_ (ground) was excellent, but only due to the
instructors. Fllght training inltiallywas not on company
equipment, creating concern and some confusion for first-time
checkouts. Line training was adequate_ Recurrent training has
too many complex systems on the same day due to (I am told) FAA
requirements for so much time to arbitrary subjects. 4
Early training (sim 1-3) was poor. Training in a simulator with
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entirely different cockpit from our DC-9s is poor, especially for
two pilots new to the DC-9, e-g- HSI vs. n? HSI.__Obvi?us lack of
ATC experience of.my F/O partner (six months as 7z, m/o) grea_±y
impacted my trainlng as I spent a great deal of time carrying his
ATC load and/or actually tralning him on the spot on how to be an
F/O In ATC environment. Half-day on introductlon to Jeps was
obviously inadequate, especially from.a non-pilot instructor 2 .
The F/O playing catch-up during the slmulators cnangea nne WhOle
emphasis of these periods from.role-playing.and habit pattern
setting in routine ops to OJT in radao and Instrument procedures.
7
I thought the initial training was fine, except for the
simulator. I could have used more training on the Jep manuals
and approach procedures. I was stuck as an S/O for slx and a
half years because of no hiring, and I had not flown all that
long. 24
We need more emphasis on crew coordination for.people like me
coming from the single seat community in the mllitary, especially
with little S/O time on the 727. 26
The big item here is LOFT. LOFT helps a lot, but it takes a
while for a new guy to figure out what to do and when. 28
The training was excellent in all respects except one. I think a
better, more sophisticated CPT would have been helpful. The
ground school instructor and simulator instructor were superb.
30
I was quite satisfied with m_ DC-9 training. Simulators in
general, though, need great improvement in the feel of the
controls and the visual presentations. Both features, on every
simulator I have flown, are over-sensitive when compared to the
actual aircraft. A pilot has to develop two sets of flying
skills, one for the real aircraft, another to satisfy the
computers in the simulator. 39
I enjoyed DC-9 training. I flew it a long while as an F/O, so it
was like putting on a really great old pair of shoes. More
emphasis may be put on less flying by the book in certain
instances. New copilots will often try to be configured and on-
speed at the marker, which really plays.havoc with the people
behind you, and makes the controller's 3oh much harder. You can
still fly smoothly and fastand get everythin_ done by i000 fee_
on a nice VFR day when you,re cleared for a vlsual approach.
They <F/Os> don't look out of the window nearly enough. (Nor do
I, probably, but I try). 40
Excellent! All my.ground School, simulator, and_aircraft .....
instructors were hlqhly knowledgeable and helpful, i woulo ±_Ke
to see a more thorough reviewof Ops Specs material and perhaps
some of the FARs. A periodic review of material in the AIM would
be helpful. 41
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I thought the DC-9 systems and simulator training was adequate(not good, but adequate). Flying training (2 rldes) was almost
marginal. Every landing was a new adventure. I had only flown
fighter-type aircraft prior to the DC-9. This put a lot of
pressure on the line check captains that flew my IOEs. Most of
my learning was accomplished on my IOE. 46
For the most part the training was good. I don't think th.e
ground school portion can.be any sho.rter. A lot of materlal is
covered in a very short tlme, requlrlng a great deal of study
time prior to classes in order to keep up. The cockpit trainer
(DC-9) in ground school is helpful, but needs_an overhaulbadly.
The flight training syllamus is very goou. I_ aoes a goou job of
preparing you for the evaluation. I felt that one of my
Instructors could have been a blt more prepared when it came to
briefing some of the pre-mission topics. 48
More attention should be paid in ground school to flight
instruments/autoDilot/flight director. The instructors do a good
job on mechanicai parts, but tend not to understand the a?_ua_.
operation of the flying part or the actual uses of the au_omanlc
phases. 49
The training was adequate. The major problem was in ground
school: dated slides, systems comments by the instructor that
were not covered in the manuals, the only reference now, after 20
months since transition, is in my written notes. The slide-tape
training environment (e.g. 767/757) is a better way to ensure
that all info is properly documented and passed along to us. We
shouldn't have to rely on the capability.and quality of the
individual instructor for the complete dissemination of the
material. 74
The training was great. I felt very confident after coming out
of training. The training aids were poor or non-existent. We
certainly need more and better CPTs. 80
91
• Do _ou like the way the DC-9/MD-88 operates in the ATC
envlronment? Please mention things you.have trouble with,
and things that work well, in dealing wlth ATC.
MD-88 Crews
TABLE V-3.
respondents (MD-88).
Listed below are replies to Question 4 by two or more
Map displa_ (HSI) a real asset; aids situational awareness
Too much t_me is spent programming In high workload periods;
MD-88 is "to0 busy"
Excellent at cruise; LNAV excellent; doesn't depend on VORs
To much head-downtime
Difficult to descend; gets behind descent
ATC changes, crossing restrictions add too much workload
VNAV level-off at i0,000 not smooth
Holding page (capability) helpful
Automation is unpredictable
Too many brief descents, interruptions from ATC
DFWATC operates poorly
Controllers don't understand our "magic"
Speed changes under autothrottle too abrupt
Radar superimposed on HSI map excellent feature
Problem of killing capture wlth V/S wheel
7
6
5
4
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
The MD-88 works well, but when things get busy it takes too much
time to program the computer• It's just easier to hand fl_ some
times. The autothrottles are the best part of the automatlon.
They are extremely reliable, and free your attention to fly the
approach more carefully. 9
I like the way the MD-88 works with ATC, but I have trouble with:
I)
2)
3)
Shallow descent rate, 15 flaps, idle power, 180 kts. yields
less than 1500 fpm <descent rate>• Sometimes this is not
adequate at big airports.
VNAV is a nuisance below 12,000 since it decides when to
slow to 240 kits. (I0,000 foot transitS-on). FMS OVRD is
good in theory, but the desired speed is not maintained in
descent, the path is.
Updating contlnuously the heading bug in Map mode -
busywork!
Things I like:
I) Nav display with weather projection capability•
great safety enhancement.
2) Nay display during vectoring for ILS approach•
awareness vastly increased.
This is a
Situational
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3) Fuel calculations in FMS - a safety backup. i0
cruise po.rtion of flight is great - you don't have to constantly
be followlng VORs, correc_in_ zor wind manually lake in the DC-9.
Descent profile helps in seelng if you will make <crossing>
restrictions. Enterlng.holdlng patterns wlth plenty of lead time
is nice, however you stlll need to manually (mentally) figure
these out. In a non-ATC environment, i.e. tower closed, call
when you are on the ground, the CRTs are a must. They give you a
great blrd's eye vlew of where you are ana where you want to go,
and save you from landing at the wrong place, ii
There are usually too many small descents, instead of 1-2 large
descents. It usually requires too much work to allow the FMS to
really be useful. Even if we do get the large descent, very
often we will get airspeed changes in the descent, which are too
much work to change in the FMS. 12
ATC at DFW is very bad. They say keep speed up and then clear
you for visuals from ii,000. MD-88 does not descend very well.
ATL ATC keeps you informed about what to expect. DFW ATC is
dangerous. Also have had them give crossing restrictions the A/C
cannot make; then they get mad. 13
Sometimes restrictions are given in a way that are not very
efficient. This causes you to reprogram FMS (heads down mode in
cockpit). Also, not as much direct <clearance> as could be. I
suspect that the controllers are not aware of the magic onLb_ard.
For example, "fly headang 200 when recelvlng proceed dlrec_.
They are unaware that we can go FMS direct. Also, FMS system
does not level and accelerate well at i0,000. It captures at
I0,000 feet, when levels off and then goes to climb power to get
the 335 kts. 14
Basically I like the operation. You must stay ahead of the
magic, or it will lead you astray. You must be sure it is doing
what you think it is doing. I have had several aircraft go from
Nay Track to Hdg Hold for no apparent reason, and the only way to
know is to constantly monitor the FMA. 18
The MD-88 works well except for the descent phase. The FMS
(VNAV) often gets behind in the descent. It is usually easier to
adjust the descent using the autopilot. ATC changes speeds on us
so often that the profiles are not workable and we lose the
efficiency of the FMS programmed descent. The LNAV function is
great. It allows ATC and the pilot great flexibility, especially
when VORs are out of service.
I particularly like the map display for maintaining situational
awareness. I feel concern when the A/C automation does not
respond (like engaging VNAV) only to find out that it did not
take, yet I had anticipated that mode was engaged. Trying to
translate ATC instructlons directly into the computer and not
getting expected responses (granted often operator error), causes
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a lot of head-down computer work. Altitude select knob set for
i00 foot increments a real poor arrangement. 21
Generally speaking I like the way the MD-88 operates in the ATC
environment. There is a problem on all automated aircraft when
your departure includes a hold-down at i0,000. Once your
autopilot goes into the altitude capture mode and begins to level
off, and event which occurs at varlous altitudes depending on
your rate of climb, the autothrottles start to retard to keep the
speed at 250 kts. Once you level off at I0,000 the command
alrspeed bug jumps to 320-330 knots range and up come the
throttles. If you were hand flying the airplane you would not
have done this. Some pilots overcome this by going to FMS
override and selecting a speed of 320-330 as the capture begins.
The throttles then remaln at climb power; however the airspeed
does exceed the 250 kt. limit and the FAA has violated pilots for
doing this. I think it is time for a regulatory change that
would allow climbing aircraft that are cleared to I0,000 feet to
utilize this procedure (or speed intervention on the 767 or 737)
or anything that will allow the throttles to stay at climb power
during this phase of flight. It would be a muchqsmoother _
operation. Would it really be careless anu reckless to operate
at 300-350 kts. at some polnt below the magical i0,000 foot
level? Another solution: don't clear us to i0,000 climbing. 44
The -88 is a hand full. Digital programming takes a lot of time.
Analog operation (DC-9) autopllot with basic throttles is a good
deal easler to use in a fast-changin_ environment, and in fact is
the method used on the MD-88 when thlngs _et busy: Below lO_000
feet one pilot is almost completely occuplea working the raulo
with the other flying the airplane. 57
I like the hold page. Gets you into holds easily. I also like
the green descent arc in the map mode° No more mental gymnastics
on crossing restrictions. I don't like a V/S wheel that controls
both the V/S and the IAS, which when touched in the capturing of
an altitude disarms the capture and selects a new pitch mode.
Provides a lot of excitement. <See Question No. I> 59 [L-1011
F/O]
FMS requires too much heads-down operation in terminal
environment. Lack of tight integration In cockpit systems and
automation increases workload. 62
°
Things go well once you get the feel for the modes, and don't try
to set up the FMC below say i0,000 feet. ATC should avoid last
minutes runway changes. New pilots get behind very easily in the
automated cockpits. During parallel approaches ATC vectors you
toward the localizer. They should always clear you to intercept
it because often they get busy and run you across it, and legally
you must just continue on their vector. 77
I like the ability of the Nav display (ND) of the MD-88 to show
the relationship of the aircraft, nav aids, airports, and
weather. This is a major step forward is safety. When ATC gives
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vectors in the terminal area for weather, the ND is invaluable.
83
The MD-88 is difficult to slow down, especially if required to
descend at the same time. Autothrottle response - is notsmooth
enough. If [ou are a little slow in a turn In t/le urarrlc
pattern, or if ATC asks you to increase A/S by 20-30 kts., the
autothrottles will jam on too much power -- very uncomfortable
for the passengers. 85
DC-9 Crews
TABLE V-4. Listed below are replies to Question 4 by two or more
respondents (DC-9).
Need dual head radios
DC-9 can do anything required
Good radio practices are essential
Low-tech works better than automation
Precise navi@ation difficult;.hard to track airways
Poor trim adjustment in autopllot mode
Controllers talk too fast
Need independent flight directors on each side
Airspace is saturated
Flight directors are antiquated
ATC controllers are highly cooperative
DC-9 very maneuverable, responslve to flaps/slats
RNAV is needed
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
The DC9 works well except for being unable to get much point-to-
point or direct clearances. If you are not RNAV equipped, you
don't get the shortcut routes as often as RNAV aircraft. ATC
provides headings depending on their workload. 3
Troubles: holddowns, slowdowns, delays, saturated frequencies,
less than capable controllers/equipment, less than capable
pilots, inade_.ate separation, untrained radio voices. Works
well: flexibllity, permitting deviations <route>, mostly sharp,
clear, concise instructions or calls, forwarding weather
information from previous flights, general courtesy. 4
DC-9 works well in ATC environment, but will not come down like a
727 and won't go up like a 767. I have never before seen or used
an flight director that doesn't have an altitude hold bar. I can
fly the airplane better than the autopilot on a coupled approach.
The autopilot has a hard time with gear/flap/slat movement. I
always thought the machine should be able to do better than me.
I have to get everything stable so I can take over. All in all,
it's a fairly versatile airplane. 6
The DC-9 works well in the ATC environment specifically because
it lacks the automation I loved so well in the 767. ATC is not
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geared toward RNAV/VNAV capabilities, so these features can range
from useless to handicap. The DC-9 is low-tech in a low-tech ATC
environment. The most serious fault is the lack of positional
awareness that could be _reatly improved, not with a 767 map
display, but with such slmple additl?ns as an HSI, and_D_ME on all
ILS frequencies. Having had DME to nne runway in nne 767 rea±ly
emphasizes what a safety factor .this is in the terminal area.
There is occasional difficulty wlth ATC forgettlng how busy a
two-man crew can be. They always want us to understand that they
were "on the land line", but often forget that we have an
airplane to fly first, talk second. 7
Yes, the DC-9 does a good job. It's a 1955 technology aircraft
operatin_ in a 1955 ATC environment. Please have controllers
talk a llttle slower in the DFW and NYC areas. The faster they
talk, the behinder they get. The syste m is getting overloaded.
8
The DC-9 is underpowered compared with other, newer jets. Often
ATC will ask for unrealistic climbs. When we tell them that we
cannot make it that high, that soon, we get vectored all over the
place. Avionics are adequate for today's environment, although
two independent flight dlrectors would be helpful. Simplicity
ma---kes the airplane easy and fun to fly. No FMS to babysit. 29
The DC-9 is OK. Our navigation ability is very limited as to its
precision and overall capability. Numerous correctlons are
required to stay on course.. We are rarely dead on an airway
centerline. Much mental arlthmetic and "how goes it" checks are
needed to satisfy crossing restrictions. We cannot _o directly
to a VOR much more than 200 miles away. VOR needle indications
often waver back and forth making precise navigation difficult.
39
Yes, I like the way it operates, but if you have a problem,
either in the aircraft or in the cabin in the terminal area -
with bad weather and lots of traffic - you can really get behind
trying to deal with everything at once. The DC-9 systems are
simple enough that problems can easily be handled. Listening up
before speaking; using your call sign always; don't get mad
people are probably trying as hard as they can to do right. -If
you have a delay or a go-around, so what? Come back and do it
again. You can build situational awareness by listening to the
radio and gettlng everything done before you get down into the
terminal area. 40
I am content with the way the DC-9 operates under normal
conditions. However, during times of heavy workload, one
additional factor such as an aircraft malfunction or passenger
problem can tax the crew to the limit. An ACARS syst.emwould be
useful in the DC-9. The flight director in the DC-9 is
antiquated and "sloppy" compared to latergenerations. 41
The DC-9 works well in the environments that the company sends us
into. We do not go into LAX, DCA, or NYC. This relieves us of
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some of the more unpopular cities to fly into. I also get the
feeling that the ATC controllers are aware of our capabilities.
They seem to issue clearances that are usually easy to
accommodate. 46
I think ATC must have been designed around controlling the DC-9.
On other airplanes, they frequently set you up high. The unique
problem of the DC-9 is tracklng the airways. .The controllers
seem to be much more aware of the lack of preclse aunerence co
airway centerlines. This of course is the result of our not
having computer-generated displays in our cockpit. 67
VOR/DME navigation is archaic. Point-to-point inertial through
the FMS is more accurate and would (does) provide both ATC and
the flight crews with better and simpler tools. The problem is
with the mix of the two. If the ATC system were designed for
RNAV, we could take full advantage of _he current technology and
simplify the entire system. How about requiring RNAV in the high
route system? 74
I like the fact that low automation keeps me involved with the
flight, but automation would be nice to reduce r_le worK±oau
occasionally and reduce fatigue during long days. The most
frustrating items in theDC-9 are: i) flight director; 2) the
PDI and RMI needles are all +/- 2 to 4 degrees, sometimes more.
Some Centers are accustomed to and insist on all aircraft
tracking a radial precisely. In the DC-9, there is no such
precision. I think common sense, courtesy, and empathy go a long
way in dealing with anyone. On thing that perhaps controllers
could be aware of, particularly approach controllers,.is _na_
they sometimes ask us to maneuver in such a way that Is
uncomfortable to passengers. We tend to comply, partly due to
vanity, and partly because we don't want to be "punished" with a
delay due to failure to comply. 82
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.What can you say about overall workload of the DC-9/MD-88
compared to other aircraft you have flown? Include mental
workload, monitoring, etc.
MD-88 Crews
TABLE V-5. Listed below are replies to Question 5 by two or more
MD-88 respondents.
Great amount of monitoring required, increases workload
High workload; highest of any plane I've been on;
higher than the DC-9
No _rgblem once you're experienced on aircraft;
inltially difflcult
Mental workload higher
Mental workload is less
Checklist is too long, creates workload
FMC must be watched
757 is a superior airplane
Workload the same as other aircraft; no problem
I0
8
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
There are more things to watch over than in a traditional plane.
If you could trust everything to work as advertised, the only
concern would be programming ("typing") on the computer.
Unfortunately when you least expecu It, something goes wrong and
you have to both fix the mistake or problem and also get the
aircraft going where it should be. If you just had the normal
scan and flew the airplane it would be simpler which of course
you can always revert to if you want. 9
Checklist is too long. Initial setup at the gate is relatively
long (i.e. entering fuel into ACARS, enter ZFW twice, entering CG
and ZFW CG). However, many other chores are eliminated (EPR
c---arculations, gross weight). In flight the workload is lightened
except for the checklist length. The revision of our checklists
(12-15-89) is a big improvement. Mental workload is greatly
reduced thanks to the FMS. However, the FMS does occasionally
miscalculate and it needs to be watched fairly closely. 10
The highest workload of any (transport) aircraft I have flown.
The workload on the ground is heavier than any aircraft I have
flown. Monitoring can be a pain. There are too many
combinations of switches that can get you in trouble, ii
From T/O to landing the workload on the -88 is less. If feel
that in the terminal area, the use of the FMS with the autopilot
is too much work. It is far easier to manually control the
autopilot or hand fly. 12
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You can't take your eye off for a second. I enjoy the workload.
Otherwise I would get bored. 13
Harder to stay An the loop - no need to get chart out and check
radlals, Thas can-cause boredom, causing pilot to be out of the
loop. It is harder to be a passive monitor than an active one.
I try to check radials and use charts to prevent this. 14
In the MD-88 you can do much more, but automation increases your
workload due to the increase in monitoring duties and FMS
programming. 15
Under normal circumstances the MD-88 workload is equal <to th?_
DC-9>. But, at time of high stress, ix you ury no stay up wltn
what is going on and keep using the m aqic, the workload is much
higher. In other words, the magic relieves workloau only ir it
is set up ahead of t_me. I am not sure it really reduces mental
workload because you cannot sit and allow it to function without
close monitoring. 18
The MD-88 has a high workload. The FMS is a great tool but
demands a great deal of attention. You have to constantly be
aware of the mode it is in, and it often will switch modes on
you, LNAV to Heading Hold, for example. With the influx of new
copilots it is an added task to teach the FMS and how you want it
used. There seem to be different attitudes (both in training and
among other captains) on how to use the system. The automated
MD-88 definitely increased my workload compared to the DC-9. 19
Compared to the 767/757, I feel that the MD-88 has to be watched
carefully. I feel that the two-man crew (any two-man crew)
creates anxiety in that we're often both busy and not able to
monitor each other. On the three-man crew, I felt that there was
better cross checking of the other pilot. 21
The workload on the MD-88 is a factor of 2 to 3 times great than
the DC-9 on the ground (preflight, taxi-out, checklists). Once
airborne, workload may be slightly less if little programming is
required( or maybe more if changes come up which requlre
programmlng. 34
Workload is no problem. I have to admit, when I was flying on.a
three-man crew during the initial discussion about glass cockpits
and two-man crews I was skeptical. I became a believer about
half way to Los Angeles on first leg of my IOE as a 767 F/O. I
have since had to fly technologically disadvantaged three-man
crew aircraft, and I did not enjoy it at all. 44
Durin_ smooth, normal operations the workload is less <in the MD-
88> slnce less "thought" (e.g. tracking radials, working out
drift corrections, etc.) is required. During emergencies/system
problems a two-man aircraft involves more work and crew members
are unable to effectively monitor each other since one person
must fly and the other work the problem. In the MD-88,
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preoccupation with programming the FMS during these emergencies
can lead to task saturation, even though FMS programming is only
slightly helpful. 55
Overall the workload seems to be greatly reduced. In the
departure and terminal stages, thlsis essentially t.rue=whenlth.e -
full capabilities of the FMSare unuersuoou anaLu_e__- - _- ....
the first several months on _ne MD-88, r/zougn, _ne rmm =an u_
overwhelming and greatly increase workload.
Flying the DC-9 was a lot simpler, but required a lot of head
work. You were more involved wlth the flying. Your brain was
the computer, for better or f?r worse. In the MD-88 you do a lot
more monitoring, and do it rauner poorly. I would always want to
be looking at an approach plate when we didn't capture an
altitude. 59
The autopilot/flight guidance system is poorly integrated.on the
MD-88. The older B-737 SP-177 autopilot/flight director ismuch
easier to use and much more reliable. The workload in the
terminal environment and during preflight is high <MD-88>. The
overall cockpit layout is poor - the hazards of derivative
aircraft. 62
Initially the workload is quite difficult. After about 50-100
200-300 hour pointhours workload becomes better and at the ....
workload will decrease. Monitoring is.very _mporuanu ana you
must train yourself to continue to monltor, especially whenyou
think all is well. Remember, In God we trus_, everyuning else we
check. In an automated airplane, I recommend check twice! 77
DC-9 Crews
TABLE V-6.
DC-9 respondents.
Workload moderate, manageable, same as other aircraft,
no problem as long as conditions normal
Workload is higher_ or excessively high in DC-9
Workload is excesslve below I0,000 feet
Third man is needed during abnormals; workload
Listed below are replies to Question 5 by two of more
higher.in an[ two-man plane
Workload is fatlguing
No "magic" - less to worry about
First officer is overworked
Monitoring load is high
Mental workload is high
17
7
7
5
4
4
3
3
3
DC-9 workload is as much as any aircraft in our fleet. With new
i00
copilots it increases the captain's monitoring workload. New
copilots should have more company experience before checking out
as initial F/O. 1
When ever_hing is going well, the workload is fine.. It's just
when outslde factors such as weather, maintenance promlems, or
passenger problems enter the _icture that it can create stress.
The DC-9 is a hands-on operatlon, so you don't have the computer
to worry about. I find that when the workload gets hectic,
actually hand flying the alrcraft helps me deal with the
situation better. 2
Man is better at working than monitoring. To me, the new
eneration of aircraft should advise the pilot of possible errors
n a passive manner, and possibly provide guldelines.for ac_lon.
Computers are better at monitoring, and should be.ut111zed to
assist the pilot in his decision making. Monltorlng can,De
boring work and even a distraction. Remember, "qulet anu aarK"
are ideal for sleeping, too. As to below Cat II approaches, why
deliver people to a destination where they can't see to get home?
4
Much of the DC-9 workload in arrival/departure area is a very
high mental workload. In the 1950 cock_it and the 1990
environment, we must do most of our declsion making without
information that the glass cockpits have. No wind information,
no visual picture of the airport and our position CRTs show far
more information than we have in the DC-9 cockpit_ Autopilot,
autothrottles, and altitude capture are sure a help in arrival
and departures. 5
On every airplane I have flown, one crew member does more work
than all the others. The F/O on the DC-9 does all the engineer's
work, all the F/O's work, and half the captain's. I try to help
as much as I can, but sometimes get loaded down and I can't watch
him <F/O> as much as I'd like to. I like to fly the airplane to
cruise altitude, then hook up the autopilot, and later fly the
plane from I0,000 to landing. I think this lessens my workload.
6
Stick and rudder and navigation workload is higher, but button
pushing workload is lower, than automated aircraft. Overall
workload on the DC-9 is lower than the 757, but the tasks that
remain are not as much f_-----Secause they include the menial tasks,
such as chart study, course setting, etc. It is too simplistic
to stack up tasks on each side of a scale. Higher workload on a
757 can be more relaxing and enjoyable if the tasks themselves
are less tedious and repetitive. Comprehensive warning systems
greatly reduce the mental workload because a pilot does not feel
the need to constantly recheck routine luems. _nergy can De
directed toward flying the aircraft. 7
The workload of the DC-9 is similar to the 727 and DC-8, very
manageable until an abnormal situation occurs. Then the 2-man
versus 3-man crew differences become obvious. With a 3-man crew
I01
there is always someone who can devote full time to flying the
aircraft. In a 2-man crew, in an abno_---a_--situation (mechanical,
passenger, etc.) generally 1 1/2 men are dealing with the problem
and 1/2 man is flying the aircraft. 8
<The DC-9 has> fewermagic components to babysit. This makes
things simple. It forces you to stay involved with the airplane.
If too many things were automated, _ou would become detached and
miss things. Overall the workload Is moderate, depending on the
terminal environment. I enjoyed "flying the airplane with my
mind" and figuring out climbs/descents etc. 29
The workload on the DC-9 is greater than it was on the L-1011.
This is partially caused by the fact that the DC-9 is two man
crew (vs. 3 for the L-1011) and no.rmally flies mor? legs per duty
period. But the DC-9 also has a hlgner men, a± worKloaa r/%an the
L-1011 due to the lack of automation on the DC-9. The DC-9
requires constant attention to navigation. There are no
computers to automatically fly a programmed route. Much mental
arithmetic is needed in the approach phase to compute star_-uown
points, and to satisf_ altitude crossing restrictions. On a i0
to 12 hour day involvlng six-plus legs, it definitely affects the
fatigue factor. 39
DC-9 - higher workload due to shorter hops. More stops equals
more dealings with ATC, passengers, fuelers, etc. More time down
in light plane country. I get pretty tired after a bad day
(weather, all instrument approaches to minimums, etc.). The
four-day trips we have are notorious. You really have to watch
it on the fourth day. You can easily make errors. 40
I don't find the workload a burden. Naturally a new copilot has
his hands full and it takes a while for him to feel comfortable.
The workload is higher in any two-man plane than the 3-man. With
the DC-9 being a manual aircraft, once you have everything done,
you just fly it. The automated aircraft takes more work
reprogrammlngo Once you are flying, unless you get ATC changes,
the automatic aircraft will do everything for you. My friends on
the MD-88 say that because the computer says it's right, many
_eople don't cross check the automation to see if the information
is correct (for example, are they really going to make a speed
and crossing restriction). 63
There's no doubt that the DC-9 is tough duty compared to other
airplanes. Lots of legs, lots of small, poorl [ equipped
airports, lots of new employees, limited avlonlcs and airplane-
related equipment. The good part is that it's really flying.
Lots of challenges with proven, albeit old, equipment, and eager,
young co-workers. What could be better? 67
I believe for the workload for the captain is•a lot less than
other aircraft, but for the F/O it is ! lo___tmore. 80
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6. List the features or modes of your aircraft flight guidance,
instrumentation, and avionics that you like and dislike.
The results of this question are given in Table V-7 below.
Following the tabulated responses are verbatim responses where
these were included by the volunteers.
TABLE V-7. Likes and dislikes in cockpit equipment.
LIKES: MD-88 Crews
Item
Times
Mentioned
Map mode of HSI
HSI map and weather radar on one display
Airports and nay aids on HSI map
Flight path on HSI map
Map plus DME
Flight Management System (FMS) in general
Information available from FMS
Hold page
Autoland Cat II and III capability
Autothrottle (esp. T/O and cruise)
LNAV (NAV)
VNAV
FMS override button
Auto go-around
[i]
Direct intercept page
VOR designator (3 letters) to establish waypoint
Various levels of automation available
NAV-autopilot-autothrottle relationship
Vertical speed mode to climb in turbulence
Reliable autopilot
Glass cockpit in general; EFIS displays
FMApanel
EPR calculation regardless of anti-ice use
Color radar
ACARS
Fast/slow bug on PFD
ILS display
ADF display
ETA to fixes
Dual head radios
Engine power
Automatic strobe light
Autobrakes
Transponder auto shutoff after takeoff
Pressurization
13
9
3
1
1
I0
4
6
5
4
3
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
4
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
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DISLIKES :
Item
MD-88 CREWS
Times
Mentioned
o_m_Imml_
AHARS (unreliable; not up to IRU)
VNAV descent (rough; unable to maintain airspeed)
VNAV level off at I0,000 feet (power surges)
ND obscured by yoke
Altitude select knob (I00 foot adjustments)
Mysterious loss of alt hold and alt capture
Altitude control in level-off
Altitude alert window (numbers change)
Map failures due to navaid loss
FMS hard to get used to
DFGS in general
FMS too complex (e.g. hold page)
Auto_ilot-FMS interlink cumbersome
FMA info should be on ADI (like 757)
Can't auto tune VORs
7
9
5
4
4
3
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
Autothrottle response
A/T slow to respond to level off
Speed modes awkward
Autopilot
A/T on landing
Assigned airspeed doesn't go into profile calculation
Difflcult to transition to IAS mode smoothly
Vertical speed wheel
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
Too many FMC (and map) failures
Computer slow to respond
Burned out lights in engine display, FGS panel
Lack of logic in switch patterns and movements
MCP design
ADI screen in fuzzy
3
1
1
1
1
1
Air conditioning system
Flat plate digital instruments for engine parameters
MCP design
DFGS should have self-illuminating buttons
Time spent programming (head in cockpit)
Updating heading bug (company policy)
Too many ways to do the same thing
Too many buttons to press to do some things .
Too many repeated inputs (e.g. ZFW)
VNAV below 12,000
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
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LIKES :
Item
DC-9 CREWS
Times
Mentioned
Simple o_eration; basic airpl.ane; easy to understand
"Evervthlng" - good generic alrplane
Basic-air_lane - allows you to keep up skill level
Avionics in general
Reliability
Flight director ("simple")
Autopil?t ("simple", "predictable")
PDI reclprocal heading feature
SCAT
ILS - A/P mode
Heading select
Approach coupler
Engine instruments
VOR/DME
Manual throttles
"steam gauge" <traditional dial>
Heading bug on flight director
ILS ("stralght-forward")
Hand flying
Smooth roll control
Landing characteristics
instruments
8
3
1
3
2
8
6
6
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Comments
The DC-9 works fine if you understand its limits. 37
All facets of the avionics, instrumentation, and guidance are
SIMPLE! The autopilot doesn't fly the pilot: the pilot has to
fly the autopilot. VOR/DME information seems to be enough to get
around in our domestic U.S. system. I'm not interested in INS or
ground track information. I really like flying the DC-9.
The DC-9 is a good basic aircraft that will do anything but
autoland. Because it is a basic airplane, it keeps your flying
skills up. 63
The good thing about the DC-9 is its simplicity. Once you've
made the trip back down memory land and gotten comfortable again,
it's really a remarkably reliable, simple airplane. And best of
all, it flies great. 67
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DISLIKES : DC-9 CREWS
<Note: most of the "dislikes" listed by DC-9 crews were items or
features that are not present in their aircraft. These are
listed in the first segment of the table below>.
Item
Times
Mentioned
Lackinq, or would liketo have:
HSI (in place of RMI and PDI)
Autoland
Pitch reference on F/D
Altitude hold bar on F/D
VOR annunciation in F/D mode
Light test feature in F/D mode
Altltude capture on A/P
Pitch command on F/D in level flight
Wind or TAS readout
Go-around mode on A/P
RNAV ("for fuel savings")
Angle of attack indexer ("for windshear escape")
Third VHF com to monitor company radio
Dual DME dlsplays for each pllo_
ii
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADF (non-digital)
Weather radar (need color; antiquated; erratic)
Flight director
Cockpit antiquated in general
Autopilot ("sloppy", unresponsive in some modes)
Autothrottles
ADI (too small)
VOR mode on A/P
Engine instruments
Gear horn cutout only on F/O's side
Hard to equilibrate VHF volume esp. over i0,000
Can't hear bell when F/A calls
Would like redundant and independent A/P and F/Ds
Pitch control too sensitive on descent
Sometimes skids when A/P engaged in level flight
Instrument lighting
Can't engage A/P in a turn
ATC demands more than a DC-9 can do
ILS needles are in poor position
Too many lights are illuminated on the ground - hard
to catch important one
Altitude alert
Hard to remember which compass inputs to what _
Lacks the basic "T" arrangement due to PDI
F/D and A/P don't always agree on coupled approach
Approach coupler is not smooth
4
3
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
i.
i-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Pressurization is a problem is not set correctly 1
Can't see VHF No. 1 freq. when captain uses A/P turn knob 1
No. 1 DME and altimeter hidden by yoke 1
Slat extend light hidden from view [i] 1
[I] Doesn't say by what.
Comments
1950's cockpit in a 1990 environment.
The whole cockpit of the DC-9 with respect to flight guidance,
instrumentation etc. is marginal. The reliability of our DC-9s
is superb. While I may not like some of the instrumentation, at
least they always work.
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• If you have flown both a traditional an_dd ! qlass cockpit
aircraft (MD-88 or 757/767), please glve us your insights
into the differences between operations in the traditional
and the glass cockpit. (If not, please leave blank).
MD-88 Crews
I have flown traditional aircraft (KC-135, T-37) in the Air Force
and now the MD-88. The biggest advantage to the glass cockpit is
the amount of information available to .the_ilot from the FMS,
and the autothrottle and autoland capabl±lules. The disadvantage
is the time spent inside the cockpit trying to program the FMS,
when often times it would be easier to fly the whole plane by
hand without the neat gadgets. My biggest concern, with the glass
cock, it is the erosion of basic flyin_ skills in instrument
conditions. We.rely so much on autopiiot (because we are
encouraged to glve a smooth ride to the passengers) that the
basic crosscheck of flying instruments, and eye-hand coordination
skills, become rusty along with the confidence to fly an
instrument approach down to minimums. 9
I rely on the FMS map without cross-checking the charts. Every
now and then the map will be off by up to 1/3 mile, as verified
by the outer marker. Situational awareness is much better in a
glass cockpit. 10
I like the glass cockpit. The CRT is tremendous in helping us
know exactly where we are and how much we really need to deviate
in weather. The bird's eye view it gives us is fantastic. The
flight guidance system and FMS still increase rather than
decrease workloads at the times you need their help the most. I
liked flyin_ the glass cockpit because it was a challenge, but it
definitely is not a workload reducer In Its present format. You
also have to work at keeping up your basic flying skills or you
lose them. I still back up everythin_ with VORs and radial
selections. If in doubt, I still believe the VORs. ii (L-1011
F/O)
The glass cockpit aids the pilot in finding a field he is
unfamiliar with at night. I would never go back to traditional
cockpits if I can help it. 13
I flew both the DC-9 and the MD-88. You can do much more with
the FMS and the DFGS and autothrottles. But there are moments
when you workload is actually increased on the MD-88. Also,
FMS/autothrottle responses are sometimes very slow or abrupt.
They need to be updated to smooth, reasonable response times• 15
The glass cockpit has significantly more information available to
the pilot on few instruments. The glass cockpit or advance
automation is hard to use or program when unusual situations come
up, such as holding at a different fix, or routing changes once
the computer has been programmed• 16 (DC-9 Captain)
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The glass cockpit has some very, ver_ nice features, such as the
nay display, which makes route plannlng, weather avoidance, and
ever to some extent route changes easier to visualize and
complete. I particularly like the nay.display during an ILS
approach when the whole picture is belng displayed and your exact
posltion is easily determlned. I do not like.the fa?t that the
same nav display with go D/R and then "nay fall" a_ nne wors_
moment. Then the workload required to recover the N/D is usually
too high and the rose or arc displays must be selected. In the
terminal area, the workload can be very high if you try to keep
up with the FMS. Usually it is better to set it up for the final
approach and use the "straight" autopilot until then. I also do
not like the fact that at least half the nav display is hidden by
the yoke. I cannot emphasize enough th.e absolute necessity as
captain of being certaln that the FMS is doing what you think it
is doing. 18
In the traditional aircraft, all attention in the critical areas
of flight are on the primary flight instruments, and if it's VFR,
the outslde environment. To use the automated cockpit, a certain
amount of the attention is diverted. It has to be, in order to
run the automated cockpit. On takeoff the PNF has to look in the
cockpit to push climb power, VNAV, and to run the flaps up at
i000 feet. In the traditional cockpit, the PNF can do his duties
and still look outside. In the approach environment the PNF has
to have his head in the cockpit much more in the automated
cockpit. I feel that the automated cockpit is not desi_ed for
VFR. Your outside awareness is much better in the tradltional
cockpit. 19
I believe I maintained a better situational awareness in the
traditional cockpit. I find that I frequently expect the magic
to take care of me and I allow myself to be dlstracted from
flying the airplane. 21
Traditional is much easier and simpler to operate...few system
require "programming." Set VOR course and frequency - what else
is there? It requlres you to stay in the loop and do more head
work (updating frequency and course, planning descents,
visualizing a holding pattern or best headings to go around a
storm. On the negatlve side, if you get out of the loop, there
is no pre-programmed course or descent to back you up. The basic
difference is that a glass cockpit provides a tremendous amount
of information, some of it useful, some of it distracting.
However, in order to get the useful information, the system has
to be programmed en route. This takes time (workload) when time
may be of the essence. The interface between crew members and
the systems is a major factor in how the system will be used.
The interface on the MD-88 has not been designed as well as it
could be (767 guys can't wait to get back to that aircraft). 34
From an operational point of view, there are few if any real
differences with the exception of the map <HSI map mode>. While
this is very useful, it promotes a loss of abillty to "visualize"
the aircraft position. With respect to the FMS, I strongly
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believe that a solid foundation is needed in terms of basic
fl_ing skills. This is difficult, if not impossible, to get by
inltially flying an aircraft like the MD-88. 35
1) Glass cockpit is always 2-man. In weather with an emergency
you approach (sometimes exceed) task saturation. 2) High level
of automation can leave pilot out of the loop since humans are
not good at lust monitorlng (wit,.out coupling monitoring to
action), and you get bored and dlstracted. That's flne as long
as the system is working properly, and it's been programmed
properly. But if these two prerequisites are not met, it'll bite
you. 3) Glass cockpit - a pre-condition exists (I know caus?
I've done it) with analyzing why the aircraft isn't doin_wna_
you thought you told it to do. So you tr_ _o reprogram I_. A_
the while the error is uncorrected; e.g. It does not intercept
the ILS, so you check that it is armed, that .the ?orr?ct freq is
in, etc. .Meanwhlle you are shooting through une loca±Izer or
getting hlgh on the glide slope. 4) Tradltional cockpit - much
less flexibility than glass cockpit, e.g. lacks RNAV, more
difficult to remain position oriented, requires more attention.
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The workload of the PNF is greatly reduced in the glass cockpit
due to the fact that he doesn't have to look up freqs/courses,
etc. The ability to know your exact posltion Is definitely
comfo.rting. This is useful during visual approaches into
unfamlliar fields. 56
Glass cockpit are definitely higher workload environments. I
like them for a perverse reason - I like gadgets, as I suppose
most pilots do. Crew coordination gets to be a problem on an
aircraft with a DFGC because of the many different ways to
operate that accomplish essentially the same thing. This
presents more areas of disagreement between crew members as to
which technique is better. I frankly think that the traditional
cockpit is a far safer operation, but the glass cockpit is the
future because CRTs are cheaper to maintain than conventional
instruments, and this is a "bottom line" driven industry. 57
In the glass cockpit you rely more on the computer, and the
company pushes you to do it that way. They say you should back
everything up manually, but If you did you couldn't handle the
workload. I felt that my flying skills were better than flying
the traditional planes, but now I make an effort to turn off _the
magic every once in a while to remain proficient. 58 [767 F/O]
DC-9 Crews
<Note: Most DC-9 crews had not flown glass cockpit aircraft, and
hence could not answer this question. Only ten replies were
given. Nine of these are reproduced below; the tenth was
incomplete. Of the ten replies, eight had previously served as
ii0
first officer on the 767, one was now flying as first officer of
a 767, and one captain had just completed 767 school. None of
the DC-9 pilots in the study had MD-88 experience (see Figure II-
2 and II-3). The past or present 767 experience is noted in
brackets at the end of the comment.>
The traditional A/C can be set up for departure and changed much
easier and quicker than the glass A/C. Once we are out and on
our way, the.glass cockpitprovides much more information and
closer tracklng tolerances than traditlonal A/C. It's harder to
change route in the glass cockpit. I prefer the large HSI of the
767/757 over the smaller one on the MD-88. Approaches are easier
with the extended runwa_ centerline and less chance for wrong
airport landing under vlsua± approaches with the glass cockpit.
3 [former 767 F/O]
You stay more on top of situations and airspace around you in the
traditional cockpit. Glass cockpits--are fine if all goes as
planned, and the programmed information is correct. It is
disconcerting to have _our head down reprogramming when you're
descending into busy alrspace. Likewise, to delay departure
because you are re-or re-reprogramming your magic for ATC
changes, or disagreement with its internal workings. Glass
cockpits can be very boring - to distraction - when you're
cleared direct in the dead of night. But they can ease the
workload when you know what lies ahead. I prefer doing instead
of watching, yet I do appreciate the split-second support the
magic can provide. 4 [former 767 F/O]
The glass cockpit gives one so much more information in one
picture that mental time can be used on the big picture. In a
conventional cockpit much of the time is spent visualizing where
you are and where you will be. The glass cockpit gives you the
entire picture, as well as wind vectors, climb and descent
crossings. Automation in glass cockpit allows _ou to manage the
aircraft and spend time planning. Traditional is more hands-on,
so while you are trying to stay ahead, you must spend quite a lot
of time monitoring what is happening now. 5 [former 767 F/O]
The glass cockpit has a much lower workload en route. The tedium
of frequency changing, course setting, estima-tem-_ng, etc. is
all gone. The downside is that the pilot can drop out of the
loop mentally. This is not so much a problem at cruise, but
finding yourself out of the loop on an approach when computer
dumps can be disastrous. The temptation to re-proqram at this
point can be overwhelmin_ and also very dangerous. (We don't
emphasize enough the cholce of switching to manual nay at this
polnt.) In the traditional cockplt, there is less automation,
and thus less risk of findin_ yourself lost. One must stay in
the loop just to get the baslc job done...but over--capability
is decreased at a price. On balance, the glass cockpit is highly
desirable and a great safety advance, if training emphasizes the
dangers" of over-dependence on the displ-ays. 7 [Former 767 F/O]
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I just checked out on the 757/767 in February <questionnaire
received March>. I have to qualify my answer with the fact that
I only have one mon.th lime experlence on the 767 and things are
sul_± mew t? me. The FMc programming is not as compatible with
une ATe system as it should be. Too many times ATC clearances
are not as exact as FMC programming. Rather than giving a direct
clearance, ATC gives you an.airway intercept. It takes more
steps to program - it's easier to pick up a map. The FMC is
great for en route clearances and low densitM areas. There are
too many changes to make in high density arrlvals and departures.
The VNAV is not very smooth in making crossing restrictions .... 24
[New 767 F/O] .<Note: prior to the completion of this study, the
company recognized this problem and put more emphasis on choice
of automation level in the training program>.
I have just.finished training on the B-767, but have not yet
started flying it on the line. I do have some observations
unough. I like very much the technolo_, of the 767. However, I
thi.nk an.error has been made in the philosophy of flight
tralning.s approach to the use of that technology. We are
basicall_ instructed to use the auto systems all of the time.
Here I disagree. While we need to be thoroughly familiar with
the use of all the systems on the glass cockpit, we should also
be encouraged to often fly the aircraft using only raw data (DC-9
type) instrumentation. I think with all the emphasis on
automation there is a subconscious tendency for all pilots to
feel somewhat removed from the operation of the aircraft as the
"computer system" takes over. Complacency could be a result.
For sure greatly degraded basic instrument flying skills are a
result. 39 [767 captain just out of training]
The single largest drawback to the glass cockpit is the amount of
time required to feel comfortable and proficient with the
systems. Once you learn to scan and assimilate all the wealth of
information supplied by the glass cockpit, it becomes highly
beneficial. The autoland capability of the 767/757 is truly an
asset (likewise the L-1011 autoland). I miss not having such a
system on the DC-9. 41 [Former 767 F/O]
For the first 20 years of m_ flying career experience was
restricted solely to traditional cockpits, m_ felt comfortable
knowing that whatever needed to be done would only be done if I
did it: It was easy to understand the concepts and equipment and
une major cna±±enge was to develop your own physical skills to a
p?int_where they.measured u_ to your own lofty expectations. Now
unat _'m a captain, I am _rlmarily focused on the safe completion
of a flight, rather.than impressing myself or someone else with
finesse and _erfectlon in physical flying skills.
• From thls vantage, I like the assistance that the automation
gives In that it allows more attention to be given to the "big
picture", rather than concentrating0n physical details.
The problem obviously is that on rare occasions, there is an
equipment malfunction, off-route clearance in a busy ATC
environment, or weather problem that necessitates reversion to a
manual mode. This gives you a great deal of simpatico for a fish
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suddenly hauled out of water. Charts fly, blood pressure rises,
and confusion reigns supreme. With 20 years of experience flying
manually, I was able to cope with the occaslonal misfire. My
concern is with people who in the future will have less and less
of a reservoir of experience to fall back on.
My other concern is with the transition period into the
glass cockpit. Six months and 300 hours into the transition
period, I felt extremely comfortable wlth and confident in the
new technology. In fact, I would still go back to the 767 in a
minute if senlorit_ allowed it. The first six months was a
period of slow assimilating the new way of flying. I felt like a
world class marathonertrying to ride around on a bike and
getting tired. Different skills were required to do the same
task, and it seemed quite frustrating and confusing.
Another concern is that making the airplane do what you want
it to do by pushing buttons becomes almost an end in itself. You
have some difflcult_ ascertaining that line where you need to
give up on controlling the magic and concentrate on controlling
the airplane by whatever means necessary. This is also a concern
below i0,000 feet where.you can easily become enthralled with
pushing buttons and monitoring the magic and forget to
concentrate on such real hazards as uncontrolled aircraft and
flocks of birds.
I only flew the 767 for one year, but toward the end of that
time, after 600-700 hours, another potentlal problem became
apparent. After you s_end six months figuring out h?wto _ .
efficiently o_erate thls marvelous machine, you s_arn ueveloplng
a deep a_preclation and respect...almost awe...of It. You
monitor it hour after hour and it functions perfectly and you
soon realize that it can fly longer and more perfectly than you
will ever be able to do. After a while it's difficult, bordering
on the impossible, to monitor it the way you would a fellow crew
member. After all, you know that a fellow crew member is going
to foul something up once in a while, so you keep alert knowing
that you may need it for ammunition for the times when he catches
you in a foul-up. It makes a nice little mental game and keeps
you both sharp. With the computer, there's so few glitches that
the mind finally just gets overwhelmed with monitoring and goes
into the ignore mode in spite of all your best efforts to the
contrary. 67 [former 767 F/O]
By far the biggest advantage of the glass cockpit lies in the HSI
map mode. The ability to orient ones self at a glance instead of
relying on the mental gymnastics of bearing and DME, which
requires constant updating (and the added burden if the VOR is
co-located with the airportl frees one to concentrate on other
aspects in the approach envlronment. I think the company should
emphasize (encourage) the importance of each pllot hand flylng a
raw data approach at least once during every rotation--especially
on the 767/757. In my three years on the 767, I was amazed at
how few pilots went back to the old compass rose and flew raw
data. It was a humbling experience every time I did it, but it
was a good reminder that the "old ways" are still there as a
backup. I had one experience with a bad DME signal in Boston
that skewed our map by over 15 miles on an approach to R/W 4R in
113
low weather conditions.
74 [Former 767 F/O]
Otherwise, the system worked flawlessly.
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.Please feel free to add anything else that you think we
should know about the human factors of your flying job.
MD-88 Crews
Overall, the MD-88 is a big improvement over older generation
concepts. If the pilots are not prone to complacency, it is much
safer_in the MD-88, as well as more efficient. It is up to the
pilots, however, not to let their attention lapse to a point
where they let the A/C do things that are n?t Intended. It is
easier to stay ahead of the MD-88 than on o_ner A/C, DU_ l_ is
not automatic. I0
Stress keeps going up. I am afraid of making any kind of mistake
for fear of losing my livelihood. I am human and we humans are
not error free, yet we keep going with-the opposite assumption,
and when we do make an error, we are therefore punished even
though there ma_ be a reason for us doing this. We look at what
error was done Instead of trying to understand why it was that we
were placed in a situation where the likelihood of an error being
committed was greater. Radios are the weakest link in our
system, yet we run our operation as if they will always work.
When you really need the readback procedure to work on ATC, which
is when you are busy, it's a joke. When you are busy the
controller will usually miss a wrong readback. He too is task-
saturated and is no longer listening -- he is thinking of the
next command he must issue, ii
I would like to see a study of the duty day, including: i) the
number of legs per duty period; 2) rest breaks during a duty
period. Some of our trips have 12-hour days with at most a one-
hour break between legs with an A/C change. This leaves no time
to eat during a long duty period, especially in bad weather; 3)
rest breaks between duty periods. 18
I feel that there is a definite difference in the copilots that
have flown copilot on traditional cockpits and then moved to the
automated; as opposed to copilots that have just flown the
automated cockpit. The former are more aware of the outside
environment and flying the airplane. The latter are much more
concerned with using the automation efficiently, but forget that
we don't fly by ourselves. I also feel that we need to
constantly practice flying airplanes. We need to make raw data
approaches and takeoffs. That is how we get our feel for the
alrplane. I hope that the new automation does not become a
crutch rather than a tool> 19
I strongly believe that the 3-man crew was lost to purely
economic considerations, at a real safety loss. We gave up the
redundancy of human factors. When the "going gets tough" for 2-
man crews, the pilots often operate almost independently, unable
to monitor each other. On three-man crews, I always felt that
one pilot could concentrate on "aviating" and the other two
pilots could run the appropriate checklists, trouble-shoot, etc.,
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while double-checking on one another! The MBAs have won again!
21
With the advent of more complicated electronics and nay aids, we
are advocating that the pilot not flyin_ make all changes on.the
flight gu.idance control.panel, flap _osltion, radio rrequencles,
lights, Ig_itlon, anti-lce, etc. Thls.fur_.er. complicat?s _.
flylng) in tna_ i_ _aKes ulmematters for the pilot flying (hand
(albeit a short time) for the brain to pu_ a name on a particular
control to be moved, verbalize the control and movement. Then
reception, processing, and reaction time of the pilot not flying
come into play. The comment from above is "think ahead". Ifwe
could always foresee the future, instantaneous reaction of the
pilots would not be necessary. 22
Pilots need to remain proficient in all levels.?fautomati?n with
respect to the aircraft_ A p11ot needs_the_aDllln_o go _o____
"Plan B" in the event or any Klna or au_omauion.ral_ureo. _o_ny
policy should promote this.phllosophy of perioulcally uslng n
autothrottles, no flight dlrector. This would help keep those
skills in tune when the automation fails. 35
The absolutely worst human factors problem in our business today
is the continued scheduling of crews with late night and early
morning duty periods withln the sam.e rotatlon, as well as the
month's schedule° For example, • nau one _rlp when I arrived in
California at i:00 a.m. (4:00 a.m. EST). Then a day later I had
to get up in CVG at 4:15 a.m. for a 6 a.m. departure. No matter
how automated we get the cockpit, until these scheduled duty .
times are addressed then there will always be stress anu mls_aKes
ctors that onl managers have control to change. We
created by fa . Y - - ...... _Ii
as pilots have trled for many years _o correc_ _n_s anu s_ see
it in the 90's. 53
Fatigue is a problem in flight crews of any aircraft type. The
problem with automated cockpit crews is that they tend to rely
too much on the aircraft when fatigued. For example, when I am
tired I don't monitor altitudes in climbs and descents as closely
as I should to ensure altitude captures. The point I am trying
to make is that will all the technology available today, I feel
that more emphasis should be put on ways to provide safeguards in
cockpit automation to assist fatigued crews. The MD-88 Is
definitel_ a ste_ in that direction, but more should be done to
increase Its rellabllity. 56
retire in nine years. If the glass cockpits are the future,
'm glad to be retiring. Continuous automation does result in a
deterioration of flying skills, and the big problem is what do
you do when the electrons quit? Will a pilot still remember
basic flying skills? .I fly with copilots now who get upset and
have difflculty handllng the A/C if the flight director is off.
They're hooked on the steering bars. Without them, they're lost.
ATC is also a problem. A lot of new hire controllers know
nothing about airplanes, and especially do not realize that 250
kts. at 28,000 feet is not the same as 250 kts. at i0,000. I am
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also receiving a lot of ambiguous clearances from controllers
know
these days. I'm not sure what their standards are_ but I _'_i
they need to be raised. The qualiuy or new nlre _l±ous Is s_i±
-ood owin- to mv comDanv's preference for ex-milItary ty_es.
_-_--_-_- st_ll ve_J_imDortant in this business, and It's the
real reason the system isn t more dangerous than it is. 57
The current training policy when switching aircraft is
ridiculous. I was trained for the 767 from October 8 to November
15, then I went back to the MD-88 from them till December 31.
Then on January 7 I am on the 767 again. With the complex
cockpits and.s_stems of today's planes, do they.really expect me
to stay proflclent in one plane while training In another? 58
I feel increasing mental strain due to the legalistic climate
today.. Though I do my best _ersonally and attempt to foster good
communlcations and coordination with my fellow crew members and
other company employees who are part of this team, it seems that
this may not be enough to satisfy the FAA or the _ress should a
decision of mine be questioned. For example, taxiing at BHM for
flight to ATL, "autospoiler inop" messages is displayed on OAP.
We stop, check the POM, reset the C/Bs as directed, but the
message is still displayed. Next we check the MEL as directed
for landing weight penalty and description of items to comply
with in order to fly the aircraft with this message displayed.
for
Requirements include: A) Do not arm autospoilers _ . T/O or
landing; B) Do not arm autobrakes for T/O, C) Au_omraKes must
be placarded (MCO sticker applied). Do we: I) Return to the
gate to have MTC apply placard? 2) Comply with A and B and .
write up malfunction, continue to ATL, and have MTC a_ply placate
there? I feel that optlon 2 is no less safe than optlon I, but
in today's climate I chose to return to the gate. This all took
place in a recent LOFT, so it didn't cost the company any money
or inconvenience any passengers, but my concern is the effect on
the system this sort of thing is going to have. 60
The job today is not what it was 20 years ago when I was hired.
Today there are many factors combining together to erode the
satisfaction and esteem we once enjoyeu in unls career.
Sometimes we pilots have been our own worst enemies. I've never
heard a doctor tell people that open-heart surge.ry is a. pie?eof
cake. Yet pilots routinely play down the demanulng _asKs nna_ we
are called upon to perform. A Cat II approach in a blizzard with
cross winds, snow and ice covering the runway, and a generator
inop - "Aw shucks, Miss, there ain't nothing to it. Any monk. e_
could learn this." In my career I've been through a fuel crisis,
controller strike, two recessions, and deregulation. That was
nothing compared to the current frenzy over drug testing,
security screening, leveraged buyouts, and checklist changes. We
at this airline are fortunate that we have such a strong company.
Yet we feel the trickle-down effects of thesethings none-the-
less. The more automated the A/C becomes, the more my role
changes frOm_atOn__ fliqht manaqer. The best system I've heardof is at Air The bought head-up displays (HUD) foe their
727's which allows pilots to hand fly a Cat III approach! In
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summary, the airline pilot job is not what it used to be. But we
all go through changes in life, so what's the bi_ deal? Well,
when frustration levels are increased at what polnt is job
performance adversely affected? 85
DC-9 Crews
You should have done this <experiment> prior to the manufacturers
and airlines dumping millions into the development and purchase
of all this fancy stuff. I prefer the close coordination of the
2-man crew. However, in emergency situations I would prefer
three men (hi_ackings, emergency descent for structural problems,
any t_e of sltuation that may require One person out of the
cockplt). Having one person left to work radios and possibly
operate systems (especially abnormal systems) is too much for a
safe operation. 4
Look into the scheduling practices of various airlines. It seems
that everyone wants to get his pound of flesh out of the crew:
the company, the passengers, the news media, the FAA, the NTSB,
the courts, the taxing authorities, airport security, and DOT
(with the drug testing). Pilots have to overlook all this
pressure and still do a safe and professional job. All of this
takes is toll mentally and physically. 6
Scheduling trips with long days and short layovers and back side
of the clock <night flights> that include landing in the early
morning and flying another leg do not lead to a very safe
operation. Too much time is being taken away from aircraft
training and used for CRM and security training. 24
Pilots and flight attendants should be scheduled together. At
least all day, but entire rotations or even an entire line for a
month would help team building and allow the entire crew to work
together much better. Sometimes we'll see five crews a day.
this does not make our job any easier. It would be nice to know
the _eople we work with long enough to know their names. Another
airl_ne schedules crews together, so the "inefficiencies"
argument doesn't hold a lot of weight. Without exception al___lof
the F/As and pilots I have talked to agree with me. 26
I feel that now the most irritating part of my job is the ATC
environment. Specifically the lack of coordination that goes on
between controllers. It seems that each controller sequences his
traffic according to a letter of agreement rather than the next
controller's ability to handle the aircraft. This is evident
when you are switched to a new controller and_he/she asks why you
are going so slow/fast. 28
F/Os need to realize that they have a ticket that can be taken
away and a job that can be lost. If they are too meek to
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criticize me when I am screwing up, they will have to pay the
consequences. I try to point out that I'll be making mistakes
and they.must call them to my attention. No one pilot can do it
all by hlm---se_f. 38
Why are we so tired after a three or four day trip? The day
after a hard trip you feel almost poisoned. It's not a "good
tired", such as results from hard manual work. Rather it is a
harsh feeling that seems to go all the way to the bone marrow.
I've never understood this. Our work is not hard physically and
it's not all that stressful mentally. Find a cure for this and
you can retire-_rly. 39
I think that more emphasis needs to be placed on studying the
physiological effects of poorly conceived flight rotations with
continually chan_ing sleep cycles, inadequate rest periods, and
lack of opportunlties for proper nourishment. Being tired,
dehydrated and hungry probably plays a much larger role in crew
effectiveness than the type of automation we employ. 41
1) Lack of food on some flights with long duty days, or
early/late flights when food service is closed, 2) Work days -
early one day, late the next. More attention should be paid to
diurnal cycle by scheduling. 3) Get the reporuers_newsj an_0%
lawyers out of the cockpit. Flight recoruers _cocKpl_J are ±
off limits until after all investigation is over and finalized.
4) Spend FAAmoney to upgrade all runways used fgrcommercial
aviation, with a minimum of. VASI, R/W markers wl_n lUOU root
length remaining, ILS, VOR_DME on all airports. The money held
by the government in the A_rport Fund <Avlation Trust Fund> to
help balance the budget figures doesn't do much to help safety.
49
There has.to be some wa[ to improve communications between ATC
and the alrplane. A volceless system using an up/down link wi_n
visual screen and printout (if desired) would be great. Don't
overload pilots with senseless, repetitious checklist items,
briefings which are often not listened to. Callouts are for the
benefit of the CVRs. All in all, we're a more standardized pilot
group which is good. However, let's not cross over a common
sense line and run a SAC <Strategic Air Command> type operation.
It's still a fun job - let's keep it that way. 51
In the Marine Corps in Viet Nam I sometimes flew over 90 hours
per month. As a commuter airline pilot and flight instructor I
flew nearly I00 hours some months. As a corporate pilot I flew
about 35 hours a month. With this company I have flown all full
contractual months with few exceptions for 14 years. My
conclusion? 35 hours is about mlnimum for staying sharp, more
than 80 is too much. Additionally, I believe that rotating
shifts, disrupted sleep patterns, back side of the clock flying,
etc. is highly deleterious and should be Krea_eu as SUCh for
scheduling purposes. 67
In today's flying you almost need a lawyer in the jumpseat. Any
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mistake (including the wrong foods for a positive drug result)
can cause a loss of license. Flying is not so hard, but keeplng
up with all the rules and being afraid to make a._mistake" can
cause an upset stomach. I've never known of a p1±o_ wn 9 . _.
deliberately made an error. Yet there is a feeling or navlng _ne
screws tightened more and more, so no possible human error can
occur. That is a wrong assumption the on the part of the public,
press, FAA, and the government. Working in a hostile environment
is not all that much fun, and it's very tiring, leadlng to
possible "errors" on.the pilot's pa.rt. It is tough to keep
awareness at 100% whlle always looklng over your shoulder and
being second guessed. 80 _!_!!_
_i¸ ,
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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This volume outlines the purpose, rationale, and methodology of
this study, and reports some of the.data.colle?ted, in a simulator
experiment, as well as from a questlonnalre. At _nls wrlting the
analysis of most of the data generated b[ the simulator
experamenthasnotbeencompletea, anawlllbe reported in
Accordingly, theexperimental
subsequent volumes of this report.
data reported here do not allow..theauthors to draft concluslve
results: .this will have to awalt _ne anal[ses wnlcnwa±±__
reported in Volumes II and III, and summarlzeg_In volume ±v-
Indeed, the primary questions whlch promptea unls stuuy, a neea
to understand differences between traditional and advanced
technology cockpits with respect to crew ?9ordination and
communication, will not be addressed in thls volume
Nonetheless we shall summarize and comment on the information
reportedhere, as we believe that even in its incomplete state,
the data reflect on the basic questions and hypotheses that
motivated this study.
B. SIMULATOR (LOFT) RESULTS
In this section we shall discuss the results of the LOFT
experiment covered in detail in Chapter IV. The reader should
keep in mind that the purpose of the LOFT experiment was not to
pit one aircraft model against another an9 ueclar? a wlnner. ±_
would better be described as an opporuunlty no aetermlne _ne
relative strengths and weaknesses of a traditional and a hlgh
technology version of the same basic air?raft. Inshort, it
should be regarded as an exploration, not a con_es_
Had it been a contest, it would have been a somewhat unbalanced
one, for as we have pointed out in Chapter II, the DC-9 crews
were considerably more experienced in_their aircraft.than.thos_
in .the MD-88. Although the DC-9 pilots nau more rlylng ulme ±
thelr aircraft, both with respect to hours in type and months in
type (see Chapter II), their total flying time was actually
slightl_ less than the MD-88 crews(the differenc? being
statistically non-significant). Also, statistical analyses
within fleets found no correlation between performance measures
and time-in-type.
The LOFT scenario described in Chapter III was designed to be
both realistic and fair to all crews. That is, we attempted to
construct a LOFT that would not, in any way that we could
predict, favor either the traditional or the high-technology
aircraft. The electrical systems that were failed and the
abnormal procedures for combating the failures were virtually
identical in the two aircraft, the other problems aealu w_un
weather and decision-making, which was essentially aircraft type-
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independent.
If there was one factor we attempted to build in, it was that the
LOFT be communication-intensive. .We believe that we accomplished
this. The LOFT was highly demandlng of the crews, but within the
bounds of realism, and appeared to meet the goal of requiring a
highly coordlnated effort between the two pilots. The
combination of the electrical problems, deteriorating weather
both at the destination and potential alternates, and clearance
into a somewhat irregular unpublished holding pattern created a
high workload atmosphere throughout the flight, and the need for
a well coordinated cockpit. A "one-man show" probably could not
have completed the LOFT successfully.
The fact that the LOFT scenario was communication-intensive
provided those crew members who had been through the company's
new CRM program the opportunity to practice what they had
learned. Even those who had not yet taken the course were
certainly aware of it, and mindful of the lessons that they would
soon learn. We will have to await the publication of Volume III
to gain insight into how the crews of the two very different
aircraft handled their cockpit communications demands.
Workload
One of the significant differences produced by the LOFT data was
that MD-88 pilots, using the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) rated
their own workload as hi_her than dld the DC-9 pllo_s. Tnls
finding is somewhat consistent with the informataon ?btalnea on
the questionnaire (see Chapter V, Section D, par_icu±ar±y open-
ended question No. 5 on workload. See also open-ended question
No. 7, for pilots who have flown both a traditional and a glass
cock_it aircraft.) Although there was great diversity of
opinion, it was generally felt that in spite of some of the
obvious advantages of the glass cockpit (e.g. the HSI map mode
display, the superior autothrottle, etc.), the workload in the
MD-88 could become excessive.
This was also consistent with the findings of previous field
studies in automation (Curry, 1985; Wiener, 1985, 1989), where
pilots of the advanced technology aircraft expressed the feeling
that during periods where the workload was high, the automation
increased the workload, and where it was low, it tended to reduce
workload.
The concern over workload in the modern cockpit was also
consistent with opinions of crew members in the host airline's
757/767 and MD-88 fleets whom the first author spoke with during
jumpseat observations. The typical comment, heard repeatedly
during interviews, almost to the word, was "I love this airplane,
love the power and the wing, and I love this stuff (pointing
toward the mode control panel and CDU), but I've never been so
_ in my life." At this point they often add, "But some day
it (automation) is going to blte me." The word "busy" and the
sentiments just quoted appear over and over in the lexicon of the
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glass cockpit pilots, even though as seen above, their overall
view of the aircraft is highly favorable.
_t as the word "busy" appeared so often in the conversations
nd-open-ended questionnalres of MD-88_pilots_ __the_wo_dh_e_ and
seen over ana over in _ne opinlons or u_-_ cre_ _ _
(and "slmplicity"). The DC-9 pilots repeatedly d_scribed.their
alrcraft, its systems anu opera_lons, as slmple. _so_e. many
of the attltude Items repo_)ed in Chapter IV address the question
of workload and automation )
The reasons for the subjective feeling of excessive workload in
the modern technology aircraft has been explored in the previous
field studies (see references above), and need not be repeated
here. We would mention that the LOFT portion of this study
essentially validated both the problem s and strengths of cockpit
automation reported in previous NASA research, and gave emphasis
to the words of previous authors (Wiener and Curry, 1980)
regarding the necessity to allow pilots t? work out their own
solutions to problems, wlthin reason, employlng automation, or
turning it off, as they see fit.
An interesting example was the entry into the.holding pattern at
Columbia. This was a demanding procedure, whlch was re_ulred by
ATC due to the presence of a no-radlo (NORDO) alrcraft in _ne
vicinity of Columbia VOR (CAE). The crews were 3us_ comlng orr
of a missed Category II approach, and had to copy their clearance
and plan their entry and holding pattern. For the DC-9 crews,
there seem to be few alternatives and little trouble. They
simply dialed the radial on their VOR course selector and with
this and DME flew by basic airmanship into the holding pattern.
For the MD-88 crews, there were alternatives. They could fly the
entry using basic airmanship and VOR navigation, much as the DC-9
pilots had done, or they could turn to the CDU holding page, set
up a waypoint to be used as the holding fix, and fly via direct
intercept to the holding fix, then allowing the FMC to establish
their holding pattern, and hold automatically. Many of the MD-88
crews that attempted this did so correctly, and exploited the
full benefits of automatic holding. However, several crews had
difficulty entering the unpublished holding pattern into the CDU,
or got "behind the airplane" and could no_ ca_cn up, and got lost
on the entry.
Perhaps the smoothest and safest performance of this task came
from those MD-88 crews who combined basic airmanship with
automation. These crews elected to ignore the hold page and FMC-
based navigation in general, and manually selected the VOR and
radial much the way the DC-9 pilots had done it. They then flew
manually or at a lower level of automation (e.g: autopilot,
heading selectF;and altitude hold). Upon crossing the holding
fix and establishing their inbound leg, they then turned to the
hold page and assigned the FMC the task of establishing and
malntaining the holding pattern.
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This type of performance, with a crew (presumably the pilot
flying) deciding when to use automation and when not to, has been
an issue In management and training in the last decade. One
extreme policy.has been to require that. the crews utilize the
automation. P11ots in prevlous field s_uuies nave rererreu co
this management policy as "We bought it, you use it." Many
pilots in this and previous automation studies have been critical
of their transition training for an allegea over-empnasls on
automation, on teaching only how to use, rather than whether to
use, various features of the available automation (see open-ended
question No. 3).
Curry (1985) urged training departments to offer what he called
"turn-it-off training." It would appear to the authors that this
particular port_on of the LOFT experiment, and the varlous
solutions attempted by the crews, brinks this problem into focus,
and validates the recommendatlons of W_ener and Curry. About a
year after the LOFT study, two airlines, Delta and Federal ....
Express, promulgated their own "Philosophy of Automation"(se?
Appendix 4). Delta's philosophy is clearly consls_en_ wl_n une
view that flight crews should have discretion, within the bounds
of reason, to use or not use automation, consistent with their
views of the best and safest way to perform a maneuver.
Perhaps out of these studies and the examination of the question
by Delta, Federal Express, and other airlines will emerge a new
doctrine: "We bought it, you decide if and when you wish to use
it." We would endorse such a management policy.
Crew Performance Ratinqs
The three measures of crew performance as judged by the expert
raters, the LOFT instructor and the NASA observer, produced few
statistically significant contrasts. Where significant results
were found, they again favored the DC-9 crews over the MD-88
crews. The crew composite ratings from the Overall Rating Form
filled out by the NASA observer revealed significantly higher (18
per cent) ratings for the DC-9 crews. On the Detailed Rating
Form the DC-9 crews again were seen as superior, though the
difference (about 8 per cent) fell just short of statistical
significance. On the CRM Evaluation form (sometimes called
"LIne/LOFT" form) no differences between aircraft models were
detected. The interpretation of these between-model differences
will be discussed later in this chapter.
It is interesting that so few contrasts produced significant
differences on the crew rating scales. It Is not easy to
interpret the failure of the captain versus first officer as
pilot flying to produce differences. There was in our LOFT plan
a defect that ma_ have diminished somewhat the potential of this
variable. At th_s airline the first off_cersare not permitted
to perform the duties of PF on Category II approaches. As a
result, at the point in the flight to Columbia where it was
ascertained that the weather required a Category II approach, in
those crews in which the first officer had been the PF, the
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captain had to take back the PF role for the approach. Following
the missed approach, some captains gave it back to the first
officer, but most elected to remain as PF for the holding pattern
and the diversion to Charlotte.
As a result of this transfer of duties, our ability to assess
differences in crews with the duties were assigned to captain or
first officer suffered during one of the critical points of the
flight. Differences between these conditions may emerge from our
analyses of crew coordination and communlcation (CRM), whlch wlll
be covered in Volume III.
In an analysis of reports to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting
System (ASRS), Orlady (1982) found not a superlorluy in one or
the other conditions, but the fact that cerualn types or errors
prevailed under each condition. For example, when the captain
was the PF, there was a greater number of reports of near mid-alr
collisions (NMACs), takeoff anomalies, and crossing altitude
deviations. When the first officer served as PF, there were more
altitude deviations, NMACs during approaches, and landing
incidents. Orladv's study was completed before the appearance of
the current generation of high-technology aircraft, and we do not
know of any study of the combined effects of PF/PNF duty
assignment and cockpit automation.
Crew Errors
In spite of the higher performance ratings of the DC-9 crews, no
such differences could be found in our analyses of error data.
Our experimental hypothesis, based on the field studies of Wiener
and Curry, including interviews and questionn.aire? by_ilots of
advanced technolog_ aircraft, was that cockpit automation
generates more serlous errors than traditional technology. Thus
we expected to see, among crews flying the same LOFT scenario,
not necessarily a difference in the number of errors, but a
different error distribution, namely for the MD-88 crews a higher
frequency of the more serious errors in our three-way
categorization of error severity. The reasons for this
hypothesis are discussed in Wiener and Curry (1980), and Wiener
(1988, 1989). To put it very briefly, it is in the nature of
digital systems to invite more serious errors, due primarily to
the opportunity to make blunders in digital input, but due also
to the relative lack of "coupling" of the pilot to the machine in
the highly automated models, and the lack of feedback inherent in
many automated systems in aviation and elsewhere.
While Wiener and Curry felt that they had some basis for su?h a
prediction, still there had not been an experlmen_al evaluation
of the types and severity of errors that would be produced by the
two levels of technology. We believe that this is the first
attempt to verify experlmentally the automation-severity of error
hypothesis. As the data reported in Chapter IV indicates, we
failed to find support for the hypothesis in this experiment.
Table IV-4 and the analysis of variance of these data reveal no
differences in mean number of errors between DC-9 and MD-88
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flights, nor is there a significant difference in the
distribution across the three severity classifications. Likewise
the error analysis performed by the NASA observer, who rank-88
ordered the severity of the errors commltteu Dy DC-9 anu Mu-
crews, showed that the mean error severity of the two aircraft to
be essentially equal.
It is true that we found no support for our hypothesis that the
more automated aircraft would generate more severe errors.
However, it is equall_ important to take note of.the fact that
the opposite hypothesis, that automation elimlna_es numan errors
by eliminating their source, oft stated by nne prouucers anu
supporters of automation, found no support from this experiment.
It is long been the dream of traditional englneers to "automate
human error out of the system." To the degree that this
experiment represents a realistic simulation of a highly
demanding airline flight segment, we f_nd little to comfort those
who see automation as a cure for human error.
C. CONCLUSIONS
What does this say for automation? Granted that the MD-88 crews
were less experienced in their aircraft, it appears that where
differences exist, they favor the performance of the
traditional technology aircrews. As to the difference in
experience levels, our sample of pilots actually represent the
real world of line flying, In that for at least the next few
years, the pilots of advanced technology aircraft wil_ hav_ less
time in.type than those flying traditional alrcrar_: Tne_-?u
crews dad, however, have eq_.al (actually slightly nlgner) _o_a±
flylng time than the DC-9 pilots. In the years to come, these
differences will be less apparent: the advanced technology
aircraft will no longer be the "odd balls" of the fleet, but will
be the mainstay. And accordingly, t_.eir crews will have time in
type approaching that of the pilots In the older aircraft. We
sav "approaching" because for several years, until the
traditlonal planes are retired, the phenomenon of DC-9, B-737-I00
and -200, and _articularly B-727 pilots, who s_end many years in
the same cockpit and accrue a vast amount of tlme in type, will
remain. The 20-year B-727 veteran can be found at almost any
airline.
Setting aside the differences in experience in type, we ask why
advanced technology has not served Its pilots better?
The pattern of results provide only weak evidence of e_ther
higher workload or poorer performance among.the MD-88 crews. The
statistical contrasts critical to our experlmental hypothesis .
failed to provide statisticall_ significant differences. Analysis
of the observer's detailed ratlngs only a_proach traditional
statistical significance criteria, while instructor ratings and
errors are in the same general direction but are nonsignificant.
We have identified either an overall effect of substantially
lower magnitude than those seen in previous investigations or a
problem that occurs only in narrowly defined situations.
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We would have to conclude that, with the exception of the overall
ratings of crew proficiency, we have failed to find reportable
dlfference between the performance of DC-9 and MD-88 crews, and
thus at this point cannot draw any inferences about the effect of
cock_it automation on the ability of qualified crews to fly a L
difflcult mission. We have falled to produce evidence to supporu
our hypothesis that automation would gen?rate more_serious ....d
errors. Clearly one may also conclude v_la_ we n_v_ nu= p_u==_ _
a case in favor of high technology cockpits - - that the crews or
the DC-9, a product of mid-1960 decade technology, performed just
as well as those flying a very advanced, very expensive, modern
technology aircraft.
D. EPILOGUE
Aviation safet_ is a living, growing, constantly changing
enterprise. Times change, new problemsemerge, new equ.ipment
appears, and the industry enjoys a steady improvement in
machlnes, materials, training methods and devices, maintenance,
information, procedures, supervision, and management. Many of
the problems pointed out in this report and in subsequent volumes
in this series have alreaay been remedied.
Certain portions of this report., mainly the discussion of errors
made both on line flights ana in our slmulation experiment,
involve self-criticism. It is a testimonial to the dedication of
the management of the cooperating airline and the professionalism
of the volunteer pilot group that they would share their
experiences and opinions with the authors, and hence with the
avlation community at large.
The errors and weaknesses reported here should not be viewed as
criticism of the host airline and its pilots, but as an example
to others of the unselfish efforts on the part of a company and
its employees to understand and imProve the human factors or
airline flight. The willin_ness to examine, recognize, anu
report conditions that require remedy is the foundation of flight
safety.
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Participant Survey
ID Number
Please fill out this short survey to give us your opinion about the LOFT scenario you have just
completed.
Crew Position (circle one) CAPT FO
1. Wea'e you aware of the events and problems presented in this LOFT prior to participating today?
No information about any aspect of it.
SHght familiarity with problems and events.
Considerable familiarity with problems and events.
Detailed information on problems and events.
Please evaluate the work or effort required by the scenario using the scales below. A general
definition is provided for each scale.
2. Mental Demand: How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g., thinking,
deciding, calculating, remembering, looking, searching, etc.)? Was the task easy or
demanding, simple or complex, exacting or forgiving?
Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High
3. Physical Demand: How much physical activity was required (e.g., pushing, pulling,
turning, contmning, activating, etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, slow or brisk,
slackor su_uous, restfulor laborious?
Low I 2 3 4 5 6 7 High
4. Temporal Demand: How much time pressure did you feeldue to the rateor pace atwhich the
tasksor taskdements occm'red? Was thepace slow and leisurelyor rapid and frantic?
Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High
5. Performance: How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals of the task
provided by the LOFT?. How satisfied we_'e you with your performance in
accomplishing these goals?
Perfect I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Failure
6. Effort: How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of performance?
Low I 2 3 4 5 6 7 High
7. Frustration Level: How insecure,discouraged, irritated,stressed,and annoyed versus
secure,gratified,content,relaxed,and complacent did you feelduring the task?
Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High
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OVERALL RATING FORM
Crew Number/Date
Aircraft DC-9 MD-88 (circle one)
Evaluate the crew as a team on each of the following items:
CREW COMMUNICATIONS AND DECISION MAKING
1. Communications were thorough, addressing
coordination, planning, and problems anticipated Not at all 1 2 3 4 5
2. Open communications were established among
crewmembers. Not at all 1 2 3 4 5
3. Timing of communications was proper. Not at all 1 2 3 4 5
(_)Communications were relevant, complete, and
verified. Not atall 1 2 3 4 5
5. Active participation in decision making process was ..
encouraged and practicecL Not at all 1 2 3 4 5
6. Alternatives were weighed before decisions were
madefinaL Notatall 1 2 3 4 5
(_ppropriate immediate actions were taken when time
was not available for crew decision making. Not at all 1 2 3 4 5
Very much
Very much
Very much
Very much
Very much
Very much
Very much
INTERPERSONAL (MANAGEMENT) STYLES AND ACTIONS
8. Crewmembers showed concern with accomplishment
of tasks at hand. Notatall 1 2 3 4 5
9. Crewmembers showed concern for the quality of
interpersonal relationships in the cockpit. Not at all 1 2 3 4 5
Very much
Very much
WORKLOAD AND PLANNING
_. Overall workload
Work overloads were reported and work prioritized
or redistributed.
12. Crewmcmbers planned ahead for high worldoad
situations.
13. Appropriate resources were used in planning.
Low 1 2 3 4 5
Notatall 1 2 3 4 5
Notata11 1 2 3 4 5
Notatall 1 2 3 4 5
High
Very much
Very much
Very much
CREW ATMOSPHERE AND COORDINATION
14. Overall vigilance
15. Interper_nal climate
16. Preparation and planning.
17. Distractions avoided or prioritized
__. Woridoad Distributed and communicated
Conflict resolution
Overall technical proficiency
Overall crew effectiveness
Inattentive
Hostile
Late
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Ale_t --
Friendly
Well in Advance
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Items 4, 7, i0, 19 and 20 excluded from analyses
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DETAILED RATING FORM
Crew Number/Date
Aircraft DC-9 MD-88 (circle one)
Evaluate each crewmember. Use the following ratings for all categories:
1 - below average
2 - slighdy below average
3 - average
4- slightly above average
5 - above average
•n/a - not observed or not applicable
Items specific to a phase are indicated in bold.
PRESTART
APU Problem Resolution
Crew Coordination/Communications
ATC & Ground Communications
Plan. & Sit.Awareness
Procedures, Checklists,Callouts
OverallPerformance & Execution
Captain
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
FirstOfficer
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
Notes
TAXI/TAKEOFF
Crew Coordination/Commnnications
ATC Commtmications
Plan. & Sit. Awareness
Procedures, Checklism, Callouts
Aircraft Handling
Overall Performance & Execution
Captain
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
FLrst Officer
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
Notes
CLIMB
Crew Coordination/communications
ATC Communications
Plan. & Sit.Awareness
Procedures, Checklists,Callouts
PA & PAX Handling
AircraftHandling
OverallPerformance & Execution
Captain
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
F'_rst Officvr
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
No_s
CRUISE
Crew Coordination/communications
ATC Communications
Plan. & Sit. Awareness
Descent Planning
• Procedures, Checklists,Callouts
PA & PAX Handling
AircraftHandling
Overall Performance & Execution
Captain
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
First Officer
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
12345n/a
Notes
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.___
• _
_ i_._ _ _
_ _._
_'___.___
NS 80395
11-89
SECTION I: PERSONNEL DATA:
Rater ID #
Date: Month Year
Number of previous CRM seminars? Capt. __ F/O
Number of previous LOFTs? Capt. __ F/O _ S/O
Base: Capt. F/O S/O__Equipment
DELTA AIR LINES CRM EVALUATION SHEET
Rater yr. of birth
(Do NO____Tenter the day)
S/O
Please place a checkmark to identify the crew member(s) and type(s) of training or checking being evaluated,
or Crew Audit
(Line Check Only)
('Line Check Only)
Line Check for Capt. FIO S/O
Number of Takeoffs and Landings observed
Total Amount of time observed
LOFT (2 hr 30 min) followed by training. LOFT #
Captain PC + 45 rain. CRM LOFT with special crew training.
Other trai ni ng (specify type and position)
LOFT #
®
I::)EL.TA
SECTION I1:
I°
.
3.
4.
o
6.
7
8.
9
10.
11.
12.
13.
14
15
16.
17.
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT EVALUATION
Briefing: Thorough, establishes open communications, addresses
coordination, planning, team creation, and anticipates problems
Communications: timely, relevant, complete, and verified
Inquiry/questioning practiced
Assertion/advocacy practiced
Decisions communicated and acknowledged
Crew self-critique of decisions and actions
Concern for accomplishment of tasks at hand
Interpersonal relationships/group climate
Overall vigilance
Preparation and planning for inflight activities
Distractions avoided or prioritized
Workload distributed and communicated
Overall workload
Overall TECH N ICAL proficiency
()verall CREW effectiveness
If Observed:
Management of abnormal or emergency situation
Conflict resolution
(CIRCLE)
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Low 1 2 3 4 5
• Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Poor 1 2 3 4 5
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
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APPENDIX 2 - ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE
ID Code:
Please place your self-assigned NASA ID code above. If you do
not know your code, just attach a piece of paper with your name.
We will replace your name with the code and destroy the paper.
Once all the questionnaires are in, we will destroy the only ID-
to-name list once and for all. Where we use the shorthand
DC-9/MD-88, take that to mean whichever model you currently fly.
If your aircraft or seat assignment changed since you joined the
study last summer, what is your current aircraft and seat? Reply
only if there has been a change.
aircraft seat
I. AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCE
We would like to know your past experience in your company's
turbojet aircraft. Please consider your experlence only art this
comDanY. Place an "X" in the box for each seat on each alrcraft
that you have ever occupied. Do not put flying time.
SEAT
Captain F/O S/O
DC-9 * * * xxxxxxxx *
MD-88 * * * xxxxxxxx *
............ • .......... * .......... * .......... *
B-737 * * * xxxxxxxx *
............ • .......... * .......... * .......... *
B-757/756 * * * _ *
............. • ........... * .......... *---- *
B-727 * * * *
DC-8 * * * *
...... • .......... * .......... * *
L-1011 * * * *
....... . .......... . .......... . ........ ----*
DC-10 * * * *
...... • .......... * .......... * .......... *
B-747 * * * *
....... • --. * .......... * .......... *
Io Which seat in which aircraft did you occupy immediately
before going to DC-9/MD-88 school?
Aircraft Seat
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• Approximate total flying hours at this company (include S/O)
hours
3. Approximate hours DC-9 MD-88
3a. How man[ months has it been since your DC-9/MD-88
transitlon to your present seat?
months
4. What do you consider the most advanced aircraft (with respect
to instrumentation, avionics, automation etc. that you have
flown? Include military or other employers:
ans:
iii!i
5. Do you own a home computer? (Y/N) ans:
6 If yes, what type?
o MD-88 ONLY: Please indicate the approximate number of
autolands you have made (either as PF or PNF) in the last
year (1989).
Number
1 Approximately how many actual Cat II or III approaches have
you made (as PF or PNF) in the last year (1989)?
Cat II ; Cat III (MD-88 only)
• Approximately how many non-precision approaches (as PF or
PNF) have you made in the last year (1989)?
VOR LOC ADF
I0.
If the money and qualit_ of trips were all _n e same, what
would be your first cholce of plane to fly company's
present fleet?
Aircraft:
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II. ATTITUDE-TOWARD-AUTOMATION SCALE
This is a 28-item attitude scale• It is called an "intensity
scale" because.you can indicate not only you r agreement or
disagreement wlth the statements, but the exuen_ to wnlcn you
agree/disagree. Note that the statements can be positively or
negatively stated. The scale is straight-forward -- there is no
attempt to be "tricky."
Answer all questions based on your present aircraft• That is, if
you now fly the MD-88, but once flew the DC-9, answer as an MD-88
pilot• Where we use the shorthand "DC-9/MD-88", we mean
whichever one you are currently flying.
For the purpose of these questions, consider the word
"automation" to mean autopilots, autothrottles, flight directors
etc. in the DC-9; and in the MD-88, the more advanced flight
guidance and controls as well.
l•
2.
•
•
•
.
7.
8.
•
i0.
Ii.
12.
13.
14.
Flying today is more challenging than ever.
I take active measures to prevent a loss of my flying skills
due to too much automation.
The DC-9/MD-88 automation works great in today's ATC
environment.
It is important to me to fly the most modern plane in my
company's fleet.
As I look at aircraft today, I think they've gone too far
with automation.
I always know what mode the automation is in.
I use the automation mainly because my company wants me to.
In a highly automated plane, you run the risk of loss
of basic flying skills•
Automation frees me of much of the routine, mechanical parts
of flying so I can concentrate on "managing" the flight•
I am not concerned about making errors, as long as we follow
procedures and checklists.
I look forward to more automation - the more the better.
I have no trouble staying "ahead of the plane".
CRM training is more important for two-pilot than three-
pilot crews•
Automation does not reduce total workload.
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17.
18.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
It is easy to bust an altitude in today's environment.
Flying the DC-9/MD-88 in congested terminal areas such as
Washington and New York is not particularly difficult.
Training for the DC-9/MD-88 was as adequate as any training
that I have had.
I am concerned about the reliability of some of the
automation equipment.
I prefer the two-pilot cockpit to the three-pilot operation.
I am concerned about the lack of time to look outside the
cockpit for other aircraft.
I use automation mainly because it helps me get the job
done.
Our CRM training has been helpful to me.
Some times I feel more like a "button pusher" than a pilot.
There are still modes and features of the DC-9/MD-88
automation that I don't understand.
There is too much workload below I0,000 feet and in the
terminal areas.
In the DC-9/MD-88, it is easy for the captain to supervise
the first officer.
Autoland capability enhances safety.
Electronic flight instruments ("glass cockpits") are a big
advance in safety.
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_ _ ............ _ ............ _ ...... _----
......... _ ............ _ • ....... _ ............ _----
_ _ ....... _- _ ....... _----
_ _ ............ _ ............ _ ....... _----
_ _ ............ _ ............ _ ....... _----
_ _ _ _ _OI
......... _............ _............ _............ _ ............ _--
III. OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS
Note: In the original forms sent to the volunteers, space was
allowed between the questions. For brevity this page of the form
has been condensed in this report
Please answer the following questions in your own words.
1. Describe in detail a error which you made, or observed, in
the DC-9/MD-88 that could have led to an incident or
violation. How could it have been avoided? (equipment
desi_? training? crew coordination?)• Please describe
speclfically what occurred•
2. What can you say about crew coordination on the DC-9/MD-88?
What areas of crew coordination/communication need
improvement?
3. What did you think of your training for the DC-9/MD-88? What
topics should receive more/less emphasis? Any comments on
training aids and devices that were used, or needed?
4. Do [ou like the way the DC-9/MD-88 operates in the ATC
envlronment? Please mention things you have trouble with,
and things that work well, in dealing with ATC.
5. What can you say about the overall workload of the DC-9/MD-88
compared to other aircraft you have flown? Include mental
workload, monitoring etc.
6. Please list the features of modes of your aircraft flight
quidance--_-[nstrumentation, and avionics that you like and
dislike.
Like Dislike
•
8
If you have flown both ! traditional and a qlass cock_it
aircraft (MD-88 o5 757/767), please glve--us your inslghts
into the differences between operations in the traditional
and the glass cockpit. (If not, please leave blank)•
Please feel free to add anything else that you think we
should know about the human factors of your flying job.
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APPENDIX 3 - SIGN-UP FORM FOR VOLUNTEERS
Name Capt. or F/O?
Address
City
State ZIP
Home Phone: Area Code ( ) Number
Are you presently an instructor or check airman?
How long have you been flying the MD-88 ? months
Total MD-88 flying time hours
Total flying time (including flight engineer), all company
aircraft: hours
Make up an ID code for yourself and enter it below. Use any
combination of letters and numbers (up to a max of 6). Do not
use your Social Security or company pay number, birth date, etc.
Insert it in the blank below. The last two positions are for our
use. The last indicates aircraft type (DC-9 vs. MD-88). In the
next-to-last, insert "i" if you are a captain, "2" if you are a
first officer.
The red sticker is for you. Please enter your full eight-
character ID and keep it some place convenlent. We suggest a log
book or Jep manual. If you have questions, please call the
Project Director or your Safety Committee.
Your ID code:
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APPENDIX 4 - DELTA AIR LINES AUTOMATION PHILOSOPHY STATEMENT
The word "Automation", where it appears in this statement, shall
mean the replacement of human function, either manual or
cognitive, with a machine function. This definition applies to
all levels of automation in all airplanes flown by this airline.
The purpose of automation is to aid the pllot is doing his or net
job.
The pilot is the most complex, capable and flexible component of
the air transport system, and as such is best suited to determine
the optimal use of resources in any given situation.
Pilots must be proficient in operating their airplanes in all
levels.of automation. They must be knowledge ab.le in the
selectlon of the approprlate degree of automation, and must have
the skills needed to move from one level of automation to
another.
Automation should be used at the level most appropriate to
enhance the priorities of Safety, Passenger Comfort, Public
Relations, Schedule, and Economy, as stated in the Flight
Operations Policy Manual.
In order to achieve the above priorities, all Delta Air Lines
training programs, training devices, procedures, checklists,
aircraft and equipment acquisitions, manuals, quality control
programs, standardization, supporting documents, and the day-to-
day operations of Delta aircraft shall be in accordance with this
statement of philosophy.
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APPENDIX 5 - PREVIEW OF VOLUMES II, III AND IV
Listed below is a brief descriptions of forthcoming volumes of
this project. Expected publication date is mid to late 1992.
VOLUME II (Everett Palmer, Editor)
This volume will consist of two parts:
i. An extension of the analyses of crew error made during the
LOFT flights.
2. An examination of the procedures as carried out by the LOFT
crews, and an analysis of workloadpeaks.
VOLUME III (Barbara G. Kanki, Editor)
Volumes I and II are concerned with flight crew performance, and
the relationship between performance and level of automation. In
contrast, Volume III deals with group processes, or the means by
which flight crew performance is achieved. We may think of level
of automation as an input variable, and crew performance as an
output variable; Volumes I and II attempt to express output as a
function of input. Group process variables may be thought of as
mediators between input and output. Mediating processes describe
the strategies or behavior styles which differentiate among
performances and typically involve communication pattern, s which
are analyzed as dynamic, interac_Ing sequences or menavlor or
flight crew member. Volume III will chart this mediation
actlvity b[ a detailed analysis of crew communications from the
LOFT exerclses. It will ex]_lore other group processes related to
communication skills, decislon making, problem solving, and
training countermeasures associated with effective crew
performance.
VOLUME IV (Earl L. Wiener, Editor)
Volume IV will be an executive summary of the three previous
volumes. It will highlight the findings, implications, and
applications of the study. It will be relatlvely brief, and will
be able to serve as a stand-alone summary of the study.
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